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ABSTRACT
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF POLITICAL PARTIES
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M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Jerome

M.

Mileur

American political parties, throughout their history,
have functioned as central institutions of governance and
democracy. While their legislative and policy making role

remains vital today, their identity as a link between

citizens and government has changed markedly in this
century. A major reason for their shifting electoral role
has been the emergence of state governments as active

regulators of the political process in the Progressive Era.
Since the late 1960's, the U.S. Supreme Court has

adjudicated a series of disputes involving this legalized
electoral environment, becoming in the process a major

interpreter of the legal status of political parties. The
absence of any reference to parties in the text of the

Constitution has given the justices of the Court
significant authority in structuring the constitutional
status of parties. The dissertation examines the ideas

which have guided the exercise of that authority, and
explores their implications for the American party system
and American democracy.

v

Analysis of Court opinions involving ballot access,

party organization\nomination procedures, campaign finance,
and patronage reveals two opposing schools of thought among
the justices of the Court. One viewpoint envisions politics
as a "natural order" nurtured by wide party competition and

access to the electoral arena, and perverted by many state
regulations. A contrasting vision sees politics as a

"constructed order" nurtured by stable party competition
and best preserved by state regulation. These differing
ideas of party politics are reflected in the justices'

conceptions of political competition and choice, party
structure and functions, judicial standards of review, and
the proper role of government in the electoral process.

The political implications of these contending

viewpoints extend beyond the purely judicial realm, shaping
the future of the American electoral system and efforts to

build stronger parties. An analysis of these schools of
thought using a set of "strong party\responsible party"

attributes concludes that, while the "natural order" offers

parties some increase in autonomy, neither viewpoint offers
a clear road to stronger parties.

The quest for party

renewal must ultimately be as political as it has been
judicial.

In addition,

these opinions reflects a broader,

continuing debate over whether democracy is best understood
as expression

(access,

competition)

or governance

(legislative representation, stability)

vi
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION- POLITICAL PARTIES, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
CHARACTER OF AMERICAN POLITICS
The Legal Status of Parties: Contested Institutions

Since their inception, political parties have played
an important role in American politics and government,

structuring the electoral process and the legislative
branch,

as well as serving as a source of policy ideas and

political appointees. Unlike the legislature, executive,
and judiciary, however, parties were not included in the

governmental design of the Constitution; they have evolved
out of the pressures of politics, without any explicit

constitutional guidelines or pedigree. As a result, issues
of party structure and electoral procedures have elicited

ongoing debate among politicians, legislators, and judges,
as well as political scientists; the changing legal status
of parties reflects this lack of a clear constitutional

framework. This dissertation analyzes these debates about

parties and the electoral process by examining the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court,

the most important

modern interpreter of the parties' legal status.
The legal status of parties in the U.S. began in some

uncertainty, as noted above, in their absence from the

nation's founding document. The Constitution is silent on
their role in the legal structure of the government. The

absence of parties may be characterized not simply as an
oversight, but as a "hostile silence",

1

if one examines the

views of party held by many of the Constitution's
authors.

1

As a result,

the first parties evolved outside

the constitutional structure and were,

for the most part,

unknown to the law until the latter part of the nineteenth
century. With regard to electoral procedures, only voter

registration came under the purview of state laws, and such
laws were largely confined to the New England states until
the second half of the nineteenth century. 2

The absence of legal regulation of parties during most
of the nineteenth century can be explained in part by their

dominance in the political system. Joel Silbey has

characterized the period from the 1830 's to the 1890 's as
the "party era" in American politics, a time when partisan

imperatives controlled and shaped political action.

3

Many

of the party organizations during this era were themselves

dominated by small groups of individuals, who controlled

On the views of parties held by the Founders, see
Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party Syst em: The Rise of
Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 17 80-1840
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,
1

1969)

.

Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, Democracy And
The American Party System (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956)
history
p. 319. For a detailed treatment of registration
Harris,
P.
through the Progressive Era, see Joseph
Registration of Voters In The United States (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution, 1929)
2

,

Joel H. Silbey, "The Rise and Fall of American
Political Parties, 1790-1993", in The Parties Respond:
L.
Changes In American Parties And Ca mpaigns, 2nd ed., ed.3-18.
Sandy Maisel (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. H
Joel
For a fuller presentation of this argument, see
838-1893 (Stanford:
Silbey, ThP American Political Nation, 1
Stanford University Press, 1991)
3

the distribution of patronage jobs and the selection of

party candidates for office. Particularly after the Civil
War,

many of these party organizations developed into

political "machines" which effectively managed the politics
of their locality or state,

resulting in extensive graft,

vote fraud and other corrupt practices. This corruption was
the subject of increasing protest in the last decades of
the nineteenth century,

calling the legitimacy of this

party-dominated political process into question.

4

These protests against "machine" corruption soon bore
fruit; the vacuum of government oversight of parties was

filled by extensive state regulation of parties and many of
their electoral activities, especially during the

Progressive era early in the twentieth century.

5

Among the

reforms instituted were the secret ballot, the direct
primary, party organization and registration statutes,

civil service reform and corrupt practices acts. These

regulations occurred mainly at the state level

(civil

service and corrupt practices laws were enacted at the
federal level) and were treated as questions of policy,

For a broad historical background on "machines" and
political "bosses", see Alexander B. Callow, Jr., ed., The
City Boss In America: An Interpret ive Reader (New York:
Silbey, Political Nation
Oxford University Press, 1976)
4

.

;

See in particular Leon Epstein, "Parties As Public
Utilities", chap. 6 in Politica] Parties In The American
Mold (Madison: University Of Wisconsin Press, 1986)
5

3

rather than as constitutional issues.

6

While these

regulations did not always achieve their desired effects,
their lasting impact has been profound: they made

governments an active and important participant in the
structuring of partisan politics and the electoral process.
As with many other contentious political issues,

the

status of parties and electoral procedures, and the role of

government in electoral and party affairs, have become
judicial issues as well. Since the late 1960's, a series of
U.S.

Supreme Court opinions has frequently overturned, and

occasionally upheld, statutes governing ballot access,
party organization, primaries, and campaign finance; the

practice of patronage has also been dramatically limited.

Grounding their opinions in the individual rights to vote
and to associate, derived from the First, Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the justices have
carved out constitutional protection for party activities,

while preserving a continuing role for government in the

electoral process
As a result of their opinions on party and electoral

disputes,

the justices of the Court have become major

interpreters of the legal status of parties, establishing a
At this point in time, the constitutional guarantees
had
of free speech and association in the Bill of Rights
by
yet to be applied to the states through "incorporation"
guarantees
means of the Fourteenth Amendment. Free speech
York 268
were first applied to the states in Git low v. New
and the freedom of association was not
U S 652 (1925)
decision
clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court until its
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
-in NAACP v.
6

,

,

significant degree of constitutional protection for party
autonomy. Like the politicians,
them,

however,

judges,

and thinkers before

the justices have no indisputable

constitutional role for parties on which they can base
their decisions. While the First and Fourteenth Amendment

guarantee of associational freedom, the Fifteenth Amendment
guarantee of the right to vote, and the Tenth Amendment

protection of state government powers do establish
significant parameters for the justices, the complexity of
the resulting jurisprudence in these areas reflects the

degree to which the justices shape the character of these

broad guarantees in their application to specific issues.
Most importantly, none of these constitutional guarantees

enshrine explicit roles for parties as institutions in the

political process.
Faced with statutes and constitutional provisions

whose meaning is often subject to interpretation, and

a

lack of a clear "place" for parties in the constitutional
system,

the justices must rely in part on their own

judgments about the structure of parties and electoral

procedures in a democratic system, a reliance which
subjects parties to a "continuous founding". While

precedent will build up weight, it may be contested, and
the continuing role of state authority over parties and

elections guarantees that future legislative and judicial
arguments over the nature of parties and the political

process are not foreclosed.
5

This absence of firm constitutional guidelines on

parties creates a continuing opportunity for judicial
interpretation. This dissertation explores judicial

interpretations of parties and the electoral process
through a critical analysis of U.S. Supreme Court opinions
in party and election disputes. The goal of the analysis is

not to attempt causal explanations of particular decisions,

on the model of judicial behavior studies, but instead to

explicate the understandings of parties and the electoral
process contained in the Justices' discourse, their "giving
of reasons" for their decisions.

7

In addition,

judging

various regulations of parties and the electoral process

within the parameters of constitutional guarantees of

association and voting

(as well as

statutory law) creates

an opportunity for the justices to consider broader

questions about the nature of democracy

.

Supreme Court opinions are useful in understanding
such debates about parties, the electoral process, and the

nature of democracy because, practically, they represent
the voice of a defining institution of American democracy.

They are the Constitution's view of our parties and of our

For an example of judicial behavior studies, see
Studies In U.S.
Harold J. Spaeth and Saul Brenner, eds
Supreme Court Behavior (New York: Garland Publishing,
1990) The approach used here is derived from a broader
study of liberal ideas in the Court's jurisprudence by La
Roqers M Smith, Liberalism and Ame rican Constitutional is
author
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). The
indebted to the model
7

.

6

,

electoral system as seen by the Court.
of interest because they are,

8

The opinions are

as one scholar put it,

"a

relatively untapped mine of American political thought". 9
In addition to majority opinions,

this dissertation also

focuses on dissenting and concurring opinions, despite the
fact such opinions do not carry large weight in legal

precedent. From an analytical standpoint, however, these
"minority" opinions are particularly relevant in tracing

conflicting currents of thought among the justices.
An analysis of the constitutional understandings of

parties enunciated by the Supreme Court, while valuable in
itself,

needs to be placed in context in order to evaluate

its implications for the political system as a whole. This

dissertation critiques these constitutional understandings
from an institutional perspective, employing a group of
"strong party attributes" as evaluative criteria. These

interrelated attributes, which consist of
of citizens and government,

(2)

(1)

the linkage

the contesting of

The ideas are not necessarily the personal views of
the justices, but their interpretation of the Constitution
on the matters at hand. Justice Potter Stewart expresses
this distinction in his dissent in Williams v. Rhodes, 393
Stewart puts it thusly: "It is thought by a
U.S. 23 (1968)
great many people that the entire electoral college system
of presidential selection set up by the Constitution is an
anachronism in need of major overhaul [footnote omitted]
As a citizen I happen to share that view. But thi s Court
must follow the Constitution as it is written..." (emphasis
mine). Williams 393 U.S. at 61 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8

.

.

,

Political Thought And The
American Judiciary (Amherst: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1993)
p. xi
9

H L

Polhman,

ed.,

,

7

elections,
(4)

(3)

the management of political conflict, and

the guidance of government and public policy,

are

derived from the literature on parties, particularly from
the work of Larry Sabato and James Ceaser. 10 The justices'

understandings will also be evaluated in light of the
"responsible party" model, a particularly important variant
of the more general "strong party" model.

11

The remainder of this chapter explains the

methodological approach and likely theoretical and
practical significance of the dissertation, and concludes
by reviewing the existing literature on the legal status of
parties. Chapters 2-5 analyze the justices' opinions in

ballot access, party organization/nominating procedures,

campaign finance, and patronage cases, examining particular
elements of the electoral system. The concluding chapter
reviews the findings and explores their implications for
the jurisprudence of the Court,

parties,

the future shape of

and American electoral politics.

Larry J. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun: Shaping
Political Parties For America's Future (Glenview, IL: Scott
and James Ceaser, Reforming The Reforms-. A
Foresman, 1988)
Critical Analysis Of The Presidential Sel ection Process
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1982).
10

,

The "responsible party" model has a much greater
concern with the programmatic function of parties. For
analyses of the multifaceted nature and active history of
Ranney, The
the "responsible party" perspective, see Austin
and
Doctrine of Responsible Pa rt y Government: I ts Origins
Present State (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962);
Challenges
John Kenneth White and Jerome M. Mileur, eds
Illinois
Southern
To Party Government (Carbondale:
University Press, 1992)
11

.

8

,

Methodology of the Study
The methodological approach employed in this

dissertation is textual analysis of Supreme Court opinions
and related documentary evidence in party-related cases

before the Court. The analysis focuses on the justices'

understandings of three important issues in the electoral
process: the scope of political competition and voter
choice, particularly among parties; the functions and

structure of parties; and the role of government in

structuring the parties and the electoral system. The
analysis also examines the standards of review adopted in
these cases, as the choice of a review standard can be

closely related to, and strongly affect, the substantive
concerns of a judicial decision. Standards of review

represent the level of scrutiny that judges will employ in

evaluating the constitutionality of government or private
actions,

and range along a spectrum, based on the level of

justification required for the action at issue to be judged
constitutional
In broad terms,

at one end of this spectrum is the

"strict scrutiny" standard, which requires that governments
show a "compelling state interest" to be at stake in the

actions at issue. This standard was first clearly

enunciated by the Court in NAACP

v.

Alabama

12
.

At the

NAACP 357 U.S. 449 (1958). This standard is most
consistently 'used by the modern Court when a "suspect
classification" (such as race) is implicated
classification is
particular statute or action; when such a
12

,

ma

other end of the spectrum is the "minimal scrutiny"
standard, which requires only that government show a

reasonable and legitimate purpose for its actions and
statutes. Both of these standards often employ a balancing

approach to adjudicate between the constitutional rights
and governmental interests involved.

The standards chosen by particular justices in the
cases examined here frequently reflect each justice's

attitude toward government action in the electoral process.
Two groupings of justices are found:

(1)

"natural order"

justices, who are generally suspicious of government action
in the electoral process,

typically employ a "strict

scrutiny" standard of review, and demand strong

justification for government intrusions on constitutional
rights; and

(2)

"constructed order" justices, who generally

give government greater leeway in the electoral process,

and usually hold governments to the milder "minimal
scrutiny" standard or give their interests greater weight

under the "strict scrutiny" standard. The standards used by
the justices are very much intertwined with their

substantive positions in this area of the law.

involved, the statute is frequently found to be
"invidiously discriminatory". As the cases here will
demonstrate, however, the presence of such a classification
rights
is not necessary to trigger "strict scrutiny"; other
as
such
in a "preferred position" under the Constitution,
from
First Amendment guarantees, often draw such scrutiny
the Justices. The "preferred position" of certain
constitutional rights was first enunciated by Justice
in United
Harlan Fisk Stone in the famous "Footnote Four"
(1938).
States v. Carolene Products Company 304 U.S. 144
,

10

The issues noted above are chosen for the range of

questions they raise. They encompass the major dilemmas

with which the justices must wrestle and provide a wide yet
focused observational guide to the territory of the Court's
opinions. This analysis should clarify how the justices

understand parties and the electoral process, going beyond
the legal standards of "freedom of association" and

"compelling state interest" to underlying policy positions
and arguments

13
.

The first issue considered, the scope of political

competition and voter choice, involves the nature of
democracy. How far should party competition be encouraged?

How much voter choice should be promoted? What is the
connection,

if any,

between statutory structures and the

scope of party competition and voter choice? These are

ultimately questions about the scope of democracy.
The second issue, the functions of parties,

involves

the structure of electoral democracy. Who should parties

represent in the political process? What viewpoints should
they represent? Should democracy be within, as well as
between,

the parties? Should parties play an important rol

in nominating candidates,

or in supplying government

personnel? These considerations involve the role of partie

An interesting and recent example of how the
Court's opinions can be fruitfully analyzed for deeper
philosophical positions and arguments is Andrew Stark,
"Corporate Electoral Activity, Constitutional Discourse,
and Conceptions of the Individual", American Political
Science Review 86 (September 1992): 626-37.
13

11

m

structuring a democratic electoral process and

democratic governance.
The third issue,

the proper role of government in

managing the electoral process, involves questions of
authority and who should govern the structure of politics.
Should the state have wide ranging legal authority to
structure the process? Or should the state intervene only
to prevent blatant discrimination? These

questions embody

concerns about the state's role in promoting electoral
order and stability.
The final issue, the choice and application of

judicial standards used to evaluate these cases, sheds
light on the justices' viewpoints about the more

substantive issues. What standards should the state
statutes,

or party challenges, have to meet? While this

seems like an internal and legalistic dilemma,

the choices

made have a profound impact on the issues at hand, because

whoever is given the heavier burden of proof (or the
benefit of the doubt) by these standards is placed at a
significant disadvantage (or advantage)
The broader concern driving this dissertation is that
the interpretations of the justices influence the strength
or weakness of parties as institutions. Efforts to

strengthen political parties have been frequent and
contentious in political science over the last fifty years;
one need only refer to the 1950 APSA report Towards A More

Responsible Two Party System

,

the controversy that
12

surrounded it, and the continuing desire of more recent
scholars to "renew" political parties. 14 While this
"strong-party" argument is by no means the only view of

parties among political scientists, it is taken as

a

yardstick of evaluation because it has set the terms of
debate over parties and electoral politics. With the
frequent laments over the current state of parties and

electoral politics more generally, it is appropriate to

consider how the justices' interpretations support or

hinder the objective of stronger parties. 15
The need for stronger political parties has been

contested in both political science scholarship and
practical politics for decades, yet the views of the
justices on these matters have only begun to be explored in
To understand the justices'

a systematic way.

interpretations in this wider institutional context, they
are critiqued using a series of "strong party attributes"

American Political Science Association (APSA)
Committee On Political Parties, Towards A More Responsible
Two Party System (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1950). For a
series of contemporary views on party government, see White
Challenges Some notable third party
and Mileur, eds
efforts in this century, particularly the Progressive
campaigns of 1912, 1924 and 1948, can also be characterized
as efforts to build new parties in response to the
perceived weaknesses of the Republican and Democratic
parties
14

.

.

,

.

Two prominent examples of this pessimistic view of
Hate
parties and elections are E.J. Dionne, Why Americans
Benjamin
and
1991),
Schuster,
Politics (New York: Simon and
The
Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics By Other Means
York:
(New
America
inns
In
Declining Importance Of Elect
Basic Books, 1990)
15

:

.

13

as evaluative criteria. These attributes are derived from

literature on parties, particularly the work of James
Ceaser and Larry Sabato. The four attributes that concern
us,

and some of the questions they raise for those

attempting to assess their condition, are as follows-.
The Linkage of Citizens and Government
A. How open are parties to citizen
participation?
B. Do citizens have incentives for supporting
parties?
C. Are parties accountable to the public?
D. Is the electoral process seen as
legitimate?
II. The Contesting of Elections
A. What choice of candidates do the parties
provide?
B. Are parties competitive in contesting
elections?
C. Do parties have sufficient resources to
nominate candidates, place them on the
ballot, and aid their campaigns
financially?
III. The Management of Political Conflict
A. Do the parties successfully aggregate
differing political interests?
B. Do the parties enable needed political
change?
IV. The Guidance of Government And Public Policy
A. Do the parties offer policy platforms?
B. Are these positions promoted by the elected
officeholders of the party?
C. Do parties staff and guide the government?

I.

These attributes of linkage, contesting of elections,
conflict management, and governance focus the

dissertation's broader critique, as they cover the broad
themes of democracy, stability and governing capacity that
are at the heart of any effort to evaluate the existing

democratic system or the parties within such a system.
The interpretations of the justices are also critiqued

from the perspective of the "responsible party" model, an
14

important variant of the "strong party" model. Those
who

advocate for "responsible parties" believe that parties
should take clear and differentiated policy stances,

nominate candidates who share those stances, and work to
enact those policies when their nominees are elected to
office.

In sum,

they believe that the primary function of

parties should be programmatic and governance -oriented, not
simply electoral. As the dissertation reveals, some

justices appear to share this concern with the policy

function of parties.

With regard to the method of analysis, the author

believes textual analysis is the most appropriate method to
use,

since the dissertation deals with an institutional

body where words and ideas are central to its work and are
its lingua franca

.

As Rogers M. Smith has noted,

while legal discourse is produced by distinctively
socialized elites, it expresses significant strains in
American political thought as a whole, if for no other
reason than that judicial decision-making both
reflects and structures broader political and economic
activit ies
the behavior of political actors, and of
the institutions they construct and participate in, is
influenced in part by the nature and adequacy of the
ideas they possess, and the basic ideas of a given
period and group often have a discernible structure,
which may be articulated in revealing fashion by the
political writers of the day. 16
.

.

.

The central contention of the dissertation is that the

Court has experienced an ongoing internal debate about the

nature and structure of electoral democracy, a debate that
is driven by different understandings of the purposes of

16

Smith,

Liberalism

,

p.

6.
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parties and the electoral process. The question of what

institution (parties or government) should have the

authority to define the nature and structure of electoral

democracy is also contested by the justices of the Court.
One school of thought, which is here called the "natural
order",

emphasizes the importance of party competition and

citizen participation, and values the programmatic function
of parties,

all of which are seen as natural phenomena that

are only impeded by government statutes. In this view, a

widely diverse, competitive multiparty system is seen as
natural,

an innate quality of politics that is disturbed by

the artifice of statute.

17

The opposing school of thought,

called here the "constructed order", emphasizes the

effectiveness of the major parties and values their
electoral function, which government is seen as preserving
by its statutory framework. In this view, the current party

system is seen as the evolutionary product of the

democratic political process addressing legitimate
political needs, an historical construction of legislative

politics that should be respected and protected.
The dissertation finds that these two "schools of
thought" have been consistently championed by particular
justices,

and that these justices have thereby played a

This view is similar to James Madison' s argument
that competition between numerous interests is a natural
James
part of politics, particularly in a large republic.
James
Hamilton,
Madison, Essay Number 10, in Alexander
(Chicago:
Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers
49-53.
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), pp.
17

major role in shaping the evolution of the Court's view in
this area.

It also finds that the justices are divided not

only in their understanding of parties and electoral
politics, but also with regard to the nature of democratic

politics in a federal system. The justices' positions in
the cases reflect differing visions of the nature of

American federalism, the "natural order" giving more
deference to national interests and the "constructed order"
favoring the interests of the states. These divisions are
sometimes moderated, but are consistently present in the
long run. The continuation of these coherent, but

frequently divergent, perspectives on the Court bespeaks

continued uncertainty in the constitutional jurisprudence
of parties,

elections and democracy. This is not, however,

uncertainty born of directionless confusion, but of clear
division among the justices. 18

Significance: Why Examine the Justices' Views?

The study of judicial interpretations regarding

political parties and the electoral process offers
theoretical and practical insights of interest to students
of parties,

public law, and American politics generally.

The distinction is an important one. Two clear
perspectives implies a shifting "balance of power" between
them; potential litigants, politicians, and the public can,
by analyzing the justices' views, perceive with some
certainty which holds the balance at a particular time. A
Court without direction, on the other hand, will leave
the
those who will be affected by its rulings wandering
wilderness, unsure of what to expect next.
18

m
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The main contribution of this dissertation lies in its

exploration of how justices of the Supreme Court understand
the purposes of parties and the structure of electoral

politics, knowledge which will provide deeper insight into

how the Court is likely to react to parties in the future
(and view changes in the structure and fortunes of

parties)

.

As Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley note,

"it

is... an intriguing and important enterprise for us to come

to understand the way our least political branch of

government has treated our most political entities". 19
Improving our understanding of the justices'

interpretations is made more significant by the growing
role and authority of the Court in this area of the law.

Even though the Court has returned authority to the
parties, and thus reduced state authority,

it is the Court

itself which has taken on the most new authority and

involvement

.

The Court has now become a third active and

important shaper of parties and the electoral process in
our system, and scholarship needs to examine how the

justices view these institutions. In addition,

understanding the deeper arguments about the purpose of
parties and their role in American governance yields a more
useful and powerful understanding of the legal status of

Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley, "On the Treatment
Journal
of Political Parties in the U.S. Supreme Court",
Politics 52 (May 1990): 414.
19

18

American parties than would a simple descriptive analysis
of the Court's decisions.

This dissertation also adds another level to our

understanding of the modern "administrative state" that
helped to produce much of modern party regulation. Sidney
Milkis argues that President Franklin Roosevelt undercut
the role of parties as part of his drive to transcend

politics and expand "national administrative
capacities". 20 This type of national managerialism carries
a

propensity to work against the authority of state

governments and to encourage the kind of conflicts

witnessed in many of the parties cases. The justices' views
in these cases helps us to comprehend one facet of their

understanding of the "administrative state"
Finally,

there are important practical insights to be

drawn from this dissertation. A deeper analysis of how one

major institution of American governance (parties and the
electoral system) has been understood and influenced by

another (the Supreme Court) is valuable in and of itself,
but it also yields many collateral insights that are

relevant to the practical debates over the health of

political parties in the 1990'

s.

Although party

Sidney M. Milkis, "Programmatic Liberalism and
Party Politics: The New Deal Legacy and the Doctrine of
Responsible Party Government", in White and Mileur, eds
Challenges pp. 104-132. This theme is treated more fully
in Milkis, The President And The Parties: The
New
Transformation Of Tdp American Party Svsf-pm Since The
1993)
Deal (New York: Oxford University Press,
20

,

,
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institutions have adapted to the modern realities of
"candidate-centered" politics by becoming highly effective

resource and service providers, their power is strongly

circumscribed by the direct primary and other Progressive
Era reforms that remain in place, and public attitudes

toward the major parties continue to be skeptical or
dismissive. 21 The dissatisfaction with the Republicans and

Democrats is most notably reflected in the number of
significant third party presidential candidates in recent
decades. 22 This mix of successful adaptation, continued

limitation, public dissatisfaction and third party

challenges has provoked many of the disputes heard by the
justices,

and their decisions have in turn shaped the

evolution of these phenomena. 23 A better understanding of
the justices' views will help us to chart their current and

future impact on the evolution of parties and the American

electoral system.

On the successful adaptations of modern parties,
F. Bibby, "State Party Organizations: Coping and
John
see
Adapting", and Paul S. Herrnson, "The Revitalization of
National Party Organizations", in Maisel, The Parties
Respond pp. 21-44 and 45-68. On the continuing legal
limits facing parties and public dissatisfaction with
parties, see Silbey, "Rise and Fall", 3-18.
21

,

George Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, and
Ross Perot in 1992.
22

The justices' decisions have been particularly
proce;
important, for example, in easing the ballot access
the
see
candidates;
for third party presidential
the
description of the Williams and Anderson decisions in
literature review.
23

20

Literature Review
Since the late 1960's, the justices of the Court have

handed down opinions in a wide range of disputes involving
parties and the electoral process. They have ruled on the

constitutionality of various filing fees, signature
requirements, ballot access deadlines, primary voting
statutes, delegate selection procedures, campaign finance

regulations, and patronage practices. While most of these

decisions will be examined in depth in the following
chapters,

a brief sketch of some of the leading opinions

will help to place the literature review which follows in
context, by providing a glimpse of the general direction of
the majority decisions and the standards of review they

employ

24

One of the earliest decisions by the justices in this

area was Williams v. Rhodes

,

decided in 1968. George

Wallace's independent campaign for the presidency brought
suit against Ohio's ballot access laws,

claiming that the

early filing requirements and the organizational

requirements imposed on minor parties violated the freedom
of association of his supporters. The majority of justices,

employing a "strict scrutiny" standard of review, found
that the Ohio regulations did infringe on the freedom of

association of Wallace and his supporters (without a
sufficiently compelling state interest) and invalidated the

Synopses of other cases are provided in the
literature review, as needed.
24

21

law. They made particular note of how the major parties

were advantaged by such statutes. 25 At least at the

presidential level, the justices began to open up access to
the electoral arena for minor parties.
In 1975,

the justices took on the question of whether

Illinois could compel the national Democratic Party to seat

delegates at its 1972 convention who were chosen by

procedures established in Illinois law instead of those of
the Democratic Party.

In their Cousins v. Wigoda opinion,

the majority ruled that the national Democratic Party has

the right to decide how delegates to its convention are
chosen,

and refused to seat the delegates chosen by

Illinois-specified procedures. Employing a "strict
scrutiny" standard of review, the justices began to provide

greater freedom for parties to structure their nomination

processes

26

This party freedom was strengthened in 1981 by the

majority opinion in Democratic Party of the United States
v.

Wisconsin ex rel La Follette

,

usually referred to as the

La Follette decision. The national Democratic Party brought

suit against Wisconsin's "open primary law" in an effort to

enforce Party Rule 2A, which mandated that all bound

delegates to the Democratic National Convention be chosen
in primaries open only to Democratic voters. The majority

25

26

Williams

,

393 U.S.

Cousins v. Wigoda

,

23

(1968).

419 U.S. 477
22

(1975).

ruled in favor of the Party, on the grounds that the state
cannot restrict the national Party's freedom of association
in the absence of a compelling state interest. 27 La

Follette employs a "balancing of interests" standard of
review that is somewhat more moderate than "strict
scrutiny"
The justices revisited the issue of ballot access,

in

particular for third party presidential candidates, in
their 1983 opinion in Anderson v. Celebrezze

.

The 1980

independent presidential campaign of John Anderson brought
suit against Ohio's early filing deadline, on the grounds

that it limited the freedom of voters to associate with

Anderson. Employing a combination of "strict scrutiny" and
a three part

"balancing test" as a standard of review, the

majority opinion invalidated the Ohio law. 28 Once again,
the justices'

ruling invalidated barriers to minor party

access to the ballot.
The freedom of parties to structure their own

nominating procedures was reaffirmed in the 1986 majority
opinion in Tashi ian

v.

Republican Party of Connecticut

.

The

Connecticut Republican Party's 1984 effort to open some of
its primary contests to unaffiliated voters was opposed by

the State of Connecticut, which had a law mandating that
The
all primaries be open only to registered party members.

" Democratic Party of the Unit ed States
ex rel La Follette
28

Anderson

v.

,

450 U.S.

107

Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780
23

v.

Wisconsin

(1981).
(1983).

majority of justices ruled in favor of the Republican
effort,

thereby overruling the state law, using a "strict

scrutiny" standard of review. 29 While this was a closely

divided decision (5-4)

,

it reenforced the justices'

direction in Cousins and La Follette

.

As the above highlights suggest,

the general direction

of the majority of justices has been toward expanding the

ability of parties to structure their own affairs,

especially nominating procedures, as well as toward
expanding the ability of minor party presidential
candidates to have access to the ballot. While the

dissertation and some of the literature reviewed below note
that the justices' overall jurisprudence is more mixed in

terms of its impact on parties, the general direction of
the majority in recent decades has expanded the rights of

major and minor parties. In so doing, the majority of their
opinions have employed a combination of "strict scrutiny"
and "balancing of interests" standards of review to protect

party freedom of association.
Most of the scholarly literature on the legal status
of parties and the Supreme Court has appeared in law

reviews,

and is complemented by a small but active

political science literature on the topic. This literature
is characterized by three major approaches which,

though

not mutually exclusive, have fairly distinctive concerns.

29

U.S

.

Tashiian v.

208

Reoub.i

-i

r^n Party of Connecticut,

(1986)
24
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The most common approach is analysis of the legal standards
and doctrines employed by the justices. A second focuses

upon the legal and political impacts of the justices'
decisions. The third and least common approach attempts to

place the justices' decisions in larger historical or
theoretical perspectives. The findings of each of these

approaches are examined in turn in this section; the

historical/theoretical is most relevant to the approach of
this dissertation.

Legal Analysis

The major focus of scholars using the legal analysis

approach to the justices' decisions is the doctrine of
freedom of association as applied to parties. Their views
on the use of this doctrine by the justices can be divided

into three types of "responses" to the justices'

jurisprudence:
modification,
and

(3)

approval with friendly proposals for

(1)

(2)

qualified approval with some misgivings,

strong disapproval. While many prod the justices on

particular points, most of these scholars approve of the
Court's general direction; strong dissent is in the

scholarly minority.
Stephen Gottlieb offers one of the most positive views
of freedom of association. Gottlieb examines the legal

status of parties,

including the Tashiian case and a

California dispute that later reached the Court, and argues
for a continued expansion of the party freedom of

association defended by the justices. 30 He does, however,
call for the justices to shift their standard of review

from "balancing of interests" to identifying the most

appropriate decisionmaker, which Gottlieb sees as the
critical issue in these disputes. Citing political science

literature on the probable corruptions of the legislative
branch, he argues that the justices provide a service by

defending the party's right to decide how they should
organize themselves and nominate their candidates for
office. 31 The question of who should exercise authority

over party affairs is Gottlieb's central concern.

Charles Gardner Geyh,

in an extensive examination of

the La Follette case and its implications, also takes a

positive view of the justices' decisions through La
Follette

Geyh argues that La Follette cannot be understood

.

solely in terms of the "balancing of interests" standard of

review stated by the justices. Instead, the rhetoric of the

opinion reflects as much concern with which "actor"

(the

30

The California dispute involved a challenge by
major party adherents in California to state statutes
specifying a detailed organizational structure for parties
and their procedures, as well as a state ban on preprimary
endorsements. The Supreme Court struck down all of these
statutes in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee 489 U.S. 214 (1989), further reinforcing party
freedom of association.
,

Stephen Gottlieb, "The Courts And Party Reform"
(paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, September
The justices have yet to explicitly adopt the "most
1985)
appropriate decisionmaker" standard noted here, though
analysis of their opinions certainly reveals they are aware
of the question.
31

.
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state of Wisconsin or the national Democratic Party)

is the

best decision maker in the nomination process, and with

national versus state interests, as it does concern for a

traditional balance of interests. He argues that the
Court's stated standard of review is not fully reflective
of its actions,

and should change. 32 Both Geyh and

Gottlieb appear to recognize the justices' deeper arguments
over the level of authority that parties should have over

their own functions.

Andrew Pierce also takes issue, in a supportive way,
with the stated legal standards employed by the justices.
In an examination of the justices'

treatment of issues

related to presidential nominations, Pierce argues that the
Court should explicitly disavow the "political question"

doctrine of noninterference, so as to approach party rights
solely from a freedom of association perspective. He also
contends, based on the opinions of the justices,

that the

use of the "state action" doctrine in relation to

presidential nominations is no longer viable. 33 Pierce

Charles Gardner Geyh, "It's My Party And I'll Cry
If I Want To: State Intrusions Upon The Associational
Freedoms Of Political Parties - Democratic Party of the
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette " Wisconsin
Law Review 1983: 1 (1983), pp. 211-40.
32

,

The "political question" doctrine had been used in
earlier Court opinions as the main justification for
letting the political process, not the Justices, decide a
dispute. Decisions like Cousins departed from this doctrii
by grounding noninterference in freedom of association;
Pierce is simply urging that departure be made explicit
contrast, the "state action" doctrine had justified
judicial intervention in party affairs in the past, most
33

_
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sees the jurisprudence in this area as a bit unclear,
and
he encourages the justices to adopt freedom of
associatior
as the uniform standard of decision in the future. 34

Though he ultimately shares Geyh and Gottleib's concern
with authority, he sees a clear use of freedom of

association as the most appropriate standard for deciding
questions of party and electoral affairs.

Arthur
Pierce's.

M.

Weisburd reaches conclusions similar to

In an examination of Court decisions involving

nominating methods, Weisburd traces the history of the
"state action" doctrine in relation to these disputes and

finds that the Court's use of freedom of association has

essentially negated the doctrine in relation to parties.

Given that demise, freedom of association should provide
parties with wide-ranging freedom in nominating methods,

bringing any existing state restrictions into doubtful
constitutionality. 35 Weisburd, Pierce, Geyh, and Gottlieb
are unified in their general support for the Court's

notably in the "white primary cases" that culminated in
Smith v. Allwright 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Pierce suggests
that, in light of the new freedom of association
precedents, this should also be clearly disavowed. Given
the importance of Smith to issues of racial bias in the
electoral process, however, the doctrine is likely to be
limited rather than fully disavowed.
,

Andrew Pierce, "Regulating Our Mischievous
Factions: Presidential Nominations And The Law", Kentucky
Law Journal 78, no. 2 (1989-90), pp. 311-75.
34

Arthur M Weisburd, " Candidate Making And The
Constitution: Constitutional Restraints On And Protection
Of Party Nominating Methods", Southern California Law
Review 57 (January 1984), pp. 213-81.
35

.
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approach to party autonomy and authority over party affairs
in the Co usins / LaFollette / Tashi ian line of cases.

Julia Guttmann is typical of the second scholarly
response. While she adopts a positive view of freedom of

association,

she is also troubled by the Court's

application of the doctrine. Focusing on decisions
involving primary elections, Guttmann argues that the
courts have yet to articulate a unified doctrine on state

regulation of primaries, and proposes the adoption of a
doctrine of "collective freedom of association" to fill
that gap. She argues further that the Court's current

approach to deciding cases in this area, most specifically
the LaFollette case, virtually guarantees that freedom of

association claims will always be successful against
competing claims of compelling state interests, and that
the justices have taken freedom of association too far in

this approach. Like the scholars in the first group,

Guttmann contends that the Court should clarify its
standards; unlike them,

she also contends that the

"balance" of freedom of association has shifted too far in

favor of parties. 36 For Guttmann, states still have a role
to play in exercising authority over party affairs.

Brian

L.

Porto similarly takes issue with the Court's

application of freedom of association, specifically the

Julia Guttmann, " Primary Elections And The
Collective Right Of Freedom Of Association", Yale Law
Journal 94 (November 1984), pp. 117-37.
36
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standards applied in ballot access decisions. Focusing on
the ballot access cases decided since Anderson v.

Celebrezze, Porto argues that the Court has been

overprotective of the two party system by applying

a

more

lenient "balancing of interests" standard to these
disputes,

to the detriment of third parties and independent

candidates. 37 He argues that the Court should return to
the clearer "strict scrutiny" standard it enunciated in

Williams v. Rhodes

,

a standard that

would better protect

interests outside the two major parties. Porto's analysis,
like Guttmann's, takes issue with the application of

freedom of association to parties, but Porto argues for
more (rather than less) protection of parties, particularly

minor parties. 38 Unlike the scholars above, Porto's
central concern is with the ability of minor parties to

compete in the political process, rather than with

authority over party affairs.
In addition to nomination and ballot access cases,

the

justices' patronage decisions have also sparked scholarly

As Chapter Two will discuss in detail, many of the
post- Anderson decisions which Porto examines uphold state
regulations and limit ballot access for minor parties and
candidates. Munro v. Socialist Worker's Party 479 U.S. 189
(1986) upholds a Washington State requirement of a 1%
primary vote total for access to the general election
ballot, while Burdick v. Takushi 112 S. Ct 2059 (1992)
upholds a Hawaii ban on write-in votes.
37

,

,

.

Brian L. Porto, "The Constitution And The Ballot
For
Box: Supreme Court Jurisprudence And Ballot Access
Annual
the
at
presented
Independent Candidates" (paper
Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association,
Providence, Rhode Island, November 12-14, 1992)
38
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commentary. The three majority opinions on patronage
in
recent decades have all been decidedly hostile
to the

practice. The justices have blocked patronage-based

dismissals in the Cook County,

Illinois Sheriff's

Department; blocked similar dismissals of Assistant Public

Defenders in Rockland County, New York; and prohibited the
use of partisan considerations in hiring, promotion,
transfer, and dismissal decisions by the state of

Illinois. 39 Much of the literature on these decisions is

uncomfortable with the way in which the justices have

dismissed government arguments in their application of
freedom of association and speech to patronage issues.
A brief commentary by Louis Cammarosano, for example,
notes the confusion in lower court patronage decisions that

followed the Elrod and Brant i decisions, and argues that
the Court needs to adopt a more balanced approach in

dealing with patronage issues. Seeing the justices'
decisions as too ant i -patronage, he calls for a
"structured,

logical framework" that emphasizes a balancing

test between First Amendment deprivations and the practical

benefits of patronage. Like Porto and Guttmann, Cammorosano
asks the Court to adjust its applications, but his concern

The cases noted are Elrod v. Burns 427 U.S. 347
445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Rutan
(1976); Brant i v. Finkel
Republican Party of Illinois 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
39

,

,

,
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v.

is with the proper role of party affiliation in staffing

the government

40

In contrast to these relatively friendly critiques,

a

third group of scholars explicitly disapproves of the

Court's use of freedom of association on the grounds that
the Court's posture regarding party and electoral issues

should be one of strict noninterference, not only with the

parties but also with the states. This is particularly
evident with regard to patronage issues. One scholar,

Martin

H.

Brinkley,

examines the patronage decisions of the

Court and lower courts and finds them to be "a morass of

confusion and doubt". Brinkley asserts that the Court's
recent "appropriate requirement" standard for evaluating

patronage cases has only created huge uncertainty, and
faults the Rut an Court in particular for consistently

downplaying the importance of governmental interests. He
argues for more attention to the "positive" aspects of
patronage, and gives a strong defense of state interests in
the political process. 41 Like Cammorosano, he is concerned

Louis Cammarosano, "Application Of First Amendment
To Political Patronage Employment Decisions", Fordham Law
Review 58 (October 1989), pp. 101-16.
40

Martin H. Brinkley, "Note: Despoiling The Spoils-.
Rutan v. R eeublican Pa rty Of Illinois ", North Carolina Law
Review 69 (March 1991), pp. 719-40. The "appropriate
requirement" standard asserts that partisan affiliation can
if such
be a consideration in personnel decisions only
the
for
affiliation is an "appropriate requirement"
position or duties in question.
41
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with the appropriateness of partisan affiliation in

government staffing.
Daniel Lowenstein is the most skeptical of the legal

analysts who take issue with the Court's jurisprudence.

Lowenstein takes a much more critical view of the Court's
recent party jurisprudence than most other scholars,

contending that the Court went too far in its Tashiian
decision. Lowenstein argues at length that parties should
go to the public and the political process, not the courts,
to resolve their disputes. He views conflicts like those in

Connecticut

(

Tashi ian

)

and California (Eu) not as party

versus state disputes, but as intraparty disputes. The
justices of the Court, in Lowenstein'

s

view,

handled

earlier cases properly, but went astray with Tashi ian

.

While his skeptical view is not shared
by most scholars,

it represents an important counterpoint

to their views. 42 Lowenstein argues that questions of

authority should be resolved by the political process, not
the courts,

and should not automatically favor the party as

the best decisionmaker.

As the preceding review reflects, most "legal

analysts" accept the basic notion of freedom of
association, but suggest various modifications of standards

and\or application. They are united, however, in their

Daniel Lowenstein, "Constitutional Rights Of Major
Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry" (paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C., 1988).
42
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primary focus: the legal doctrines and standards involved.
Many discuss the political ramifications of their
arguments, particularly the question of authority over

party affairs, but their analytic eye is on the law. A
number of other scholars, on the other hand, pay greater

attention to the impact of the Justices' decisions on
parties and the political process, the large majority

approaching the analysis from a "proparty" perspective
close to the "natural order" school of thought.

Impact Analysis

Most students of parties who examine the justices'

decisions on party and electoral issues for their practical
impact on parties share a preference for building stronger

political parties. As a result, they have generally

applauded the decisions of the Court as an important step
towards "party renewal". In their view, the increased

authority and autonomy that have been granted to parties
through the freedom of association doctrine will enable
parties to grow stronger as institutions. While some of
these analysts are very sanguine about the possibilities

opened by the justices' decisions, others take a more
cautious view of their impact and note the limitations

imposed by the balance of power on the Court, practical
politics, and public opinion.

Kay Lawson, an advocate for "party renewal", sees the

Court's freedom of association decisions as having very
34

positive implications for parties. In an analysis of the
effects of state laws on parties, Lawson argues that

"litigation is slow and costly, but it is one of the most

promising routes for freeing parties of excessive state
regulation". She applauds the Court's decisions, especially
its rejection of the "public interest" arguments offered by

state governments. She contends that the Court's decisions

provide parties with greater potential freedom to help
themselves

43
.

In The Party's Just Begun

,

Larry Sabato argues that

parties can best make the decisions affecting them, and
should be left to do so, as the Court
states)

appears to be arguing. Sabato'

identical to Lawson'

s:

(if not all
s

the

key contention is

the Court decisions are an important

tool for enabling party renewal. 44 In a similar vein,

David

E.

Price argues that party regulation is only one of

the reasons for party decline, but is a particularly

important one because it can be reversed
the constitutional,

.

as well as practical,

He contends that

case for

dismantling many of these laws is strong. Price seems to
share the optimism of Lawson and Sabato that parties will
be more free to plot their own course because of the

Kay Lawson, "How State Laws Undermine Parties", in
A. James Reichley, ed., Elections American Style
240(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp.
43

60

.

44

Sabato, The Part y's Just Begun.
35

Court's decisions. 45 The ability of parties to have the

authority to shape their own functions is a central concern
of these analysts,

analysts

as it is for Gottlieb and other legal

.

Leon Epstein, like Price, Sabato, and Lawson, focuses
on the broad impact of the Court's party freedom of

association jurisprudence; however, he is less sanguine
than they about the expansion of that freedom and its
impact on "party renewal". In an analysis of the Court's
Tashj ian opinion and a survey of state party officials

regarding its impact, Epstein argues that the Court is
reluctant to expand the reach of freedom of association
past certain parameters, and that state parties have made
few changes or challenges to state law as a result of
Tashi ian

.

Though he favors strong parties, Epstein is

skeptical of how much the Court's decisions will accomplish
to that end.

46

A number of scholars have focused specifically on the

ramifications and impact of the Court's patronage
decisions. Cynthia Grant Bowman, for example, examines

patronage in Chicago and cites both that city's experience
and other literature to dispute the claims of some scholars

David E. Price, Bringing Back The Parties
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984); see in particular chap.
5, "Parties And The Law", pp. 121-44.
45

Leon Epstein, "Will American Political Parties Be
Privatized?", Journal Of Law And Politics 2 (Winter 1989),
pp. 239-74.
46
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that patronage has been a strong and positive force in

politics. The heart of Bowman's argument is a critique of
the concerns and arguments expressed in Justice Antonin

Scalia's dissent in Rutan. She finds Scalia's contentions
unfounded, arguing that many cities have learned to live

with the Court's recent standards without undue hardship or
confusion. While she favors the majority view of the Court,

Bowman is not arguing from the "proparty" position of many
scholars; she is more concerned with questions of

government administration. 47

Historical\Theoretical Analysis
In contrast to focusing on legal standards and

doctrine, or on the practical impact of the decisions, a

number of scholars have attempted to place the decisions of

47

Cynthia Grant Bowman, "We Don't Want Anybody
Anybody Sent: The Death Of Patronage Hiring In Chicago",
Northwestern University Law Review 86 (Fall 1991) pp. 5795. A similar article by Susan Lorde Martin examines the
ramifications of the Court's patronage decisions, but her
focus is on the implications for public officials who must
deal with patronage issues. After a brief history of
patronage and an examination of the Elrod and Brant
decisions, the heart of Martin's study is an analysis of
U.S. Circuit Court decisions during the 1980' s, proceeding
on a circuit by circuit basis and concluding that there is
division as to how the Court's decisions have been
interpreted. In light of this confusion in the lower
courts, she urges officials to study and document
situations carefully before firing anyone for political
reasons. Martin's analysis views the Court's patronage work
not from a party perspective, but from the viewpoint of
working administrators. Susan Lorde Martin, "A Decade Of
Branti Decisions: A Government Official's Guide To
Patronage Dismissals", American Univers ity Law Review 39
,

(Fall 1989)

,

pp.

11-58
37

the justices in broader historical and explanatory

frameworks. Jerome Mileur,

for example,

examines the

freedom of association cases in light of the broader
historical evolution of the legal status of parties and
reaches conclusions about its future that are similar to

Leon Epstein's. Mileur'

s

analysis focuses on cases

involving party rules, ballot access, and party
registration, and finds that the Court has substantially

enlarged the range of self-determination for parties.
However, he concludes that the decisions are mainly an open
door,

not a solution,

to the more complex issues of

building strong parties; many political and intellectual
challenges remain to party building. 48

Another historical view of the Court's decisions on
parties and the law, using a different methodology than
Mileur,

is provided by Lee Epstein and Charles Hadley.

Epstein and Hadley focus on the Court's treatment of minor
parties, and the Court's role more generally in supporting
the party system. Using Court jurisprudence surrounding

majority and minority rights, and related literature, they
hypothesize that minor parties should participate more
often and be more successful in litigation than major
parties. They test this hypothesis by statistically

analyzing ninety-seven Court cases decided between 1900 and

Jerome Mileur, "Legislating Responsibility:
American Political Parties and the Law", in White and
Mileur, eds., Challenges pp. 167-89.
48

,

38

1986 in which parties were direct litigants, using cases

drawn from the LEXIS legal research network. They find

minor parties to be more active, as they expected, but less
successful in terms of "winning" cases than they expected;
they attempt to explain this by looking to broad cycles of

American politics and types of case issues, as well as eras
of Court jurisprudence. After controlling for these,

they

do find some positive treatment by the Court for minor

parties as against major parties. Beyond this finding,
their broader conclusion emphasizes the complexity of
factors involved in the Court-party relationship over
time

49
.

Leon Epstein,

in addition to his analysis of Tashi ian

,

also devotes a chapter of his text, Political Parties in
the American Mold

,

to the evolving legal status of parties,

and places that evolution in a larger historical\cultural

explanatory framework. Epstein's main argument is that
essentially private at their birth, became de

parties,

facto "public utilities" during the Progressive era;

he

traces this change to the presence of parties on state

produced ballots and the general regulatory spirit of
Progressivism that was afoot in the land at that time.
Epstein then examines the content and impact of the Court
decisions on parties and their "public utility" status, and
concludes that parties are not likely to become fully

Lee Epstein and Hadley,
Parties"
49

.
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"Treatment of Political

deregulated in the foreseeable future, since "such

a

challenge would be deeply at odds with deeply

institutionalized American political patterns"

.

Epstein

thus puts forth an historical\cultural framework for

understanding the legal status of parties. 50 Such a
framework does much to place the parameters of the debates
this analysis finds among the justices of the Court.
In contrast to the works discussed above,

two scholars

explicitly focus their analyses on the major concern of the
present study: the justices' understandings of parties and
the broader structures of electoral politics. Clifton

McCleskey examines the Court's decisions in ballot access,
patronage, and "freedom of association" from the late
1960 's to the early 1980'

s,

with the goal of understanding

the Court's views on democracy and the substantive policy

effects of their decisions. McCleskey argues that,
the viewpoint of substantive policy,

obscured more than it has clarified"

"from

judicial review has
.

He finds the Court to

be very confused about democratic politics and argues that

political scientists bear some responsibility for this.
McCleskey'

s

view of the Court and parties is much more

negative and pessimistic than most scholars in the field,
but the issues he raises are important. They help to

organize this dissertation, which, by examining a more
explicit set of issues involving parties and the electoral

50

Leon Epstein,

"Parties As Public Utilities".
40

process than McCleskey's does, hopes to shed greater light
on whether his conclusions are justified.

51

John Moeller is another scholar who has examined the
Court's understanding of parties and democracy in its

treatment of parties. Moeller analyzes the Court's

decisions on conventions and primaries, ballot access, and
patronage, and argues that they can only be understood "in
the context of a broader discussion about democracy and

politics in which the courts have engaged"

.

Unlike

McCleskey, Moeller does not find confusion on the Court in
this area.

Indeed,

he argues that the Court's decisions are

a product of three focused and contending "visions" of

democratic politics:

(1)

"fair politics", which emphasizes

access and majority rule and is disenchanted with parties;
(2)

"1st Amendment politics", which focuses largely on

individual rights and freedom of association in making

decisions in this area; and

(3)

"Madisonian politics",

which sees American politics as open and involving

a

complex balance that necessitates accommodation for the
rights of parties and others as well and leads to case-bycase decision-making. He finds Court decisions to entail a

contentious mix of all three visions. Moeller'

s

work tries

to understand the Court's broader views of parties and

democracy in a systematic manner, and the author

assesses

Clifton McCleskey, "Parties at the Bar: Equal
Protection, Freedom of Association, and the Rights of
Political Organizations", Journal Of Politic s 46 (May
51

1984)

,

pp.

346-68.
41

his conclusions about the Court's views of parties and

democracy in the concluding chapter. 52
Finally, while the literature to date on the Supreme

Court's parties decisions is extensive, most of it

approaches the topic with a primary focus on either the
legal standards and doctrine involved or on the practical

political ramifications of the decisions. A smaller number
of scholars,

such as Mileur, Leon Epstein, Moeller,

McCleskey, and Lee Epstein\Hadley

,

attempt to place the

Court's decisions in a larger historical or explanatory
framework. This dissertation builds on the foundations of
all of these approaches in order to establish a clearer

picture of the Court's views on political parties and their
place in the American constitutional system.
In particular,

this dissertation addresses one key

feature of the literature. Many of the scholars in this
area have expressed the belief that the Court's standards,

and\or its underlying ideas of parties and democracy, are
uncertain. The questions examined in the dissertation

address the substance of that position, and the

dissertation finds that what is present is not so much
directionless confusion, but rather a fairly clear division
among the justices themselves. This division may be roughly

perceived even in the varying positions in the scholarly

John Moeller, " The Federal Court's Involvement in
the Reform of Political Parties", Western Political
Quarterly XL (December 1987), pp. 717-34.
52
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literature examined here. My analysis argues that this

division holds both good and bad consequences for parties
"at the bar" and in the polity.

43

CHAPTER

2

THE COURT AND BALLOT ACCESS: DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY AND
PARTY COMPETITION

Virtually all students of representative democracyacknowledge the central importance of the right to vote,
but less attention is given to a critical corollary of that
right: the candidates one can vote for on the ballot. The

ballot choices open to voters in the United States are

regulated not only by party nomination processes, but also
by state statutes designed to restrict ballot access to
"legitimate" candidates. The scope of party competition and

voter choice, and thus the nature of American democracy, is
not free and unlimited; the flexible but well-defined

parameters of ballot access have been set by the states for
a century.

Controls on candidate access to the ballot first arose
as part of the broad effort to reform the electoral process

that took place during the Progressive era. Many of these

laws were designed to restrict and stifle the growing

political power of third parties during this period, in

particular the Socialist Party of Eugene Debs, by making

it

more difficult for them to place candidates before the
voters. As a result, the major parties gained a significant

advantage

1

1
.

of this
It is important to note that many "reforms"

the
period were used to restrict, rather than enlarge,
scope of participation and parties. The
blocked
Populist\Progressive era, which saw third parties
from the ballot, also witnessed the effective
44

The impact of ballot access statutes can be even more

profound for political parties than for voters. Without
access to the ballot, parties cannot perform their primary

function of contesting elections in order to win control of
the government. Voters may have alternate choices, however

biased and limited, but a party whose candidates cannot
gain access to the ballot has nowhere to turn; it is likely
to face political irrelevance,

if not extinction.

Given their consequences for party competition and
voter choice, state standards for ballot access establish
significant parameters for the character of the party

system and the electoral process. Consequently, the content
of these standards raises theoretical and practical

questions about the scope of party competition and
democracy, as well as the proper scope of state authority
in the electoral process.

Implicitly,

they also shape the

nature and functions of political parties as institutions.

disenf ranchisement of African-American males in the South.
This was accomplished through a variety of state voting
requirements which included poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, and literacy tests. The most blatant collusion of
the political parties in this disenf ranchisement was the
use of "white primaries", which restricted the right to
vote in what was the critical election in many southern
states Both the right to vote and the right to run were
not always enlarged during this period when rhetoric
emphasized returning control of politics to "the People".
The use of "white primaries" was definitively outlawed
by Smith v. Allwright While the concerns of voting rights
and minority participation are clearly related to the
concerns under consideration in this dissertation, most of
the decisions I examine do not extensively focus on these
concerns; most of the Court discussion of these issues has
occurred in voting rights and redistricting cases.
.

.
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This chapter examines how the justices of the U.S. Supreme

Court have handled these questions, through an analysis of

their ballot access opinions.
The Supreme Court's ballot access opinions have often

been contentious. At first glance, they divide into two

broad groupings. One group favors challenges to ballot
access statutes. In these cases, the justices have struck

down Ohio's filing deadline and party requirements for

minor party presidential candidates 2
filing fees for ballot placement 3

;

;

Texas and California

differential signature

requirements for local and statewide offices in Illinois 4

;

another Ohio filing deadline for independent presidential
candidates 5

;

and an Illinois party label regulation and

signature requirements. 6
The second group of opinions is the mirror image of
the first.

State laws are upheld, and there is skepticism

about those individuals and groups challenging state

regulations. In these cases, the justices upheld a five

percent signature requirement for minor parties in

2

Williams

393 U.S.

Bullock v. Carter

3

Panish

,

,

415 U.S.

709

,

23

(1968).

405 U.S.

134

(1972),

and Lubin v.

(1974)

Illinois State Board Of Election s v. Socialist
Workers Party 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
4

,

5

6

Anderson
Norman

,

v.

460 U.S. 780

Reed

,

(1983).

112 S. Ct
46

.

698

(1992).

Georgia

;

a

California disaffiliation requirement 8

signature and organizational requirements 9

;

;

Texas

a one percent

primary vote requirement for the Washington general
election ballot 10

;

and a Hawaii ban on write-in votes.

It is also of note that,

11

even though the plaintiffs in

the Court's ballot access cases have been "outsiders" from
the major parties,

third parties,

i.e.

independent

candidates, and\or individual voters, the issues addressed

by the opinions have implications for major and minor

parties alike.

12

The divided jurisprudence in this area reflects deeper

disagreements among justices regarding the competitiveness
of two party systems,

the importance of primaries,

the

purposes of parties, and the relationship of state laws to
the electoral process and party system. These

disagreements, moreover, reflect two fairly coherent

7

Jenness

8

Fortson

Storer v. Brown

9

(1974)

v.

,

,

403 U.S. 431

724

415 U.S.

American Party of Texas

v.

(1971)

(1974).

White

,

415 U.S.

767

.

10

Munro,

11

Burdick

479 U.S.
,

189

112 S Ct
.

.

(1986).

2059

(1992).

Unlike other areas of electoral regulation, the
Democratic and Republican parties have had no desire to
challenge the status quo. The reason for their acceptance
of ballot access statutes can be seen in the history of
such statutes, particularly their treatment of the two
major parties. Ironically, the ballot access case of
Williams has served as the foundation for many of the
proparty "freedom of association" decisions that have
benefitted the major parties as much as the minor parties.
12

47

perspectives on the political status quo. One is the
"natural order of politics" perspective: the existing two

party system is only competitive if not "monopolized", and
natural political configurations are distorted by biased
state laws which preserve an electoral monopoly for the two

major parties and thereby stifle truly free
competition.

13

The other is the "constructed order of

politics" perspective: the existing two party system is

competitive unless blatant discrimination can be proven,
and existing political configurations are a product of

democratic processes and nondiscriminatory state laws that
not only permit, but also enable,

competition

sufficient

14

This "natural order " \ " constructed order" division

within the opinions is evident in differing positions on

a

variety of salient issues. The opinions "argue" over the
role of third parties; the character of party membership

and control; the major functions of parties,- the role of

primary elections; the standards of evidence and burden of
proof to be used; and the character and impact of state

statutes

Majority opinions expressing this view include
Williams and Anderson
13

.

Majority opinions which enunciate this view include
Storer and Munro
14

.
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The "Natural Order of Politics" Perspective

The schools of thought in the ballot access opinions
of the justices divide on two crucial matters-,

the

competitiveness of the current party system and the

relationship of state laws to the health of party
competition. The "natural order" view generally sees party

competition as monopolized by the two "major" parties and
views state laws as important preservers,
of this monopoly.

if not creators,

The existing political order is,

in other

an artificial product of state laws. Justices who

words,

embrace this perspective tend to be skeptical of the

competitive and ideological openness of the major parties,of the sufficiency of primaries as the major competitive
arena,-

and of state claims regarding political stability,

raiding, voter confusion, and sore losers. They tend to be

more sympathetic to third parties, particularly in their
role as advocates of substantive issues ignored by the

major parties. They feel such parties would be more
successful if their natural growth was not impeded by

government statutes. In essence, this view seeks to protect

democracy

,

i.e.

open party competition, by limiting state

authority over what parties and candidates may access an
election ballot.
This "natural order" perspective is most consistently

supported in the ballot access opinions by Justices William
J.

Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and William 0. Douglas. The

perspective has also had limited appeal to other Justices,
49

such as John Paul Stevens, who have supported the

perspective in some cases. This perspective, while
sometimes in dissent, underlies pivotal ballot access

decisions like Williams and Anderson

,

and represents an

important voice in the continuing jurisprudence of ballot
access cases.

A clear articulation of the "natural order"
perspective's central assertions is found in Justice Hugo
Black's 1968 opinion in Williams

.

George Wallace's American

Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party had brought
suit against Ohio,

claiming that its early filing deadline

for third parties, a fifteen percent signature requirement,

and other requirements of party organization denied equal

protection of the laws.

15

Justice Black agreed, arguing

that the Ohio statutes gave the Democratic and Republican

parties "a complete monopoly" in the electoral system and
were likely to "stifle the growth of all new parties". The

decided advantage thereby provided to established parties
was viewed as "invidious discrimination".

16

15

The Ohio ballot access statute requirements for
qualifying as a "political party" included the creation of
county and state committees and the holding of a nominating
convention. Williams 393 U.S. at 24-25. It is worthy of
note that Ohio's ballot was the last of the 50 state
ballots accessed by Wallace. Michael Barone, Our Country:
The Shaping Of America From Roosevelt To Reagan (New York:
The Free Press, 1990), p. 734, n. 9.
,

393 U.S. at 30-34. This case demonstrates that a
claim does not necessarily have to be based on race in
order to find "invidious discrimination". In fact, George
Wallace's candidacy was an explicit reflection of the
racial animosity felt by many white voters toward
16

50

This view of an electoral system monopolized by two

major parties, which uses state statutes to disadvantage
third parties, is central to the "natural order"

perspective's concerns about the existing political
environment. The positions taken on a variety of corollary
issues, which will presently be considered in detail, all

derive from this picture of the current system. Scrutiny of
the justices' use of scholarly quotes and citations to

buttress their claim of state-produced electoral monopoly
reveals that their contentions do not go unchallenged by
students of parties and democracy. The major focus of this

analysis is not an empirical critique of the justices'
citations, however; the goal is to explicate the structure
of their ideas about parties and democracy,

and to consider

the ramifications of these ideological structures for

political parties as institutions. The content of scholarly

authority cited by the justices, as well as the context of
such citation,

sheds light on the justices'

ideology and

its ramifications.

Party Competition and Choice
In Justice Black's opinion in Williams

,

the health of

electoral competition is measured by the choices available
to individual voters. Black cites the Court's opinions in

Wesberry

v.

Sanders and Carrington v. Rash to support this

minorities, an ironic historical twist.
51

proposition.

17

Healthy competition, however, requires

more than voter choice,- it is also measured by the

condition of the party system, which must be
"nonmonopolistic"

Black writes:

.

Competition in ideas and governmental policies is
at the core of our electoral process and of the
First Amendment freedoms. New parties struggling
for their place must have the time and
opportunity to organize in order to meet
reasonable requirements for ballot position, just
as the old parties have had in the past. 18
While the need for some reasonable ballot regulation is
admitted,

these regulations must afford full opportunity

for new parties to organize and appeal to voters. A

competitive democracy on this model provides a friendly
environment for third parties.
Black's Williams opinion contrasts this "model" of

healthy competition with Ohio's party system and statutes.
Ohio's Democratic and Republican parties are given a
"decided advantage" by the state's election statutes, which
are characterized as "virtually impossible" for minor

parties to meet.
a

19

State laws have essentially preserved

monopoly for the two major parties, an unacceptable and

"artificial" restriction of party competition. Concurring

opinions in Williams by Justices Douglas and John Marshall

Harlan IV largely reinforce this position. Harlan, for
376 U.S.
323 U.S. at 31. See Wesberrv v. Sanders
(1965).
U.S.
89
(1964), and Carrinaton v. Rash 380
17

,

,

18

393 U.S.

at 32.

19

393 U.S.

at 24,

31.
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1

example,

sees Ohio as "denying the appellants any

opportunity to participate in the procedure by which the
President is selected". 20

An additional anti-monopoly argument is proffered by
Justice Stevens in Anderson

Stevens asserts that monopoly

.

often leads to corruption, so competition should extend

beyond the two established parties to prevent such
corruption. He characterizes the intent of Ohio's statute
as a "desire to protect existing political parties from

competition".

[such]

21

Healthy competition, in this view,

involves free access by all serious parties.
One opinion which seeks to offer some documentation of
this posited burden on competition is Justice Anthony

Kennedy's dissent in Burdick

v.

Takushi

.

a 1992 case in

which Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was unsuccessfully
challenged. Kennedy argues that rather than facilitating

stability and choice as the majority claimed, Hawaii's

restriction actually reduces choice and compounds political
division,
races.

22

since only one choice is available in most
He emphasizes the dominance of the Democratic

Party in Hawaiian politics, cites data on the number of

blank ballots voted, and argues that the Court had

previously recognized write-in votes as a way to mitigate

393 U.S. at 35-40 (Douglas, J., concurring) and 41(Harlan, J., concurring); the quote is at p. 41.
20

48

21

460 U.S. at 795.

22

112 S.

Ct.

at 2068

(Kennedy,
53

J.,

dissenting).

the restrictions of the Progressive style ballot,

Sanner v. Patton

citing

23
.

The preoccupation of the "natural order" perspective

with nonmonopolistic competition is complemented by its
solicitude toward third parties, which are seen as having a

unique and essential role in our political system. Douglas'
Williams concurrence emphasizes the importance of third

parties as channels for political dissent, referring to the
Court's opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire

24
.

Marshall's

majority opinion in Illinois State Board of Elections
Socialist Workers Party

,

v.

a 1979 case involving a challenge

to Illinois law setting petition signature requirements,

emphasizes the third party function of "disseminating ideas
as well as attaining political office" and stresses their

important role in American political history, supporting
the assertion with citations to works by Alexander Bickel,

Wilfred Binkley, and E.M. Sait. 25 The works he cites,
while supportive of his general point regarding third

parties as historically important carriers of ideas, are in

23

112 S.

See Sanner

v.

Ct.

at 2068-70 (Kennedy,
40 NE 290 (1895)

Patton

J.,

dissenting).

,

(Douglas, J., concurring). The
v. New Ha mpshire, 354 U.S.
Sweezv
case noted by Douglas,
refusal to answer a
professor's
234 (1957), involved a
State Legislature
Hampshire
number of questions in a New
investigation of subversive activities. Sweezy was one of
the first cases to explicitly discuss the doctrine of
freedom of association.
24

393 U.S.

25

440 U.S. at 186.

at 36,39
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some cases much less supportive of the "natural order"

perspective as a whole.

Alexander Bickel's Reform And Continuity devotes

a

chapter to minor parties in the electoral system, and his

emphasis on their historic role is congruent with

Marshall's view. After reviewing third parties in American
history, Bickel concludes that they are "an indispensable

part of the system whose beneficent chief aim is to

suppress

[them]".

26

That Bickel agrees with those

justices who see bias in the current system is evident from
a statement closing his chapter:

"state election statutes

are shot through not only with anti- third-party provisions
that are wrong on principle, but also with some which

positively disserve the two-party system". 27 Bickel
provides strong reinforcement for Marshall and the "natural
order" view of the current party system.

Wilfred Binkley's work also supports Marshall's
assertion about the role of third parties, but without
Bickel's negative commentary on the modern system. In

American Political Parties: Their Natural History

,

Binkley

discusses the breakup of the Whig and Democratic parties in
the 1840 's and 1850'

and the role of many third parties

s,

in absorbing dissident elements not accommodated by the

26

Alexander Bickel, Reform and Continuity: the
Electoral College the Convention, and the Par ty System
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 80. See particularly
chap. 4, "Minor Parties", pp. 79-89.
,

27

Bickel, Reform

,

p.

89.
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major parties. His emphasis is largely on third parties as
carriers of ideas that the major parties have failed to
address, but he also sees major parties naturally moving to

capture third party issues that win popular support. 28

Third parties play an important role in raising ideas, but
they have not replaced the major parties that tend to
"capture" their issues.

Marshall's citation of Howard Penniman and E.M. Sait,
when scrutinized in its original context, provides the
least support for the "natural order" perspective on third

party opportunities and state law. In Sait
Parties And Elections

,

'

s

American

Penniman focuses on the historical

role and importance of minor parties, and reviews the same

history discussed by Bickel. 29 This generally supports

Marshall's argument, but the final paragraph of Penniman'
chapter, which is not quoted by Marshall,

is diametrically

opposed to the contention that the current party system is
a

distortion of the "natural order of politics"

.

According

to Penniman:

The minor parties make loud complaint over the
obstacles that prevent their getting a place on
the ballot. Socialists and Prohibitionists,
contending that the major parties enjoy a virtual
monopoly in many states, have pressed vigorously

Wilfred Binkley, American Political Parti es: Their
Natural History 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959),
esp. chap. 8, "The Breakup of the Major Parties", pp. 18128

,

205

.

Howard R. Penniman, Sait's American Parties and
Elections 5th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts
29

,

Inc.,

1952),

esp.

chap. XII,

"Minor Parties", pp. 223-39.
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of late for appropriate changes in the election
laws. They have some grounds for dissatisfaction.
It is sufficient in some states to get a mere
twenty- five signatures on a petition, but in

other states petitions must be signed by many
thousands of voters. Perhaps it is not a mere
persecution complex that suggests a conspiracy of
Democrats and Republicans. Yet, in the main, the
sense of griev ance has no solid foundation. The
Progressive Party was on the ballot in 45 states
in 1948. The Socialists received votes in 33
states; and the Prohibitionists, in 20. Devotion
to a cause sometimes impairs perspective.
Enthusiasts fail to see that, from the public
standpoint, it may be desirable to keep the
ballot from being encumbered and that very few
voters think otherwise. The "splinter parties"
suffer as much from anemia as from the malignant
designs of the major parties 30
.

To find so cogent a statement of the naturalness of the

current two party system is not surprising, but to find the

work in which it appears cited in an opinion arguing
against such a position is ironic. While Penniman may
support the legitimate historical role of third parties,

Penniman, Sait's American Parties p. 2 3 9; emphases
added. Penniman clearly feels that state law has not
systemically disadvantaged the minor parties, a position
more congruent with the "constructed order" view of party
competition and state law. With regard to his assessment of
how voters view ballot access issues, a number of trends in
recent decades would appear to contradict Penniman'
assumption: (1) the relative success of recent third party
presidential candidates Wallace, Anderson, and Perot; (2)
the general public dissatisfaction with the major parties,
and the willingness to elect independent candidates like
Governors Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, Walter Hickel of
Alaska, Angus King of Maine, and independent Representative
Bernard Sanders of Vermont; and (3) the passage of voter
referenda questions easing ballot access requirements, such
as the approval of Question 4 in Massachusetts in 1990,
which reduced the number of petition signatures required
for independent candidates by 75 percent. Larry Sabato,
while sharing Penniman' s suspicions of an unrestricted
ballot, recognizes the continuing public power of this
"populist" position. Sabato, The Party's Just Begun, p.
229
,

.
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his argument is antithetical to the "natural order"

contention that state law, not public apathy, preserves

a

two-party monopoly. Nonetheless, in Illinois Board and
other opinions, Marshall argues consistently against a

restricted ballot; it is clear he would not accept the
above portion of Penniman's analysis.
The majority opinion of Justice Stevens in Anderson

continues the emphasis in Williams and Illinois on the role
of third parties and cites political scientist V.O.

Key,

on the importance of third parties as "fertile sources

Jr.,

of new ideas and new programs".

31

In arguing that

campaigns should not be "monopolized by the existing

political parties", Key's chapter on "The Role Of Minor
Parties" in his Politics, Parties And Pressure Groups

reviews the same history as the scholars cited by Marshall,
and generally supports Stevens' assertion; however, Key

points to the direct primary and the general openness of
the major parties to question whether third parties are

still essential for that purpose.

32

Like Penniman, Key's

work is less than fully supportive of the "natural order"

perspective as a whole.
Marshall's dissent in Munro
Party

v.

Socialist Worker's

a 1986 case in which the Socialist Worker's Party

,

31

Anderson

,

460 U.S. at 794.

V.O. Key, Jr., Politics. Parties, and P ressure
Groups 3rd ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952)
especially chap. 10, "The Role of Minor Parties", pp. 278303
32

,

.

58

unsuccessfully challenged a Washington State law requiring
a one percent vote in the primary to gain access to the

general election ballot,

is the most recent opinion to

stress the critical functions of minor parties in our
polity. According to Marshall, third parties "broaden

political debate, expand the range of issues with which the

electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of the
majority".

33

Third parties, in essence, offer

alternatives that make competition in parties, candidates
and ideas a reality.

The "natural order" perspective on party competition,
at heart,

sees two-party dominance as evidence of

monopolized competition, and views restrictive state laws
as a major cause of that monopoly. There is a logical

sympathy for third parties: just as two party dominance
indicates unhealthy monopoly, third parties are a sign of

healthy competition. Analysis of the opinions also reveals
that the "natural order" argument on party competition and

state laws finds both supporters and skeptics among

students of politics cited by the justices.

Party Structure and Functions
The ballot access opinions which express the "natural
order" perspective are relatively limited in addressing

issues of party structure and functions, focusing their

33

479 U.S. at 200

(Marshall,
59

J.,

dissenting).

argument on party competition and state laws. Important

attention is focused, however, on the "ideological"
function of parties. While the "natural order" perspective
does not dismiss the electoral function of parties, equal

stress is placed on ideological and programmatic

activities. In line with its views on competition and third
parties,

the "natural order" takes a more skeptical view of

the ideological "fluidity" of the major parties.

Much of the "natural order" view of parties in the
ballot access opinions must be adduced from their

discussion of third parties. With regard to party

membership and control, the complementary emphases on
monopoly and the stifling of dissent indicates a belief
that the major parties are ideologically "closed"

organizations, less interested in ideas than in winning
office. This is essentially an anti-establishment view

combined with a "responsible parties" style critique of the

major parties. Legally open, the major parties are

practically restricted in terms of opportunities for
alternative voices and alternative control. As a result,
third parties become an essential political vehicle for

alternative ideas.
The "natural order" view of party membership and

functions can be further understood by examining the

treatment of primary elections and party integrity issues,
i.e.

raiding,

sore losers,

and disaffiliation,

60

in ballot

access opinions.

34

These reveal greater concern for

maximum electoral competition both within and between
parties than for party integrity or political stability.
On the question of raiding,

Stevens'

opinion in

Anderson emphasizes that raiding is not to be confused with
a

protection of the existing parties from competition, or

used as a "cover" for exercising monolithic control over

a

party's membership or ideas. While sore loser and

disaffiliation concerns are legitimate, laws to enforce
such concerns must be tailored to that end; party

membership and control must be restricted as minimally as
possible. Ohio's statute is characterized by Stevens as

only a deadline, not a sore loser provision.

35

The "natural order" view of primary elections is

congruent with its overall perspective on competition and
the ideological function of parties. The primary is an

important forum for competition, but does not

,

by itself,

constitute sufficient electoral opportunity. Access to the
general election ballot must also be reasonably available.

Marshall's Munro dissent,

for example,

34

argues that "access

"Raiding" involves voters crossing party lines to
vote in another party's primary in order to disrupt the
results, in states where "open primaries" permit such
behavior. "Sore loser" provisions prohibit a candidate who
has lost a party primary or nomination contest from running
under another party label, or as an independent candidate,
in the general election. "Disaffiliation" statutes prohibit
a candidate from running as an independent if they were a
member of a party within a past specified period of time.
35

460 U.S. at 801-4.
61

to a primary election is not... all the access that is due

when minor parties are excluded entirely from the general
election", and characterized the general election as "the

phase of the electoral process in which policy choices are
most seriously considered"

.

Blocking minor parties from the

general election is seen as a near total bar which preempts

meaningful political participation on their part.

36

This is certainly a negative view of the "openness" of

existing parties and primaries. The fact that the "natural
order" perspective takes issue with the ballot access

standards in Munro

,

where a candidate or party can gain

access to the general election ballot with only one percent
of the vote in a blanket primary,

indicates that the

justices seek a virtually unrestricted system of ballot
access. Kennedy's discussion of Hawaii's ban on write-in

voting in his Burdick dissent provides an example of the
concerns that support this view, emphasizing that there are
few independents on the ballot and that the primary in

Hawaii is often decisive.

37

With regard to sore loser and disaffiliation statutes,
and the threats of factional infighting they are designed
to address,

Justice Brennan's dissent in Storer best

reflects the "natural order" view of such concerns. To
Brennan,

factional threats are more likely to occur shortly

36

Munro
dissenting)
37

,

479 U.S. at 202-3,

112 S. Ct. at 2069

206

(Marshall,

(Kennedy, J.,
62

J.,

dissenting).

before the primary rather than far in advance of

and

it,

thus California's one year disaffiliation requirement

limits political opportunity unnecessarily.

38

Once again,

the emphasis is on keeping competition and opportunity as

open as possible.
The "natural order" view of parties is very much in

keeping with its overall perspective on competition. Party

membership and control should both be as open as possible,
with maximum opportunities for other routes due to the de
facto restricted nature of party organizations. The

functions of parties should be ideological as well as
electoral. In essence, parties should be open to, and

vehicles of, a wide competition in candidates and ideas;
third parties fulfill part of this function for the major

parties
The particular ballot access disputes heard by the

justices have given less attention to a critical and

particularly contentious electoral issue involving
democratic competition and the nature of parties: the
ability of racial minorities to participate in the
electoral process and elect minority officeholders. Most of
the disputes in this area have reached the Court as voting

rights or redistricting cases,

ballot access per se

.

focusing less directly on

Nonetheless, ballot access for

minority candidates is a crucial step in achieving

38

415 U.S. at 761

(Brennan,
63

J.,

dissenting).

a larger

role in the electoral process. The "natural order"

perspective's concern with enabling dissent, new ideas, and
alternative viewpoints to be expressed in the parties and
offered on the ballot implicitly encompasses an argument
that traditionally disadvantaged groups and their interests

should not be deprived of political opportunity because of
a

monopolized political system.

39

Standards of Evidence and Burden
The "natural order" perspective's strong skepticism

about the status quo of party competition is evident in

their standards of evidence and burden. These opinions

repeatedly offer tests to evaluate the competing claims,
and consistently weigh these tests against the states. The

This stance is reflected in the majority opinion in
Thornburg v. Gingles 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Thornburg
invalidated a North Carolina districting plan that diluted
African-American voting strength. Brennan's majority test
for determining vote dilution focuses on "the systematic
frustration or exclusion of minority groups from electoral
competition" Nancy Maveety, Representation Rights And The
Burger Years (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1991), p. 122. Lani Guinier emphasizes Brennan's focus on
the candidate's role as the "chosen representative of a
particular racial group" as well as on protecting that
group choice and "the right to elect a representative of
Guinier correctly notes
their choice" (emphasis added)
that the current Court majority has gone in an opposite
direction in Presley v. Etowah County Commission 112 S.
820 (1992), in which newly elected African-American
Ct
county commissioners were stripped of their powers by white
incumbents. The Presley majority asserts that the right to
vote does not include the right to govern. Lani Guinier,
The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in
Representative Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1994),
,

.

,

.

,

.

pp.

13,

177-79.

64

centerpieces of their approach are "strict scrutiny" and
"compelling state interest"
The first test is offered in Black's Williams opinion.
The Court must consider "the facts and circumstances behind
the law,

the interests which the State claims to be

protecting, and

the interests of those who are

disadvantaged by the classification"

.

Black adds that

unequal burdens on minority groups can only be justified by
a compelling state interest. 40 This test did not make

freedom of association absolute or preclude state

regulation on its face, but its result upheld the challenge
to Ohio's statutes. Brennan's dissent in Storer reaffirms

this strict scrutiny\compelling state interest standard,

arguing that it should have been applied in that case, but
was not.

41

The practical import of the Williams standard is that

effective voting and party competition in our democratic

system cannot be infringed without compelling
justification. What is meant by "compelling" is not

definitively defined, but its application in Williams
emphasizes what the state should not infringe, not what it

This test for an Equal Protection Clause violation
is enunciated at 393 U.S. 30. This reflects the concern
noted earlier with the disadvantages that racial and other
minorities groups can suffer under a monopolized party and
political system.
40

41

415 U.S. at 756

(Brennan,
65

J.,

dissenting).

can protect. 42 This approach is clearly related to the

"natural order" view that the current party system is

biased by state regulations.
In Illinois Board

,

a similar three part test is put

forward by Marshall. The Court must examine the character
of the classification in the law;

the importance of the

individual interests affected; and the state interests

asserted in support of the classification. Under this test,
the majority finds that the geographic classification

involved in the Illinois signature requirement limits

associational and voting rights without being the least
restrictive means to the end of a reasonable ballot. 43
Marshall reiterates his support for this standard in his

Munro dissent. 44
Stevens' opinion in Anderson enunciates yet another

three part test to determine the appropriate parameters of

freedom of association, noting there is no "litmus paper
standard" for such cases. According to Stevens, the Court

must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by

Justice Harry Blackmun emphasizes the vague and
amorphous nature of this "easy phrase" in his concurrence
in Illinois State Board 440 U.S. at 188-89 (Blackmun, J.,
However, like many other legal terms, its
concurring)
precise meaning develops from its usage in the totality of
previous cases. Thus, its meaning cannot simply be drawn
out of the sky, but it is open to evolution and
modification in some degree. It is in this process of
modification that justices have space for interpretation.
42

,

.

43

440 U.S. at 183-87.

44

479 U.S. at 201

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
66

the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It must then
identify and evaluate the precise interests put
forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment,
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy
and strength of each of these interests, it also
must consider the extent to which those interests
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's
rights 45

Justice David Souter's majority opinion in Norman
a 1992

v.

Reed

,

case involving a largely successful challenge to

Illinois party label and signature requirements, witnessed
the most recent application of the Anderson test. 46

On their face,

these tests are all silent when it

comes to the particularities of evidence. In fact, the

justices who reflect the "natural order" perspective have

emphasized a variety of evidentiary factors, all of which
share a concern for wide and minimally impeded competition

between parties and ideas.
One focus of evidentiary analysis has been to examine

whether similar parties are given equal treatment by the
law.

Souter's Norman opinion finds Illinois restrictions on

the use of party names "broader than necessary to advance

electoral order", and the signature requirements too
onerous on a local party. In combination, they make it

easier for a statewide party to gain access to the ballot
than it is for a local party. Souter cites the Court's

previous decision in Illinois Board to emphasize that local

45

460 U.S. at 789

46

112 S.Ct. at 705.
67

ballot access standards should roughly parallel statewide
standards.

47

Chief Justice Warren Burger emphasizes this

same type of state\local standard disparity in overturning
a Texas filing fee statute in his Bullock opinion. 48

The opinions also search for evidence of state effort
to minimize the burden on the affected individuals or

groups. The justices will look with great skepticism on a

current statute if the state could have taken a less

intrusive approach. Brennan's Storer dissent,

for example,

argues that California demonstrated no effort to put a

lesser burden on candidates. 49 The political impact of
such laws is another item of evidence the opinions have

considered. Brennan's dissent in Storer stresses the

"impossible burden" of having to decide on a ballot

strategy 17 months before a general election, long before

politics makes such a choice "sensible". 50 The state
statute is seen as constricting the political landscape,
and is therefore not neutral, but rather biased and

discriminatory

47

112 S.

48

405 U.S. at 140.

49

415 U.S. at 756,

Ct.

at 706-8.

761

(Brennan,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting). As cited
earlier, Storer involved a California statute specifying a
one year disaffiliation requirement for independent
candidates; this forces the "early choice" noted by
Brennan
50

415 U.S. at 758

(Brennan,

68

J.,

Evidence of possible impacts on political events is
also stressed in Stevens' Anderson opinion. In evaluating

Ohio's early filing deadline, Stevens cites the late

launching of several third party campaigns.

51

Alexander

Bickel is cited to assert the likelihood that early filing

deadlines may actually reduce party harmony by forcing
early polarizations brought on by the deadline, and thus

decrease party stability.

52

from Reform and Continuity
in Illinois State Board

Stevens's point.

,

,

This citation to Bickel is
the same text cited by Marshall

and is generally supportive of

53

Despite its skepticism about state laws, the "natural
order" perspective does not give the parties a "free ride"
in evaluating their cases,- they,

too,

must meet standards.

Black's Williams opinion emphasizes a party's "show of
support" as a relevant criterion for evaluating an equal

51

460 U.S. at 792.

52

460 U.S. at 805.

Bickel 's viewpoint is, however, not as friendly to
third parties as the "natural order" perspective. Following
the ideas quoted by Stevens, Bickel states that
From the point of view of fostering the two
party system this is counterproductive. It is
calculated to induce third party movements, like
the George Wallace party; calculated to drive
people away from the coalition-building process
that is the genius of the two-party system, and
into a premature and more likely permanent
ideological separatism, which is precisely what
the two party system is intended to prevent.
Bickel, Reform p. 88.
53

,

69

protection claim.
Panish

,

54

Burger's majority opinion in Lubin

v.

a 1974 case involving a successful challenge to

California filing fees, also emphasizes petitions and

a

show of voter support as proper tests of seriousness for a

candidacy.

55

Stevens affirms that states have the

"undoubted right to require candidates to make a

preliminary showing of substantial support" in his Anderson
opinion

56

The Role of Government

The "natural order" perspective is highly skeptical of

state laws and holds them to a standard of compelling state
interest. This hostility is evident in successive drafts of

Black's Williams opinion. An early draft simply refers to
the Ohio statutes as the state's "position" in the

controversy, but a later draft characterizes them as "very

restrictive election laws".

57

It is no surprise that

state interests are viewed with caution and the states are

forced to prove their claims. The "natural order" view of
federalism,

revealed most explicitly in the opinions

54

393 U.S.

55

415 U.S. at 718.

56

460 U.S. at 788,

at 34.

n.

9.

This change occurred between Justice Black's
October 9 and October 15, 1968 drafts of the Williams
opinion, at 393 U.S. 32 of the final opinion. See Williams
v. Rhodes draft opinions in Folder 17, Box 54, Thurgood
Marshall Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library Of Congress.
57

70

involving ballot access for presidential candidates, also
reflects a skepticism of state interests that clash with
the national interests of a presidential election process.

The control of state legislatures by the major parties
is one of the major reasons cited for skepticism of state

intent and interests in structuring party competition and
the electoral process. Stevens' Anderson opinion asserts

that the domination of state legislatures by the major

parties may put third party interests at a higher risk and
thus justify stronger scrutiny of ballot laws.

58

Likewise, Marshall's Munro dissent argues that "major

parties, which by definition are ordinarily in control of

legislative institutions, may seek to perpetuate themselves
at the expense of developing minor parties"

Marshall even

.

goes so far as to say that "the only purpose this statute
seems narrowly tailored to advance is the impermissible one
of protecting the major political parties from competition

precisely when that competition would be most
meaningful".

59

The obvious concern is that partisan self-

interest prevails in this type of regulation.

58

460 U.S. at 793,

n.

59

479 U.S. at 201,

205

60

16.

(Marshall,

J.,

dissenting).

The fact that these justices are so explicitly
willing to question the motives of legislators in this area
of policy reflects just how far the Court has moved since
the days of the "political question" doctrine, which
advocated a neutral acceptance of legislative choices
involving these types of issues.
60

71

That states have a proper role in regulating elections
is not in dispute.

The question is what the parameters of

that role are. Black's opinion in Williams emphasizes that

state powers over elections are not absolute, but are

instead subject to constitutional limits, such as equal
protection.

61

An internal memo from Justice Abe Fortas to

Black makes clear his view that a state may properly impose
some limitations. Justice Fortas expresses the following

reservations on a draft of Black's opinion:
I'm concerned lest the opinion be taken as
indicating that the State may not impose any
limitations relating to a political party's
securing or retaining a place on the ballot. 62

Along these same lines, Stevens's opinion in Anderson cites
the legitimate right of states to prevent electoral

distortions caused by party raiding. 63
The opinions favoring the "natural order" perspective

consider a variety of state interests, and find most of
them to be either invalid or insufficiently supported by or

related to the state laws in question. These avowed
interests include promotion of a two party system, desire
for a majority victor,

structuring the primary, and

preventing voter confusion caused by a crowded ballot, all

61

393 U.S.

at 29.

Justice Abe Fortas memo to Justice Hugo Black,
October 10, 1968, Folder 17, Box 54, Thurgood Marshall
Papers
62

63

460 U.S. at 789, n.

9

72

asserted by Ohio in Williams 64

regulation of the primary

;

ballot and financing of the primary, asserted by Texas in

Bullock 65

voter education, equal treatment, and

;

political stability, asserted by Ohio in Anderson 66
screening out frivolous candidates, asserted by Washington
in Munro 67

;

and prevention of sore losers and raiding,

asserted by Hawaii in Burdick 68

.

Most of these stated

interests focus on order, stability, and restriction, and

given the nature of the "natural order" perspective, it is
not surprising to find opinions skeptical of such claims.
In their view,

there is already too much control by the

states

Stevens's opinion in Anderson emphasizes another
aspect of the "natural order" perspective: its view of

national interests and the nature of federalism. Stevens
stresses the national interest in the conduct of

presidential elections, and argues that Ohio as a state is

restricting a national process, with possible impacts both
on the voters of Ohio and the national presidential

64

393 U.S. at 31-33. Justice Harlan cites evidence on
the last point in his concurrence, at 393 U.S. 47 (Harlan,
concurring)
J
.

,

65

405 U.S. at 145-47.

66

460 U.S. at 796-805.

67

479 U.S. at 200

68

112 S. Ct.

(Marshall,

at 2071-72

J.,

(Kennedy,
73

dissenting).
J.,

dissenting).

process.

69

A comparison of two earlier drafts of Anderson

reveals that Stevens' assertions here were previously even
stronger; in two places, the word "may" is inserted as a

modifier in a discussion of effects of the Ohio
statutes.

70

In his view,

the Ohio law "places a

significant state- imposed restriction on a nationwide
electoral process ". 71 It is clear that this national

process must be protected.
Thus,

while the "natural order" has not prohibited all

state regulation of parties and the electoral process,

it

is clearly skeptical of many state statutes and the

interests asserted to support them. State governments are

given the heavier burden of proof. This demanding standard
grows out of the central concern of the "natural order"

perspective: that competition between parties and amongst
ideas has been limited by state laws that create an

artificial two party electoral monopoly, restricting

opportunities for voters, groups, candidates, and parties.

The "Constructed Order Of Politics" Perspective

The central idea of the "constructed order of

politics" perspective is that the existing two party system

59

460 U.S. at 790,

795.

At 460 U.S. 790, "may have" was substituted for
"has" at line 3, and "may affect" for "changes" at line 9.
Anderson draft opinions, March 7, 1983, and April 5, 1983,
Folder 6, Box 321, Thurgood Marshall Papers.
70

71

460 U.S. at 795; emphasis added.
74

is a legitimate historical construction of democratic

political institutions (i.e. popularly elected
governments)

.

This school of thought also holds related

views in harmony with this contention: that the current

party system is competitive and open to hard- working third
parties and independents; that parties are open,

electorally-oriented organizations; and that primaries are
a

"winnowing device" for the general election. In addition,

it asks for a high standard of evidence for discrimination

and a burden of proof on such claimants rather than

claims,

the states; state laws are nondiscriminatory unless proven

otherwise. It is essentially a positive, though not totally

unquestioning, view of the political status quo and state

regulation of the electoral process. Most importantly,
there is much less of the skepticism shown by the "natural
order" towards the motives of elected state legislators

whose regulations structure parties and elections.

These views can be traced through a series of majority
opinions,

as well as dissenting opinions in cases where the

"natural order" perspective held sway. The most consistent

adherents to these views are Justices Byron White, Potter
Stewart,

Sandra Day O'Connor, and Chief Justice William

Rehnquist. Justice White in particular is the author of

majority opinions in Storer
Burdick

.

,

American Party

,

Munro,

and

They represent a strong and fairly consistent bloc

for granting leeway to the states in ballot access

75

regulation,

in marked contrast to the "natural order"

perspective
Stewart's Williams dissent probably provides the best

summary of the "constructed order" perspective. He asserts
the following:

As my brethren's surveys of ballot requirements
in the various States suggests, the present two
party system in this country is the product of
social and political forces rather than of legal
restrictions on minority parties. This Court has
been shown neither that in States with minimal
ballot restrictions third parties have
flourished, nor that in States with more
difficult requirements they are moribund. Mere
speculation ought not to suffice to strike down a
State's duly enacted laws 72
.

Barring proof, this view will not simply assume the failure
of the current system. To these justices,

the status quo

seems fully competitive and nondiscriminatory, and state

interest and authority too legitimate to override.

Party Competition and Choice
The contention that the existing party system is

democratically healthy and legitimate

is,

ironically,

stated most explicitly in a dissenting opinion. In

Williams

,

Stewart asserts that the current two party system

is the "product of social and political forces",

laws.

73

For Stewart,

not

the explanation for major party

dominance in Ohio, as well as the failure of George

72

393 U.S. at 60

(Stewart,

J.,

dissenting); emphasis

73

393 U.S.

at 60

(Stewart,

J.,

dissenting).

added

76

Wallace's American Independent Party and the Socialist
Labor Party to meet the requirements for the 1968 general

election ballot, lies not in Ohio's statutory filing
deadline and organizational requirements, but in the
realities of Ohio politics.

Though Stewart does not cite the writings of students
of parties,

his assertion finds some support amongst

political scientists. The work of John Fenton, for example,
argues that Ohio has long been a hotly divided two party

with job-oriented rather than issue-oriented

state,

parties.

74

Other scholars also classify Ohio as a "two

party competitive" state. 75 That type of political
environment would not appear to be fertile soil for a

multiparty system, irrespective of state laws.
The implications of viewing the existing party and

electoral system as a legitimate institutional construct
are reflected in how the justices who subscribe to this

view treat a variety of related issues. To begin with,

competition is assumed to be open to all political forces
and viewpoints unless proven otherwise. While this position
is often based on the assertion that alternative parties

74

John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), especially chap. 5, "Issueless
Politics In Ohio"
See, for example, John Bibby, Politics, Parties an d
p. 52,
Elections in America (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987)
State
American
Olson,
M.
David
and
Jewell
E.
and Malcolm
Dorsey
The
IL:
(Homewood,
Elections
and
Political Parties
Press, 1982)
p. 28
75

,

,

77

can meet the requirements, there is also an assumption that
two party politics is de facto evidence of competition.

White's majority opinion in American Party v. White

,

a

1974 case involving Texas petition and organization

requirements for third parties and independent candidates,
is reflective of this view of competition. White emphasizes

that all parties have electoral access and opportunity

through primary day under the Texas system, and that the
state laws are not impossible to meet:

Hard work and sacrifice by dedicated volunteers
are the lifeblood of any political organization.
Constitutional adjudication and common sense are
not at war with each other, and we are thus
unimpressed with arguments that burdens like
those imposed by Texas are too onerous,
especially when two of the original party
plaintiffs themselves satisfied the
requirement 76
As American Party indicates, party competition will be

assumed unless clear evidence of exclusion or

discrimination is offered. White uses Texas primary turnout
statistics to argue there is still a large pool of
77
potential petition signers available after a primary.

These statistics were cited in an evidentiary footnote that
was added between the February 15 and March

76

415 U.S. at 787.

77

415 U.S. at 789.
78

4,

1974,

drafts

of the opinion,

perhaps reflecting a need for White to

bolster his argument factually. 78
White's majority opinion in Storer also emphasizes
this positive view of current competition by giving an

alternative,

retrospective view of the facts in Williams

There, he states,

.

"the opportunity for political activity

within either of two major political parties was seemingly
available to all". 79

With a positive view of the existing two party system
and its possibilities for competition, it is not surprising
that the "constructed order" perspective appears to see no

special or unique role for third parties in American

politics. While the opinions of the "natural order"

perspective stress the unique and important role of third
parties,

the justices who voice the "constructed order"

perspective are virtually silent on this topic.

As the

previous quote from American Party indicates, these
justices view the marginality of third parties as a product
of lack of popular support,

not discriminatory laws.

Despite this lack of sympathy for third parties, the
"constructed order" perspective does not blindly dismiss
all third party claims. White's opinion in Storer

enunciates specific standards for evaluating the legitimacy

American Party v. White February 15 and March 4,
1974 opinion drafts, Folder 2, Box 123, Thurgood Marshall
Papers
78

,

79

415 U.S. at 746.
79

of an independent or third party candidate:

seriousness,

community support, and true independence. On the basis of
these standards, his opinion remands to the District Court
for further proceedings a challenge to California's five

percent signature requirement brought by the independent

presidential ticket of Gus Hall and Jarvis Tyner.

80

Chief

Justice Earl Warren's Williams dissent offers a similar
test for the legitimacy of third parties: a substantial

showing of voter interest; interest shown before the
election; and a party structure with some degree of

organization.

81

The last point is the most at variance

with White's test. Thus, while third parties and
independents have no essential role in the "constructed
order of politics", those which meet certain standards
should be free to participate.
The "constructed order" perspective's view of healthy

competition

is,

in essence,

a much less demanding one than

that of the "natural order". Unless proven otherwise, the

current two party system in most states is assumed to

provide sufficient competition; two party dominance is not
equated with a lack of competition, and state laws are seen
as neutral toward or protective of competition.

Since the

two major parties are not seen to stifle competition, the

415 U.S. at 738, 746. Gus Hall and Jarvis Tyner
were the Communist Party's candidates for President and
Vice President, respectively, in 1972.
80

81

393 U.S. at 70

(Warren,
80

C.J.,

dissenting).

"constructed order" perspective is also much more
indifferent to the fortunes of third parties.

Party Structure and Functions
The "constructed order" perspective's positive view of

competition and indifference to third parties is

complemented by a sanguine view of the openness of major
party membership and control to competitive forces, and an
emphasis on the electoral function of parties. To preserve
this competitive order, however,

the "constructed order"

also seeks to protect the integrity of parties and the

primary's role as a forum for final settlement of
intraparty disputes. This effective system of orderly

competition would be disrupted by unrestricted ballot
access

White's majority opinion in Storer offers an explicit

definition of a political party, one that reflects

a

pragmatic view of parties. According to White, a party is
an ongoing,

statewide organization; its goal is to gain

control of government by electing candidates; it holds

primaries and conventions and writes platforms,
responsibilities under state law; and has specified members
who join the party.

82

This understanding of a party is interesting for its

omissions as well as its inclusions. It holds that a

82

415 U.S. at 745.
81

party's key function is electoral, which comports with
political science definitions of party like that offered by
Leon Epstein.

83

But omitted is any explicit mention of

parties as responsible, programmatic carriers of ideas, as
is the case with the "natural order" perspective and also

the "responsible parties" model of party offered by a

number of political scientists. 84 This electoral

definition supports the perspective's positive view of the
existing two party system and is largely indifferent to
third parties

Stewart's majority opinion in Jenness v. Fort son

,

a

1971 case involving a Georgia five percent petition

signature requirement, is congruent with the Storer

definition of party and addresses more explicitly the
relationship of ideas to parties. Stewart argues that
Georgia's overall electoral system "recognizes the
potential fluidity of American political life", which seems
to imply that the major parties are open to changing views

and are fluid organizations in terms of ideas, membership,
and control. Stewart cites the 1966 gubernatorial election

and the 1968 presidential election in Georgia as proof that
this openness is more than theoretical; in both,

candidates

83

Epstein defines parties as "any group, however
loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental office
holders under a given label". Leon Epstein, Political
Parties In Western Democracies (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1967), p. 9.
APSA, Towards A More Responsible Two Party System,Challenges
White and Mileur, eds
84

.

.

,

82

gained access to the ballot by petition and carried the
state

85

It is unclear,

however, precisely where these opinions

stand on the question of party membership. The Storer

understanding of party membership and control appears
roughly congruent with the "party worker" model of party
membership,

in which those persons who have joined or

worked for a party organization are seen as members, and in
which the party organization controls the party. This
contrasts with the Jenness understanding, which seems
closer to the "ticket voter" model of party membership, in

which anyone who votes for party candidates is seen as a

member and in which the public "supporters" of a party
control the party.
The difference between these two understandings of

party membership is that, under the first definition, a
party is a much smaller, more bounded organization. Both

definitions find support in the political science
literature and have long been the subject of active debate,
so it is not surprising that the justices might apply both

understandings

86

Stewart's Jenness opinion also goes beyond Storer'
stark,

85

singular definition of parties to emphasize that a

403 U.S. at 439.

On this controversy, see Ranney, The Doctrine Of
Responsible Party Government pp. 17-19. Ranney' s work
reflects the fact that this debate splits even the ranks of
"responsible party" advocates.
86

,

83

spectrum of parties exists. Stewart argues that there are
different "types" of parties, which the state may

legitimately treat differently:
The fact is that there are obvious differences
in kind between the needs and potentials of a
political party with historically established
broad support, on the one hand, and a new or
small political organization on the other.
Georgia has not been guilty of invidious discrimination in recognizing the differences and
providing different routes to the printed
ballot 87

Jenness thus embodies an understanding of parties as a

heterogeneous "species" whose differences and distinctions
can be legitimately considered by the states in their

regulation of ballot access and other electoral matters.
This understanding, as well as the understanding of the

major parties as organizationally fluid, complements the

description of parties put forward in Storer

.

Justice Antonin Scalia's dissent in Norman offers a
small addition to the preceding definitions of a party. He

states that it is "reasonable to require a purported
'party'... to run candidates in all the districts that elect
the multimember board governing the subdivision. Otherwise,
it is less a 'party'

than an election committee for one

member of the board". 88 Since no other justice joined his
dissent,

it is unclear how much support there is for this

perspective. White's Storer opinion, in contrast,

87
88

403 U.S

.

at 439

112 S.Ct. at 710

(Scalia,
84

J.

(

dissenting).

emphasizes that states cannot force independent candidates
to form a new party organization in order to obtain access
to the ballot.

important,

89

This is thus a disputed, but nonetheless

corollary to the "constructed order" definition

of a party.

The "constructed order" view of parties is therefore a

heterogeneous one, though unified in its electoral and
pragmatic focus. In terms of party structure, membership,
and control, parties are seen as open to competition and

relatively nonideological in character. Their main function
is to win elections and control government.

This contrasts

markedly with the issue-oriented "natural order"
perspective on parties.
While parties are seen as open to competition, the

"constructed order" perspective also believes that parties
are vulnerable to disruption, requiring state statutes to

"protect" their integrity and stability and thereby

preserve competition. The major concerns of the
"constructed order" in this regard are raiding, sore
losers,

and the integrity of primary elections as a

"winnowing device" for the general election ballot; these

interests are given high value when asserted by state
governments. All of these concerns reflect a desire to

preserve the meaning of party labels and party membership
from being too open and fluid.

89

415 U.S. at 745-46.
85

One method used by states to protect party integrity

and prevent sore loser candidacies is the disaffiliation
statute. These statutes bar independent candidacies by

those who have been affiliated with a party within a

specified time period before the election. White's Storer

opinion upholds such a statute, viewing it as "expressive
of a general state policy aimed at maintaining the

integrity of the various routes to the ballot"

California's changing primary laws are cited as another

expression of this state policy, which the opinion views as
fully legitimate.

90

White's Storer opinion also emphasizes the legitimate
and complementary goals of preventing raiding and prolonged

intraparty disputes by using the primary as a winnowing
device to promote clear struggles at the general election.
To protect party integrity and clarify electoral choice,

any intraparty democracy must take place at the primary
stage,

not thereafter. California's history of primaries is

offered as evidence that the primary is an "integral part
of the electoral process",

a two tiered process of

intraparty and then interparty struggles.
earlier dissent in Williams

,

91

White's

in a similar vein,

describes

the primary as an "opportunity for the presentation and

90

415 U.S. at 733-34.

91

415 U.S. at 735.
86

winnowing out of candidates which is surely a legitimate
objective of state policy".

92

The pivotal purpose of these types of restrictions,

and of primary elections, is the preservation of a stable

political system not torn by factions. In Storer

,

for

example, White turns to James Madison to support this

argument,

citing the classic Federalist 10 essay on the

"evils" of factions.

93

noteworthy that the

It is

supporting language of this defense of "the State's
interest in the stability of its political system" was

strengthened in the final draft of Storer

.

While his first

draft characterized this state interest as permissible,

White's second draft calls the interest "not only

permissible but compelling "

94
.

Stewart's Jenness opinion highlights the winnowing

function of primaries from a slightly different angle. He
cites with approval Georgia's argument that the state has

proper role in "avoiding deception, confusion, and
frustration of the democratic process at the general
election".

95

This reflects a view that electoral

confusion will result if the primary does not winnow out
candidates; by preventing such confusion, the primary

92

393 U.S. at 62

93

415 U.S. at 735-36.

(White,

94

J.,

dissenting).

See Second Storer draft, March 22,
Thurgood Marshall Papers; emphasis added.
95

403 U.S. at 438.
87

1974,

Box 122,

preserves effective competition. White's Munro opinion also
accepts as legitimate this view of the primary as a device
to simplify the general election ballot.

96

In the "constructed order" perspective,

parties are

both open and bounded, fluid and vulnerable. This view

complements the positive view of competition in the

existing two party system. As a result, state interests in

protecting the integrity of parties and the electoral
process are seen as highly credible, and statutes to
protect the primary process and prevent sore losers and

raiding are seen as fully legitimate. This view of parties
is similar to the "responsible parties" view,

one crucial element: the latter'

s

but it lacks

generally strong emphasis

on ideology and platforms.

While these arguments of the "constructed order"

perspective are strong and consistent, their assumptions
are as subject to challenge as the "natural order"

opinions. White's opinions,

for example,

accept state

arguments regarding primaries and party integrity, but say

nothing about the comparative factional experiences of

preprimary and primary systems. As an examination of the
"constructed order" views of state law will demonstrate,
the arguments of state governments are given a substantial

benefit of the doubt.

96

479 U.S. at 196.
88

Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The positive view of current major party competition

detailed above leads, as one might expect, to a skepticism
about challenges to state statutes. With respect to

evidence and burden of proof, this skepticism translates
into a demand for strong evidence from challengers of

statutes and a placement of the burden of proof on their
shoulders. This strong burden of proof on challengers is

reflected consistently in the "constructed order" opinions.
The "constructed order" opinions, while not fully

refuting the "compelling state interest" tests put forward
by the "natural order" opinions, have applied such tests to
state statutes very leniently in practice. They are

consistent in calling for a lower burden on the states and
for a more lenient standard based on "reasonableness"

Stewart's dissent in Williams

,

for example,

sees the proper

standard as being whether a classification is "wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective".

97

Other "constructed order" opinions, such as

White's in Burdick

have echoed that emphasis on

,

"reasonableness" and relevance to legitimate state

objectives

98

The flip side of this lenient standard for the states
is an insistence on strong evidence from challengers;

393 U.S. at 51 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting
McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
97

,

98

112 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
89

discrimination must be proven. In Williams

,

for example,

Stewart's dissent chides the majority for its lack of

evidence on infringement of associational and voting
rights,

and dismisses the analogy with the NAACP

discrimination cases drawn by Black, arguing that
There is certainly no comparable showing that
Ohio's ballot requirements have any substantial
impact on the attempts of political dissidents
to organize effectively."
This perspective is thus unwilling to equate cases or

assume discrimination blindly.

White's opinion in Storer captures this skepticism. He
asserts that one cannot automatically invalidate all

substantial restrictions,- there is no bright line test,

"no

substitute for the hard judgments that must be made"
White's opinion also suggests that this skepticism is not
dogmatic; Storer

'

s

remand of the Hall\Tyner petition

signature challenge underscores the fact that requirements
can be unconstitutionally severe.

100

His majority opinion

in Burdick also reaffirms that not all burdensome laws are

subject to strict scrutiny.

101

Many of the "constructed order" opinions stress a lack
of proof by those challenging statutes. Rehnquist's

Anderson dissent emphasizes a lack of proof in the record,
and argues that "a statute 'is not to be upset upon

99

393 U.S. at 60

(Stewart, J., dissenting).

100

415 U.S. at 738.

101

112 S. Ct. at 2063.
90

hypothetical and unreal possibilities, if it would be good

upon the facts as they are'". He claims the record leads to
a

"contrary conclusion" from that of the majority.

102

The citations above indicate that restrictions will
not be assumed to damage competition. This caution is

reflected in doubts about some of the tests put forward by
the "natural order" opinions. Justice Harry Blackmun's

concurring opinion in Illinois Board

,

for example,

takes

issue with the three part test used by Marshall in the

majority opinion, calling it too filled with "easy
phrases",

and thereby easy to misuse. He compares the

application of the "compelling state interest" test to past
Court use of the "substantive due process" doctrine in the

economic realm.

103

This reluctance to assume a burden on competition

appears to derive not only from the aforementioned sympathy
to state interests,

but also from skepticism of the

rationale of the "natural order" jurists for their
decisions. These doubts are reflected in Stewart's Williams
dissent; he asserts that the majority's result seems in

part to rest on "possible doubts regarding the

permissibility of the legislative objective itself".

104

The "constructed order" does not share this suspicion of

102
103
104

460 U.S. at 809

440

us

_

(Rehnquist, J

at 188-89

393 U.S. at 53

(Blackmun,

(Stewart,
91

J.,

.

,

dissenting).

J.,

concurring).

dissenting).

legislative purposes and actions, and is thus willing to
hold their actions to a lesser legal standard.
If discrimination must therefore be proven,

the

question becomes what evidence will be sought and examined.
One important factor is the comparative burden of ballot

access methods. The "constructed order" opinions have found
primaries, petition signatures, and conventions to be

equally burdensome routes to the ballot. Stewart's opinion
in Jenness asserts that obtaining signatures cannot be

assumed to be more burdensome than winning a primary.
This was reemphasized by White in American Party

primary turnout and Clifton McCleskey

'

s

,

105

who cites

Texas Politics on

the relative burdens of petition signatures and primaries.
In the same case,

White is also unpersuaded that a

convention is more burdensome than a primary, stating that
"appellant's burden is not satisfied by mere
assertions".

106

Rehnquist's Anderson dissent even claims

that maj or parties bear the heavier organizational and

ballot access burden.

107

Challengers must also show evidence of efforts to
comply with existing requirements. Warren's and White's

Williams dissents argue that the laws were known by the

plaintiffs but no effort was made to comply, a fact they

105

403 U.S. at 434-40.

106

415

107

460 U.S. at 816

us>

at 781/

787-90.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92

find to be critical.

108

This is echoed by White in

American Party when he stresses that two minor parties were
able to meet Texas requirements, while one fell far short
of compliance and another made no effort to comply. 109

The "constructed order" perspective also considers

comparative laws from other states to be relevant evidence.
Stewart's Jenness opinion cites similar ballot access laws
from other states in upholding Georgia's five percent

signature requirement.

110

Historical and current

political experience within the state is also seen as
relevant evidence, as for example White's charge to the

District Court in his Storer remand of the Hall\Tyner
dispute asking that court to consider the facts of

California politics as evidence.

111

Another type of evidence examined by the "constructed
order" opinions is the nature of the current methods. In
his Munro opinion, White cites Washington's blanket primary
as offering virtually guaranteed access to a statewide

ballot. According to him,

the requirement of a one percent

vote percentage in this primary is no real burden on the

108

393 U.S. at 62 (White, J., dissenting), 65
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). Cheif Justice Warren is even
skeptical of the 450,000 signatures collected by George
Wallace's supporters, stating correctly that they had never
been verified by the state.
109

415 U.S. at 778-79.

110

403 U.S. at 434.

111

415 U.S. at 742.
93

political opportunity to access the general election
ballot. He also stresses that the 1977 legislation

requiring this primary vote percentage did seem to be

responding to increasingly cluttered ballots at that
time

112

One of the more pivotal items of evidence for the

"constructed order" perspective is being able to

demonstrate a "show of support". Stewart's opinion in
Jenness finds that Georgia's five percent signature

requirement does not infringe on any associational or

voting rights because it is simply demanding a reasonable
show of public support for the party.

113

A party must

show it can attract support in the marketplace of politics

This echoes White's Storer standards for legitimate third

parties and independent candidates. That opinion also

emphasizes the need to show public support, a task also
faced by major party candidates.

114

Blackmun's partial concurrence in Lubin highlighted

a

important evidentiary corollary to the "show of support"
requirement: opportunity to show such support is assumed
be unimpeded if alternative means of ballot access are

provided by the states

.

Blackmun argues that the main

problem in Lubin was a lack of alternative routes to the

112

479 U.S. at 196,

113

403 U.S.

at 437-40.

114

415 U.S

at 733

.

198.

94

t

ballot,

and that the provision of a write-in option would

alleviate the issue.

115

This echoes Stewart's Jenness

opinion, which highlights the allowance of write-in votes

and independent candidates, the lenient filing deadline,
and the lack of a required primary under the Georgia system
as evidence that competition is not stifled. 116

This stress on alternative means of access is echoed
in all the "constructed order" opinions. White's opinion in

American Party notes four methods of ballot access
available to Texas candidates.

117

Rehnquist's Anderson dissent details alternate routes to
the Ohio ballot.

White in Burdick

118

:

The same standard is employed by

access by petition, primary, and

nonpartisan ballot is available to the challengers, and
therefore their ability to compete is not heavily

burdened

119

With these standards of evidence, the burden of proof
is placed on the challengers of state statutes,

as the

"constructed order" opinions demonstrate. White's Munro
opinion,

for example,

argues that a "proof" of state

interests has never been required, citing Storer in

115

415 U.S. at 723

116

403 U.S.

117

415 U.S. at 772-75.

118

460 U.S. at 807

119

112 S. Ct. at 2066-67.

at 434,

(Blackmun,

J.,

concurring).

438.

(Rehnquist, J.,

95

dissenting).

particular:

"there is no indication that we held California

to the burden of demonstrating empirically the objective

effects on political stability that were produced by the

one-year disaffiliation requirement". Requiring such proof,

according to White, would lead to "endless court battles
over the sufficiency of the 'evidence'".

120

The

"constructed order" perspective seems to have no such

evidentiary qualms when it comes to demanding proof from
challengers. In essence, the benefit of the doubt is given
to the states,

whose word will be taken at face value; the

challengers of such laws bear the burden of proof.

121

The "constructed order" perspective shows itself to be
a friend of the states in its treatment of evidence and

burden. While challengers can make arguments,

they must

show that no alternate means are available, that public

support has been offered, and that the means of access are

more burdensome than other means available to different
parties. Given these high standards,
task.

they have a difficult

It should thereby come as no surprise that the

120

479 U.S. at 194-95.

The employment of the "burden of proof" technique
for considering these cases is an indication that the
evidence is very much in dispute and/or difficult to
obtain. The demand that a "burden of proof" be satisfied
thus implies that assumptions and ideology will inevitably
color the interpretation of contested evidence. It thus
comes as no surprise that the interpretations of both
perspectives being examined here contain their own
particular assumptions.
121

96

"constructed order" perspective also takes a positive
attitude toward the character and impact of state laws.

The Role of Government
The "constructed order" perspective,

in addition to

its positive view of current party competition,

sees state

laws as nondiscriminatory in character, with a neutral or

even positive impact on competition. This view of state
laws is reflected in White's Storer opinion, which cites

prevention of raiding and the protection of the integrity
of the electoral process as legitimate state objectives

furthered by such laws.

122

State regulations are not

merely neutral to party competition, but are legitimate
interventions to protect competition and the existing party
system.

The "constructed order" perspective justifies its

positive treatment of state authority over the ballot on
constitutional, legal, and political grounds. The most

important of these are the constitutional and legal

justifications for state management of the electoral
process. Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Anderson argues
that state authority in this area is proper, based on

Article

2,

Section

and manner" clause)

1

.

of the Constitution

(the "time,

place

He also cites the Court's decision in

Macpherson v. Blacker as affirming legislative power in

122

415

US-

at 731<
97

this area.

123

Stewart's Williams dissent also frames the

question of state regulation as one of constitutional
power,

not public policy.

124

Most recently, White's

opinion in Burdick argues that "common sense, as well as
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government
must play an active role in structuring elections", and
that strict scrutiny would tie the hands of the states in
this area.

125

The "constructed order" view of federalism provides

another critical justification for their understanding of
the proper state role in this area. This is particularly

evident in the Williams dissents. Stewart refers to his

reluctance to strike down Ohio's laws by saying that to do
so would "require more insensitivity to constitutional

principles of federalism than

I

possess".

126

Warren's

dissent refers to "the need to promote orderly federalstate relationships" and "the legitimate demands of

federalism"; he even asserts that "this Court is writing a
new presidential election law for the State of Ohio"

Warren also cites past Court deferments to the states in
"these sensitive areas",

123

specifically on apportionment

(Rehnquist, J.,
146 U.S. 1 (1892).

460 U.S. at 806-9

Mcpherson v. Blacker

,

124

393 U.S.

125

112 S. Ct. at 2062-63.

126

393 U.S.

at 48

at 60

(Stewart,

(Stewart,
98

dissenting). See

J.,

dissenting).

J.,

dissenting).

procedures.

127

It is quite clear that the "constructed

order" opinions have a sure idea of the proper roles of

federal and state governments in this area.

Positive treatment of state authority is also

justified in "political" terms, i.e., the state interests
in stability and integrity discussed earlier. White's

Storer opinion accepts California's proffered interests of
fairness, honesty,

and order at face value.

128

His Munro

opinion reinforces these justifications, contending that
associational rights are not absolute and "are necessarily
subject to qualification if elections are to be run fairly
and effectively".

129

These interests are strongly

reminiscent of Progressive justifications for electoral

reform
Other state interests accepted by the "constructed
order" perspective also have a Progressive echo. White's

Burdick opinion emphasizes state interests in avoiding
divisive factionalism. Thus, Hawaii may try to prevent sore
loser candidates and party raiding by eliminating write-ins
as a method of circumventing anti-raiding laws. The

legitimate intent behind these interests, according to

127

393 U.S. at 65-69

quotes are from pages 66,
128

129

415

us

479 U-S

_

_

(Warren,
69,

and 68,

at 730.
at 193

_

99

dissenting). The
respectively.

C.J.,

White,

is the maintenance of the "integrity of the

democratic system".

130

A state government may manage the electoral process,
so long as its interventions are proper. The classification
of parties is one such "proper" state intervention.

Stewart's Williams dissent views the majority as disputing
this legitimate legislative objective, and finds it

"inconceivable

.

.

.

that the Constitution imposes on the

States a political philosophy under which they must be

satisfied to award election on the basis of a plurality
rather than a majority vote".

131

Stewart's Jenness opinion affirms the legitimacy of such
classification, asking rhetorically if nonmajor party

candidates would want to have to conduct a primary, as the

major parties in Georgia are required to do.

132

Regarding another type of state management, White's
opinion in American Party approves of the state's right to
permit only one "voting act". While states can allow

multiple acts, the Court cannot impose an affirmative duty
to do this. White cites one Supreme Court and three lower

court decisions in support of this assertion.

133

His

Storer opinion also cites the legitimacy of this

130

112 S. Ct. at 2066-67.

131

393 U.S. at 48,

132

403 U.S. at 442.

133

415

us

at 785

53-54

_

100

(Stewart,

J.,

dissenting).

limitation.
actions,

134

These justifications and "approved" state

in sum,

indicate an unwillingness on the part of

these justices to intrude into state decisions,
reminiscent
of Warren's Williams dissent.

constitutionality,

For reasons of

federalism, and political viewpoint, the

"constructed order" opinions give the states wide leeway in

managing the conduct of the party system and the electoral
process

Conclusions
As this chapter has shown,

opinions,

the Court's ballot access

from Williams in 1968 to Burdick in 1992, can be

seen not only as a shifting treatment of ballot access

regulation, but as a continuing debate over the status of

party competition, the current party system, and the impact
of state laws on that system. One perspective sees a

legitimate "constructed order of politics", while the other
sees an "natural order of politics" distorted by state

regulation. The Court's ballot access opinions reflect a

theoretical agreement on the need for party competition and
the prohibition of discrimination. They are also united in

their emphasis that parties must demonstrate a "show of
support" from the public. The justices appear to agree in

theory on the basic nature of a party. They also agree that
the state has a legitimate role to play in structuring the

134

415 U.S. at 741.
101

electoral process. Beyond these basic values, however, the
justices part company on how parties and the party system

operate in practice, particularly with regard to questions
of democracy

(party competition)

and authority (the

legitimacy of state laws regulating access to the ballot)

.

There is major disagreement between the two

perspectives on a variety of issues. First, they do not
agree on what constitutes healthy party competition. The

"constructed order" jurists believe that the two major

parties allow for sufficient competition, while the
"natural order" justices believe that a system monopolized
by two parties stifles full competition. As a result, those

who embrace the "natural order" perspective put a special

emphasis on the unique and pivotal role of third parties in

promoting competition, particularly in the realm of ideas.
With regard to the functions of parties, the electoral
function is not disputed. The "natural order", however,
places greater and more explicit emphasis on the issue-

raising function of parties than does the "constructed
order"

.

The perspective seems also to have a skeptical view

of the openness of membership and control in the two major

parties
The two perspectives also take very different

approaches to issues of federalism. The "constructed order"
is reluctant to interfere with state judgments regarding

regulation of the electoral process. Even when ruling
against a state ballot access law, these justices ground
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their decision on the narrowest rationale, preserving
as

much state freedom as possible. The "natural order", on the
other hand,

is much more willing to question state

regulations and to hold states to a high standard of

compelling interest. From these different views of

federalism and the dynamics of the party system come the
continuing divisions on the Court over ballot access

regulation
A number of observations are relevant to the analysis
of these ballot access opinions. The opinions which contain

these perspectives tend to focus on the perspective's
central concerns, and give little attention to "opposing"

points of view. In the "constructed order" opinions, scant

attention is given to third parties, and discrimination is
not focused upon. The "natural order" opinions,

contrast,

in

are limited in their discussion of the nature of

parties or the interests of the state. Each addresses a
different facet of the questions considered here, and their
views on other facets are more implied than explicit.

Both perspectives are also "silent", in evidentiary
terms,

on some of their central assertions. Their cases,

essence,

in

are both based in part on assumptions, and neither

gives a full and convincing factual defense of its

positions. The nature of the judicial forum and its modes
of discourse helps to explain these facts.

Since much of

the Court's approach is based on precedent, past arguments

and positions are often repeated in a string of cases; we
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have seen this in the foregoing analysis. In addition, the
legal opinion is not a debate pamphlet or a treatise,

though elements of both do slip into some opinions; an

opinion need not cite data nor meet all possible issues,
but must simply convey the legal findings of the court

involved. This lack of focus on factual evidence is a

result of the Supreme Court's identity as an appellate

rather than a trial court. It may only examine the

court,

facts found at trial for their sufficiency or their

connection to the proper legal doctrine to be applied in
the case. As a result,

assertions in opinions can seem very

stark

While these artifacts of the legal forum shape the
verbal content of the opinions, they do not determine the

essential positions taken. The views explored here are

substantive stances, not verbal figureheads trotted out to
make a

f oundationless

decision. The opinions, despite their

skeletal nature, contain very real perspectives and

positions
In terms of the justices'

records,

allegiances and voting

there are some fairly clear divisions. One finds

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas giving consistent
support to the "natural order" perspective, while Justices
White,

Sandra Day O'Connor, Stewart, Scalia, and Rehnquist

have consistently supported the "constructed order"

perspective. Other Justices, such as Blackmun, Lewis
Powell,

Stevens,

and Burger, have shifted their stances
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over time, and have thereby held the balance between these
two "blocs". The "constructed order" perspective is in the

majority most frequently, but the "natural order"
perspective continues to press its views in dissents, and
has in fact won some major victories in Williams and

Anderson

.

There is also a more subtle division in these cases

which crosscuts the division

I

have sketched. This is

between those cases that have had a unanimous or an eight
member majority opinion, versus those cases where at least
two justices have dissented from the majority. Examining
the cases from this perspective shows us where the

"persuadable justices" have been able to bring the opposing

perspectives together, and where they have landed when the
two viewpoints could not be reconciled. They also reveal

what the "unbending principles" of each perspective are.
In the "unanimous" column (9-0 or 8-1)

opinions: Jenness

Board

,

and Norman

,

.

Bullock

,

Lubin

,

,

we find six

American Party

,

Illinois

The connecting threads in these cases

appear to be the presence or absence of alternative avenues
to obtain ballot access,

as well as an emphasis on equal

treatment for equally situated parties. In Jenness and

American Party

,

alternative means of access were judged to

be easily available,

and so the Georgia and Texas signature

requirements were upheld. In Bullock and Lubin

,

the Texas

and California filing fees at issue were seen to bar all

alternative means of access to the ballot, and were
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therefore overturned. Illinois Board and Norman both

involved Illinois statutes that imposed differential
signature requirements for local and statewide ballot
access that fell more heavily on local candidates. Since
this was clearly unequal treatment of similar parties, the

requirements were overturned.
On the substantive side,

these unanimous cases reflect

an agreement that similar parties must be treated alike and

that multiple means of access to the ballot must be

available. With regard to the justices and the two

perspectives,

they demonstrate that the two "blocs" are not

rigidly opposed to each other; there are some areas where

both perspectives can agree.
Despite this unanimity, the differences were still
present even in these cases. Internal Court memos, for
example,

reflect that both Powell and Stewart may have had

some hesitation and doubt in the Illinois Board case. Both

wrote to Marshall indicating they would wait for

concurrences (in Powell's case, Rehnquist's) before joining

Marshall's opinion.
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This fits both their stance as

"middle figures" on these issues, as well as their general

leanings toward the "constructed order" perspective.
By comparison, there were five cases in which at least
two justices dissented from the majority: Williams

(6-3)

Justice Lewis Powell memo to Thurgood Marshall,
January 4, 1979, and Potter Stewart memo to Thurgood
Marshall, December 9, 1978, Folder 10, Box 228, Thurgood
Marshall Papers.
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Storer (6-3), Anderson (5-4), Munro (7-2), and Burdick
3)

.

Of these,

(6-

Williams and Anderson followed the "natural

order" perspective, while Storer

,

Munro,

and Burdick (all

authored by White) followed the "constructed order"
perspective. The causes of division in these cases appear
to be rooted in the different views of healthy party

competition elaborated in this chapter, but also in the
respective facts, which point less clearly to an obvious

decision than the facts of the unanimous cases. In all of
these cases, the alternative means of access were more

complex and restricted. The skepticism about their

effectiveness was increased by the biases of the state
political cultures involved, particularly the political
cultures of Ohio

(

Williams

,

Anderson

)

and Hawaii

The presence of six opinions in Williams

(a

(

Burdick

)

majority

opinion fully joined by one concurrence, another concurring
opinion,

and three dissents)

is a clear example of how

deeply these issues can divide the justices.
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What differences do these contentious cases reveal?

Anderson and Williams both dealt with Ohio presidential
filing deadlines, which the "constructed order" saw as

efficacious and the "natural order" saw as stifling. Storer
dealt with a disaffiliation requirement, with the same

divisions as Williams
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.

Munro dealt with a one percent

It is noteworthy that commentators have given

little or no attention to the divisions in Williams, since
association
it is a foundational case for party freedom of
jurisprudence
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primary vote requirement, and Burdick with a ban on writein votes. The justices divided on how severely these

restricted competition and how many alternate means were

effectively available.

With the departure from the Court of the leading
proponents of the "natural order" perspective, Justices
Brennan, Douglas and Marshall,

it would appear that the

"constructed order" view will have greater prominence in
ballot access jurisprudence, with the "natural order"

opinions preserving that perspective by virtue of their

precedential weight. The areas where the justices agree are
likely to remain stable. The results of Norman and Burdick
seem to bear out these predictions

.

Burdick shows the

"constructed order" view in ascendance, while Norman
represents the type of common ground on which the justices
have met in other earlier decisions.
The justices who bear watching as to the future of
this debate are the Burdick dissenters: Kennedy, Blackmun,

and Stevens. The latter two have been swing votes in past
cases,

and the trend of the Court may be pushing them

towards the Marshal l\Brennan position. Kennedy is a

relative newcomer to these cases. Future cases will show us
how these alignments fare.

Beyond the Court, these two perspectives may be found
in the literature of political science on party

competition,

the functions of parties,

and the nature of

state electoral laws. With regard to the competitiveness
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of

the current party system, most political scientists seem to

share Penniman's assessment that third party weakness is
due to politics and not laws. Most, however, do underscore
the important historical role that third parties have

played in the United States. With regard to the nature,
membership, and functions of the major parties, most

political scientists would agree that their main purpose is
electoral,

though this point has been debated by the

proponents of "responsible parties" for many decades. The

vulnerability of party membership and control to outside
influences, and whether party membership should be defined
as party worker or ticket voter,

are as actively debated in

political science as they are amongst the justices. With
regard to the state role in the electoral process, most

political scientists acknowledge that state management of
the electoral process at some level is likely to be a

permanent part of American politics. Even those who argue
for the legal deregulation of parties understand and accept

such a state role. In this, they appear to agree with the

mainstream of thought on the Court
The practical implications for parties and the polity
in this continuing debate are important,

albeit restrained

by the passive nature of the Court's ability to address
these issues,

i.e.,

ballot access disputes must be brought

to court and must climb the appeals ladder to the Court.

The debate reveals a continuing split in the opinions, and

among the justices, regarding the competitive health of
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the

current party system, the functions of parties, and the
impact of state regulation of the ballot. Since the ballot
is a tool for all parties,

such continuing disagreement is

not positive for either the major parties, which face

uncertainty as to third party and other challenger's access
to voters,

or independent and third party challengers, who

face uncertainty as to their ability to access the ballot.
If these opinions are indicative of the Court's general

viewpoints on party and electoral issues, it may not be a
wise forum for those who seek stable standards for ballot
access or a consistent view of the current party system.
The implications of the justices' divisions for

parties and the electoral process are thus twofold. The

agreements on the nature of parties and the general shape
of the democratic system indicate that parties will

continue to be recognized and have a basic set of rights.
The more troubling implications, however,

lie in the

differences over the party system and state regulations.

Neither side of the "argument" has formulated a sharply
defined standard beyond some general phrases, and neither
side has fully convinced the other or consistently

dominated the Court's rulings. This means that a ballot
access litigant can never be sure of the standard or result
to expect from the Court, making it a risky forum for

trying to open up access to the ballot, as well as for

advancing the rights of third parties and independent
candidates more generally. The following chapters will
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indicate whether the justices have been equally divided in

their views of other parts of the electoral process and the

party system.

Ill

CHAPTER

3

NOMINATION METHODS, PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE
COURT
Like many other electoral activities, the

organizational structures of political parties, as well as
their methods for nominating candidates for office, were

originally private matters managed by the parties. Early
parties determined their own structure and membership
without government intervention, and made nominations by
caucuses or conventions of their own devising. These

methods evolved through the first half of the nineteenth
century.

1

State governments made their first forays

into the governance of party activities following the Civil
War,

when a number of states enacted party primary laws.

The initial impact of these interventions was minimal, as
these laws were either optional or narrowly constructed and
thus either integrated into party practices or avoided.

Most parties continued to have full control over

organization, membership, and nomination of candidates

until the late 19th century. 2
The widespread adoption of Australian (secret) ballot
laws by state governments between 1888 and 1900 provided
the legal and political impetus for wider regulation of

V.O. Key, Politics, Parties, And Pressure Groups
5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), pp. 371-72.
1

,

Charles E. Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary
Elections (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928). See also
Penniman, Sait's American Parties p. 277.
2

,
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parties during the Progressive Era. The scattered and
optional primary laws became more widespread and mandatory,
as a number of states enacted statutes governing party

organization and party registration for voters. The main
justification for these direct primary and party

organization statutes, voiced most consistently by

Wisconsin Governor (later U.S. Senator) Robert La Follette,
Sr.,

was to take power out of the hands of corrupt

political machines and their "bosses" and return it to "the
People"

3

Despite some resistance by parties and a period of
limited use in the presidential nominating process, primary
and party organizational statutes have persisted and given
the states an important role in shaping the electoral

process. These statutes have also captured the imagination
of a majority of the American public,

to such a degree that

arguments for returning control of party organizations and
the nomination process to the parties are greeted with

considerable skepticism. This is particularly true in the
states where the Progressive tradition has its strongest
4

roots

Robert M. La Follette, La Follette' s Autobiography
La
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960)
ubiquitous
an
is
people"
"the
in
confidence
Follette' s
theme in the book, but is particularly well stated on p.
3

.

96

.

For recent and striking polling data on the
acceptance of primaries, see Sabato, The Party' s Just
Begun p. 207.
4

,
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The justices of the U.S. Supreme Court,

in seven major

decisions since 1972, have played an important role in

modifying the legal order in this area. The majority
viewpoint among the justices has given parties

substantially increased authority over their nominating
procedures and internal party structures, while still
leaving a role for some state regulation if compelling
state interests in such regulation can be demonstrated. As
a result,

the parties have now regained a measure of their

previous authority over their internal structures and

decisionmaking
The arguments and divisions among the justices in the

seven cases to be examined in this chapter are similar to
those in the ballot access opinions. The majority of the

justices in these cases have voted to overturn state laws,

arguing that they take away the freedom of association that

properly belongs to the party. The justices who depart from
the majority view argue that much greater deference should

be accorded to state interests and to democratically

enacted state laws, since the states have authority under
the Constitution to manage elections as they see fit. On

one side are justices who argue for party freedom,

facing

justices who are more sympathetic to state interests.

While there is less talk of "monopoly" in these

opinions than in the ballot access decisions, the

undertones of such a viewpoint are evident if one examines
the question of who the justices trust to make decisions
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about organization and nomination. The majority of justices
put faith in the parties themselves, and doubt the

intentions of the status quo state governments. The

dissenting justices defer to the authority of popularly
elected officeholders as a proper expression of democracy.
As in the ballot access decisions,

some justices trust the

"constructed order", while the majority are more skeptical
of its relation to the "natural order" of politics and

democracy

The "Natural Order" Viewpoint

The majority of justices in the party governance

opinions take a dim view of state restrictions on party
organization, party registration, and nomination

procedures. The major contention of these justices is that
the character of parties, and thereby the electoral

process,

is distorted by state-mandated structures and

procedures which reduce democratic control and
opportunities for choice. This structuring, a kind of
"construction" of a mutant political order, is viewed as

unjustified by the state interests asserted. The views of
these justices on competition, parties, legal standards,
and state law reflect this concern.

Party Competition and Choice
At the heart of the "natural order" perspective is a

belief in the constitutional freedom of parties to choose
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their own methods of governance and nomination, and a

belief that such freedom is the best guarantor of full

democratic competition. This is evident in Cousins
Wigoda,
area.

5

v.

the first full decision by the justices in this

Cousins involved delegates from Illinois to the

1972 Democratic National Convention. Upholding the freedom
of the convention to choose which of two sets of delegates
it will seat to represent Illinois,

the Cousins majority

grounds their decision in the party membership's right of

association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Illinois statutes are viewed as constituting a

"significant interference" with that freedom. According to
the author of the majority opinion, Justice Brennan,

competition is best structured by the parties, not state
governments

s

The particular effects of state laws like that of

Illinois on competition are also cited by Brennan. He

connects the law in question to the ballot access
decisions, arguing that the nomination process can restrict

Cousins was preceded
Cousins 419 U.S. 477 (1975)
by O'Brien v. Brown 409 U.S. 1 (1972), a brief per curiam
decision which involved a dispute between the National
Democratic Party and individuals from California and
Illinois who had been chosen as delegates to the 1972
Democratic National Convention, over their delegate status.
The case is important in "freedom of association" terms
because it explicitly states that there is an "absence of
authority ...in intervening in the internal determinations
of a national political party, on the eve of its
convention, regarding the seating of delegates". 409 U.S.
5

.

,

,

at 4

.

6

419 U.S. at 487-88.
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voter choice as much as a restricted ballot. He cites a
dissent by Justice Pitney in Newberry v. U.S. to buttress
his argument for the importance of nominations for

competitive choice: "the likelihood of a candidate

succeeding in an election without a party nomination is

practically negligible

... as

a practical matter,

the

ultimate choice of the mass of voters is predetermined when
the nominations have been made". 7 State laws restricting
the national process of the convention ultimately damage

national voter choice and thereby reduce competition.

Although the justices in Cousins do not discuss
explicitly,

it

their decision in this Illinois dispute is also

highly relevant to local voter choice and the

representational concerns of minority groups. The alternate

delegation seated by the 1972 Democratic Convention was led
by Jesse Jackson, long a spokesman for minority concerns,
and was chosen to challenge the "official" Illinois

delegation. The "official" delegation effectively

represented the interests of Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's
political "machine", at a time when Daley's organization

appeared to be increasingly unresponsive to African-

419 U.S. at 490, quoting Newberry v. U.S
256 U.S. 232, 286 (1921). Newberry involved the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 and its regulations on
congressional campaign spending; U.S. Senator Truman
Newberry's conviction for violating these regulations was
overturned by a four justice plurality that argued Congress
has no power over primaries. That line of reasoning was
later firmly rejected in Smith v. Allwright.
7

Cousins

.

,
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,

Americans and their concerns.

8

Thus,

Cousins offered

"after the fact" support to the ongoing effort to open up

participation in Democratic Party politics.

9

This emphasis on protecting and expanding competition
is also evident in Marshall's majority opinion in Tashi ian
v.

Republican P arty of Connecticut

,

which involved the

Connecticut Republican Party's effort to open some of its

primary elections to unaffiliated voters, a practice

prohibited by the state's closed primary law. Upholding the
right of the Connecticut Republicans to allow participation
of these voters,

Marshall states that "the Party's attempt

to broaden the base of public participation in and support

for its activities is conduct undeniably central to the

exercise of the right of association". 10 This is clearly

supportive of allowing parties to broaden their base of

Though he had initially had strong political support
from the African-American wards of Chicago, a series of
events- -including Martin Luther King, Jr.'s open housing
march in 1966 --had soured the relationship between
minorities and the Daley "machine". Michael B. Preston,
"Political Change In The City: Black Politics In Chicago,
1871-1987", in Peter F. Nardulli, ed., Diversity, Conflict,
and State Politics: Regionalism in Illinois (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1989), pp. 178-94.
8

The 1972 seating of the alternate Illinois
delegation can be seen as a part of the culmination of a
process that began in 1964 with the unsuccessful attempts
of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegation to
be seated at the Democratic National Convention. This
effort helped build the momentum for the expansion of
minority group participation in Democratic Party
decisionmaking processes.
9

10

479 U.S. at 214.
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participation if they so choose, even if this overturns
contrary state law.
This emphasis is strengthened by Marshall's discussion
of Connecticut's claim that the Republican's plan would

impose a substantial administrative burden on the state. In

finding against the claim, Marshall asserts that "the State
could not forever protect the two existing major parties

from competition solely on the ground that two major

parties are all the public can afford"

.

In drawing an

analogy between keeping a third party off the ballot due to

administrative cost and prohibiting unaffiliated voters in
a primary,

Marshall reveals a continuing concern with

monopoly, as well as suspicion of state justifications for

restricting the political playing field. 11
Participation, however,

is not equated with

organizational anarchy in the "natural order" perspective.

Marshall's Tashi ian opinion emphasizes the borders of the
association, referring to the Democratic Party v. La

Follette decision and its emphasis on "the freedom to

identify the people who constitute the association"

;

a

footnote also stresses that the decision applies only to

unaffiliated voters, not to voters of other parties. 12
Thus,

competition is not unequivocally opened across all

party boundaries. Nonetheless, the principal authority for

11

479 U.S. at 218.

12

479 U.S. at 224-25, n.

13.
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determining a party's boundaries should be the party, since
"a major state political party necessarily includes

individuals playing a broad spectrum of roles in the

organization's activities", roles which the party can best
recognize

13

Another aspect of competition relates to a party's
ability to endorse candidates for nomination; this issue is

addressed in the nearly unanimous opinion in Eu
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee

.

San

v.

Marshall's

majority opinion cites the campaign finance case of Buckley
v.

Valeo for the proposition that "debate on the

qualifications of candidates" is a central part of our
democratic system. Debate is a form of competition, which
these justices seek to protect and encourage. Nor do they
limit its range:

"free discussion about candidates for

public office is no less critical before a primary than

before a general election". 14

Any effort to limit public discussion or access is
regarded as highly suspect by the "natural order"
perspective. In Eu, Marshall notes that "a 'highly

paternalistic approach' limiting what people may hear is
generally suspect". 15 The strong connection between
speech,

1

(

association, and competition drawn by these

13

479 U.S. at 214-15.

14

489 U.S. at 223,

per curiam
15

)

citing Buckley v. Valeo

(1976)

489 U.S. at 223

.
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,

424 U.S.

justices is evident in Eu: let the parties and the voters

make their own decisions in an open political "field", with
only minimal state restriction of their choices.
Cases involving party registration requirements for

voters also raise issues of competition and its
restriction. In his dissent in Rosario v. Rockefeller

,

a

case in which the majority justices upheld a New York State

statute that mandated a deadline for party registration in
order to vote in a future party primary, Justice Powell,

joined by Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, characterizes New
York's requirement as "facially burdensome", as well as
"substantial and unnecessary ". 16 Since "a citizen without
a vote is to a large extent one without a voice in

decisions which may profoundly affect him and his family",
choice is restricted by New York. Such a restriction can

prevent a citizen "from voting in a primary in response to
a sympathetic candidate,

a new or meaningful issue,

or

changing party philosophies in his State", and in so doing
it "runs contrary to the fundamental rights of personal

choice and expression which voting in this country was

designed to serve". 17 Political competition is distorted
by such restrictions,

since political outcomes are

affected

Rosario v. Rockefeller 410 U.S. 752, 763-764
(Powell, J., dissenting); emphasis mine.
16

,

17

410 U.S. at 764,

769-70
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(Powell,

J.,

dissenting!

Powell also disagrees with the majority in Rosario
that these restrictions are due to the inaction of the

voters themselves. According to Powell, he could agree with
this if the registration deadline were "less severe", but
It is difficult to perceive any persuasive basis
for a registration or party enrollment deadline
eight to 11 months prior to election. Failure to
comply with such an extreme deadline can hardly
be used to justify denial of a fundamental
constitutional right. Numerous prior decisions
impose on us the obligation to protect the
continuing availability of the franchise for all
citizens, not to sanction its prolonged deferment
or deprivation. 18

Nor does Powell find the fact that the ban is not absolute
to be persuasive. A substantial infringement is still an

infringement, and this one "totally disenfranchises" a

particular class of citizens who register or change party
affiliation late "for quite legitimate reasons". 19
The implicit standard used by these justices to

evaluate such restrictions is a comparison of state laws on
a national basis.

Powell emphasizes that New York's

requirements are "lengthy", and that New York is the only
state with such severe restrictions; the law's uniqueness

appears to be reason for suspicion to these justices, as

more lenient laws from a variety of states are cited in a
footnote. Powell notes that "other States, with varied and

complex party systems, have maintained them successfully
without the advanced enrollment deadline imposed by New

(Powell,

18

410 U.S. at 765

19

410 U.S. at 765-67

J.,

(Powell,
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dissenting).
J.,

dissenting)

York". 20 Competition,

in essence,

should only be burdened

if absolutely necessary for its own preservation,

and a

national standard is best for evaluating this issue.
The concern of the "natural order" perspective for

open competition is clearly reflected in these cases. Party

registration deadlines, restriction of primary
participation, and state control over who participates in
the nomination process at a national party convention are
all called into question as restrictions on freedom of

association. The deeper concern, however, is to protect the
right of parties and voters to make free choices in order
to protect democratic competition.

Party Structure and Functions
The justices who favor the "natural order"

perspective, as seen in the discussion of competition,

believe in the right of parties to determine much of their
own structure and procedures. In general,

state governments

should be only minimally involved in determining a party's
procedures, particularly those of a national party. As a
result,

the decisions favor a variety of party choices,

21
some that restrict participation in a party procedure

Rosario, 410 U.S. at 763-64, 771 (Powell, J.,
dissenting)
20

La Follette 450 U.S. 107 (1981), where the
Justices upheld the right of the National Democratic Party
to bar Wisconsin from binding the votes of its delegates to
the Democratic National Convention on the basis of the
results in Wisconsin's open primary, thus allowing it to
21

,
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and some that open up participation in a party primary. 22

These justices do not take a "black and white" stand on
what a party should look like, but leave that choice to the

parties themselves.

Brennan's majority opinion in Cousins takes a clear

position in favor of party choice, arguing against the

proposition that "the interest of the state in protecting
the effective right to participate in primaries is

superior" to the party's interests. He even questions if
the state's objective could be achieved,

since the

Convention could refuse to seat the state's delegates. 23
This sounds odd when placed against the concerns for

competition and voter choice noted in the last section and
in the ballot access cases, but it is a nuanced

distinction. While these justices are concerned with the
state restricting voter choice, there is an equal concern

with the restriction of party choice. With regard to
internal affairs, such as nomination procedures, the

parties are seen as properly in control of their own
identity,

including the essential question of

restrict its participatory boundaries to publicly
affiliated Democrats.

Tashiian 479 U.S. 208 (1986), where the
Connecticut Republicans sought to open parts of their
primary to unaffiliated voters.
22

,

23

419 U.S. at 488.
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boundaries. 24 Parties are seen as both better

decisionmakers than state legislatures and better
representatives of the democratic and competitive interests
at stake. 25

Brennan also speaks to the role of the national
convention.

In concluding his opinion,

is a case where

'the convention itself

he states that "this
[was]

the proper

forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which

delegates

[should]

be seated'". 26 The party machinery is

thus properly employed to decide party issues; barring the

prevention of discrimination, government has no role in
such situations. As we have seen in the examination of the

ballot access cases, state intrusions are seen as

artificially biasing the political system; the same applies
to internal party affairs.

The justices' concern for the integrity of the free

choices of party organizations and processes is evident in

Stewart's majority opinion in La Follette

,

in which the

justices ruled that Wisconsin could not bind the votes of
its delegates to the Democratic National Convention to the

The major constitutional exception to this control
is a prohibition on invidiously discriminatory practices
that would exclude certain groups such as AfricanAmericans. This was established by the Court's rulings in
the aforementioned "White Primary" cases, which culminated
in Smith v. Allwright
24

.

For an argument favoring this interpretation,
Gottlieb, "The Courts And Party Reform".
25

26

419 U.S. at 491,

quoting
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0'

Brien

,

409 U.S.

1,

see

4.

results of Wisconsin's open primary,

since that would

violate national Democratic Party rules restricting

nomination procedures to Democrats only. 27 Stewart states
that past Court opinions have noted "that the inclusion of

persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously
distort its collective decisions, thus impairing the

party's essential functions". On that basis,

"political

parties may accordingly protect themselves 'from intrusion
by those with adverse political principles'". 28 The

Wisconsin law is seen as opening the door to such
intrusions

With regard to the issue of intrusion in Wisconsin,
Stewart cites David Adamany's study of crossover voting in

Wisconsin primary elections, to explain the derivation of
Rule 2A restricting participation to declared Democrats.

Adamany's numbers on past crossover voting are recited in
detail in a footnote. 29 Adamany's data and argument

generally support the justices' overall arguments, as he
finds that crossover voters may well "dilute" the role of

La Follette 450 U.S. 107. The specific rule at
issue is Democratic Party Rule 2A, passed to ensure that
party delegation votes are not manipulated by forces
outside the Party.
27

.

450 U.S. at 122, quoting Ray v. Blair
221-22 (1953)

28

214,

.

29

450

U.S.

at 118-19.
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,

343 U.S.

Democratic voters. 30 Stewart makes it clear in a footnote
that raiding,

i.e.,

crossing over with intent to disrupt,

is not at issue here;

the Democrat's concern is "with

crossover voters in general, regardless of their
31

motivation"

.

Two examples from past political contests reveal how
the purpose of the direct primary could be frustrated by

"outside forces". In 1938, the Republican state chairman of

Georgia sent a letter urging Republicans to vote in the

Democratic primary, in order to nominate conservative
Walter George for reelection to the U.S. Senate. 32 Thirtyfour years later, George Wallace won the 1972 Michigan

Democratic presidential primary with large numbers of
crossover voters. 33 It was this type of "abuse" to which
the majority justices appear to be objecting in the La

Follette case.
This emphasis on free party choice is reinforced by

Marshall's Tashi ian opinion, as we have seen in our

30

David Adamany, "Cross-Over Voting and the
Democratic Party's Reform Rules", American Political
Science Review 70 (June 1976), pp. 536-41. Adamany states
that the evidence he presents "tends to confirm the factual
assumptions underlying the Democratic party's rules
preferring advance party registration of voters
participating in delegate selection primaries".
31

32

450 U.S. at 123, n. 23

.

Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Into The Storm. 1937-1940
Random House, 1993), pp. 291-92.

(New York:
33

America

John
,

p

.

F.

Bibby,

Politics.
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Parties. And E lections In

discussion of competition. Marshall notes that there is a
"spectrum of roles" to be filled in a party, and elaborates
on his view thus:

Some of the Party's members devote substantial
portions of their lives to furthering its
political and organizational goals, others
provide substantial financial support, while
still others limit their participation to casting
their votes for some or all of the Party's
candidates. Considered from the standpoint of the
Party itself, the act of formal enrollment or
public affiliation with the Party is merely one
element in the continuum of participation in
Party affairs, and need not be in any sense the
most important 34
.

A party is seen as a multifaceted organization best able to

determine the avenues of participation in its activities.
Marshall makes yet another distinction about the
structure of parties in his Eu opinion. In dismissing the
state claim that the parties "consented" to the preprimary

endorsement ban, he separates the party members from the
official structure of the party; they have independent
views and rights. According to Marshall,

"it is wholly

undemonstrated that the members authorized the parties to
35
Thus,
consent to infringements of members' rights".

parties are viewed as complex and multifaceted entities by
the "natural order" perspective.
In Tashi ian

,

Marshall also notes the damage state laws

can do to parties and their activities. He analogizes the

restriction of primary voting to party members to

34

479 U.S. at 215; emphasis added.

35

489 U.S. at 225,

footnote 18.
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restrictions on financial support for party nominees to

party members, and emphasizes that such prohibitions would
clearly infringe on associational rights. He makes it clear
that the key decision maker is the party; if the party does
not want the nonmembers to participate,

they have some

right to restrict such participation. 36

Marshall cites Julia Guttmann's Yale Law Journal

article on the La Follette decision to emphasize the

centrality of the party's right to choose. 37 Guttmann
argues that the pivotal issue is the right of the party to
set its own boundaries,

Nader v. Schaeffer 38

and agrees with the distinction of

:

Central to our conception of the political party
is its ability to determine what its ideological
slant and its base of support will be-whether the
party will be broad-based and non- ideological or
closely-knit and ideological. Thus, deference to
the political party's ability to define its own
boundaries forms an appropriate cornerstone for
the law of state regulation of participation in
primary elections, as that ability goes to the
very heart of freedom of association. 39

Guttmann's piece, however, also argues that the justices'

application of the means-ends test in La Follette has

36

479 U.S. at 215,

including note

6.

Tashiian 479 U.S. at 216, citing Guttmann,
"Primary Elections"
37

,

417 F. Supp 837 (D. Conn.
1976), aff'd. mem. 429 U.S. 989 (1976), in which the
justices upheld a lower court decision denying an
unaffiliated voter's challenge to his exclusion from the
38

Nader v. Schaeffer

.

,

Connecticut Republican primary.
39

Guttmann,

"Primary Elections", p. 13 7.
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turned it "into a virtual guarantee of the supremacy of the
right of political association" by "insulating" freedom of

association from claims of state interests. 40 Thus, the

majority view is not unequivocally supported by this
citation,

as Guttmann argues that state interests cannot be

illogically ignored by an absolute freedom of association.
The "natural order" justices do recognize particular

functions as central to parties as organizations. The

nomination of candidates is one of these functions. In
Tashi ian

,

Marshall emphasizes the centrality of nominating

power to party activities. He describes the nomination of
candidates as a "basic function" of parties, citing the

party registration case of Kusper

v.

Pontikes

this function as a pivotal political moment,

.

He describes

"the crucial

juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be

translated into concerted action, and hence to political
power in the community". 41
Marshall emphasizes that Connecticut's approach to

nominating activity leaves the party no way to broaden

participation in this process beyond publicly affiliated
members if they so choose; the state insists on a public
act of affiliation. 42 The party's power over nominations
is thereby reduced,

40

Guttmann,

because the pool of decisionmakers is

"Primary Elections", p. 13 6.

479 U.S. at 216-17, including note
Pontikes 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
41

v.

,

42

Tashi ian

,

479 U.S. at 216-17.
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7,

citing Kusper

not of the party's design. Marshall thus makes a direct

connection between a central function of parties and the

freedom of parties to choose how they structure themselves
to perform that function. His opinion in Eu quotes Tashi ian

and reaffirms this position. 43

Marshall's opinion in Eu reflects the "natural order"
view that the right of parties to manage their own
structure and leadership, as well as nomination procedures,
is protected by the Constitution.

Cousins

,

LaFollette

,

and Tashi ian

Citing the precedents of
,

Marshall asserts that

California's laws regarding party structure prevent "the
political parties from governing themselves with the
structure they think best" and restrict "the parties'
choice of leaders"

.

He then proceeds to describe a variety

of leadership and organizational changes that the parties

could not make under the California statutes. He contends
that "the associational rights at stake are much stronger

than those we credited in Tashi ian "

;

party members are

seeking only internal power to choose their leaders, not
44
The fact
power over the more public nomination process.

that Eu was a nearly unanimous decision, while Tashi ian was

closely divided, reflects that even the "constructed order"
justices appreciate the strength of that associational
claim.

43

489 U.S. at 224.

44

489 U.S. at 230.
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At the heart of the dispute over party membership and

who should manage the structure and functions of parties
is
the issue of distortion. Two types of distortion issues

concern the "natural order" justices: the distortion of

party choices by "raiding" or "crossover" voting, and the

distortion of these choices by state-mandated procedures of
voting or delegate selection. Notably, their concern with

distortion is centered on the parties, but not on the
choices of popularly elected state governments.

Powell's R osario dissent addresses the issue of

distortion by "party raiding" and "crossover" voting,
asserted as a state interest by New York. He admits that
such a state interest is legitimate,

since raiding would

damage "the efficacy of the party system in the democratic
process" and "its usefulness in providing a unity of

divergent factions in an alliance for power", quoting from
the lower court's opinion. However, he takes issue with the

"presumption" that "most persons who change or declare

party affiliation nearer than eight to 11 months to a party

primary do so with intent to raid that primary"
to Powell,

.

According

"any such presumption assumes a willingness to

manipulate the system which is not likely to be
widespread"

45
.

The affiliation decisions of citizens are usually

unrelated to any desire to disrupt a party, according to

45

410 U.S. at 768-69

(Powell,
132

J.,

dissenting).

Powell; they decide their vote on the basis of candidates

and issues. 46 This latter point seems implicitly to

reflect an awareness of how the role of parties has

diminished in favor of individual candidates.
Powell also sees raiding as less germane to a situation
such as New York's, where previously unaffiliated voters
are involved. 47 Thus,

the concern about distortion should

not center solely on raiding, but also on the voting

restrictions that the statute brings about.
Powell's Rosario dissent takes a skeptical view of
raiding,

and a pessimistic view of the fortunes of parties.

According to Powell, parties are not the political force
they used to be:

Partisan political activities do not constantly
engage the attention of large numbers of
Americans, especially as party labels and
loyalties tend to be less persuasive than issues
and the qualities of individual candidates. 48
The threat of raiding is also usually more immediate than
the eight to eleven month period imposed by the statute. A

deadline closer to the primary would therefore place less

burden on the right to participate and vote, while still

protecting the party from whatever dangers of raiding do
exist. 49 The state should thus adopt less drastic measures

46

Rosario

,

410 U.S. at 769

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

47

410 U.S. at 770

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

48

410 U.S. at 771

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

49

410 U.S. at 771

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).
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to guard against this possible disruption; measures like

New York's may be worse than the disease they seek to cure.
Stewart's majority opinion in Kusper v. Pontikes also finds
the state interest in preventing raiding insufficient to

support the burden placed on voter Harriet Pontikes. 50

Marshall's Tashi ian opinion also addresses the issue
of party raiding. Marshall finds the state's concern with

raiding to be inapplicable to the facts at issue, and thus
asserts that the judgment gives "no opinion" on the

question

of raiding.

In so doing,

however, Marshall

appears to reveal a belief that raiding may well not exist.
He cites a Democratic Party study which argued that "the

existence of 'raiding' has never been conclusively proven
by survey research", and the issue on which no opinion is

expressed is "whether the continuing difficulty of proving
that raiding is possible attenuates the asserted state

interest in preventing the practice". 51 This is a

backhanded way of dismissing the issue of raiding without
formally taking that position, and reveals the "natural
order"'

s

greater concern with state-induced distortion than

with party or voter- induced distortion.
The justices have also addressed the issue of party

endorsements in the primary process. Marshall's Eu opinion
414 U.S. at 61. In Kusper the majority of justices
struck down an Illinois law which mandated a 23 month
waiting period for voters who had voted in one party's
primary to vote in another party's primary.
50

,

51

479 U.S. at 219,

including note
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9.

highlights the differential associational standard imposed
on parties by California law, noting that,

"although the

official governing bodies of political parties are barred

from issuing endorsements, other groups are not ". In this
way the parties are "silenced" in this part of the

political process. Such a state- imposed scheme of "imposing

limitations on individuals wishing to band together to
advance their views on a ballot measure, while placing none
on individuals acting alone,

right of association".

is clearly a restraint on the

52

Marshall's discussion of preprimary endorsements also
reflects the "natural order" understanding of parties as

organizations that possess both freedom and boundaries. He
asserts that prohibition of preprimary endorsements has

made it "possible for a candidate with views antithetical
to those of her party nevertheless to win its primary".

53

This may reflect a differential understanding of party

access to the political process and party operations within
that process,

i.e.,

between interparty and intraparty

democracy. The justices seem more concerned with the former
than with the latter. Marshall's Eu opinion,

for example,

cites La Follette for the position that parties have a

right to identify the parameters of their membership. This

ability enables parties "to select a standard bearer who

224.

52

489

U.S. at 217,

53

Eu,

489 U.S. at 218.
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best represents the party's ideologies and preferences".

According to Marshall,

"depriving a political party of the

right to endorse suffocates this right".

reminiscent of E.E. Schattschneider

'

s

54

This is

observation that

democracy happens between the parties, not within them. 55
Stewart's opinion in La Follette supports this
viewpoint. He notes that participation is open "for

everyone who claims a stake in the Democratic Party"

;

the

concept of investment is thus introduced, differentiating

between initial access to the political process and access
to the internal affairs of parties. The justices who favor

the "natural order" perspective focus on dilution of

participation in the latter,

a

striking nuance on their

broader participatory arguments. Stewart later argues for
this position by asserting that unaffiliated voters,

those without a stake,

i.e.

can distort collective decisions and

thereby impair the "essential functions" of parties. This
gives parties the justifiable right to protect themselves
from those with "adverse principles". 56 But, as Tashj ian
indicated,
a court,

such a choice is for the party, not the state or

to make

.

This trust of parties as decisionmakers is also

reflected in Marshall's Eu opinion. He treats the claim

54

489

55

E.E.

U.S. at 224.

Schattschneider, Party Government (New York:

Rinehart and Co.,
56

La Follette

1942), p.
,

60.

450 U.S. at 116-17,
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122.

that preprimary endorsements can lead to intraparty

factionalism with great skepticism, quoting generously from
the Court of Appeals opinion to support this view. That

court saw the prohibition of preprimary endorsements as an

"'outright ban' on political speech", and Marshall notes
its assertion that the state has not shown how its law

would prevent factionalism. He also quotes the view that
"California's ban on preprimary endorsements is a form of

paternalism that is inconsistent with the First Amendment",
shielding parties from "disruptions of their own
making"

57
.

The Court of Appeals in Eu also draws a distinction

between parties and elections which the justices appear to
accept. Marshall quotes their opinion that "a State has a

legitimate interest in orderly elections, not orderly
parties".

58

This understanding is supported by Marshall's

view of the purpose of primaries. In dismissing

California's reliance on the Storer precedent, he asserts
that it "does not stand for the proposition that a State

may enact election laws to mitigate intraparty factionalism
during a primary campaign"

.

Instead, Marshall sees the

primary as the "ideal forum" for settling such disputes
before the general election, noting that "Tashi ian
recognizes precisely this distinction". Parties, he adds,

57

489

U.S. at 221.

58

489

U.S.

at 222.
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can be protected from without, not from within, and

therefore "preserving party unity during a primary campaign
is not a compelling state interest".

59

In the balance between electioneering and the

promotion of ideas as functions of political parties, the
justices who favor the "natural order" perspective show a
bias toward the latter. Marshall's opinion in Eu quotes his
own opinion in the ballot access case of Illinois State

Board to emphasize that the "election campaign is a means
of disseminating ideas as well as attaining political

office"

Parties and elections will not be viewed simply as

.

the pursuit of jobs and authority, but as a means of

articulating and enacting ideas as well

.

Marshall claims

that California's preprimary endorsement ban defeats that

purpose because it "directly hampers the ability of a party
to spread its message and hamstrings voters seeking to

inform themselves about the candidates and the campaign
issues"

These state-created limits are also seen as

.

"particularly egregious where the State censors the

political speech a political party shares with its
members"

60
.

The "natural order" justices also assert that the

message and ideas of a party are shaped by the party's
structure. In a footnote in Eu, Marshall notes that

59

489

60

489 U.S. at 223-24.

U.S. at 227.
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regulation of party leadership "may also color the parties'

message and interfere with the parties' decisions as to the
best means to promote that message". 61 There is a direct

relation between organization and leadership and the issues
and positions of a party.

Marshall's Eu opinion also makes an important

distinction between legislators and the party to which they
belong. He states that "simply because a legislator belongs
to a political party does not make her at all times a

representative of party interests"

.

This is in line with

the findings of political scientists that elections are now

dominated more by candidates than parties. Marshall expands
on the implications of this state of affairs:
In supporting the endorsement ban, an individual
legislator may be acting on her understanding of
the public good or her interest in reelection.
The independence of legislators from their
parties is illustrated by the California
Legislature's frequent refusal to amend the
election laws in accordance with the wishes of
political parties. Moreover, the State's argument

ignores those parties with negligible,
representation in the legislature. 62
In this,

if any,

we see a suspicion both of the motives and

allegiances of the legislative branch and of the parties

currently in power. Party interests are thus not seen to be

61

489 U.S. at 230.

489 U.S. at 225, footnote 18. For a political
science perspective on this issue, see Paul Herrnson, Party
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Campaigning In The 1980'
Press, 1988), and Sabato, The Party 's Just Begun. They
note, but are not happy with, this "candidate-centered"
62

politics
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automatically protected by a party "controlled" legislature
or government

The justices who favor the "natural order" perspective
do not have a

fully consistent view of what parties should

look like, but they are consistent in favoring the freedom
of parties to make choices about internal structure,

membership, and the nomination process. On the one hand,

parties are supported in making their own determinations of
who can and cannot participate in that process. On the
other hand,

in supporting that free choice,

the justices

find themselves supporting both expanded and contracted

participation in the process. They are thus not married to
one particular ideological construct of party membership

and control

Standards of Evidence and Burden
As in the ballot access cases, the justices who favor
the "natural order" perspective hold the states to

standards of strict scrutiny and compelling state interest.

Brennan makes this clear in Cousins

:

Even though legitimate, the 'subordinating
interest of the State must be compelling...' to
justify the injunction's abridgement of the
exercise by petitioners and the National
Democratic Party of their constitutionally
v.
protected rights of association. NAACP
63
(1958).
Alabama 357 U.S. 449, 463
,

63

419

U.S. at 489
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A simple standard of reasonableness or rationality is
insufficient; the state must give strong reasons for its

infringement of association, which is given the benefit of
the doubt. The states must prove that their involvement in

these processes are justified actions, and not unwarranted

distortions that burden freedom of association.
Powell's dissent in Rosario

,

for example, questions

the majority opinion in that case for its failure to

identify the proper standard of scrutiny, a failure which
he contends is likely to confuse other courts and state

legislatures when they try to understand how such burdens
should and will be evaluated. The majority's description of
the New York law is characterized as "nebulous

promulgations", which are essentially analogous to the
"rational basis test" that is sometimes employed by the
justices. Powell's central contention on standards is that

past Court precedents do not support the use of the

rational basis test in these cases, but call instead for

a

stricter standard of review. 64
Powell contends that the proper yardstick is "whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state

interest". He asserts that past decisions value the right
of association highly,

arguing that this right "must be

carefully protected from state encroachment". The standard
that past cases call for is one of "strict judicial

64

410 U.S. at 767

(Powell,

141

J.,

dissenting).

scrutiny". Interests must be evaluated "in the context of
the means advanced by the State to protect it and the

constitutionally sensitive activity it operates to impede"
He also quotes with approval considerations from Dunn v.

Blumstein

.

States pursuing legitimate interests must draw

statutes with "precision", and they "must be tailored to
serve their legitimate objectives"; they must also choose
"less drastic means" of pursuing their objectives. The onus
is thus on the states to infringe as little as possible

upon the freedoms exercised in the electoral process.
Powell sees New York as failing in that objective. 65
The "natural order" perspective uses a comparative

standard to evaluate state laws, in that the experiences
and statutes of other states are noted as evidence. In

Stevens's unanimous opinion in Marchioro v. Chaney

,

for

example, he places particular emphasis on the widespread

nature of statutory requirements for state committee
structure,

citing numerous state laws. 66 This indicates

that these justices will not blindly rule in favor of

freedom of association claims. Similarly, in Tashi ian

65

410 U.S. at 768-70

(Powell,

J.,

,

dissenting).

Marchioro v. Chanev 442 U.S. 191 (1979), at 195.
Marchioro involved a challenge by members of the Washington
State Democratic Party to state statutes which required
political parties to have state committees composed of two
members from each county in the state. In a unanimous
opinion, the justices found that the regulations did not
infringe on party freedom of association, since the
Democratic Party had made a free choice to vest power in
its state committee.
6S

,
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Marshall refers to the Anderson ballot access opinion to

emphasize that there is no "litmus paper test" to resolve
these controversies; decisions must be made on a case by
case basis, using the Anderson three part test. 67 The

states are nonetheless given the heavier burden of proof,
as the Anderson test calls for a compelling state interest,

not simply a reasonable or rational basis.

Marshall's Eu opinion reinforces that demanding
standard for state interests. He enunciates a test similar
to those employed in the ballot access cases. The justices

must "first examine whether it

[the state statute]

burdens

rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments".
If such a

burden is found on parties and their members, "it

can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the State shows
that it advances a compelling state interest, and is

narrowly tailored to serve that interest". 68
The key to understanding the approaches of both the
"natural order" and "constructed order" perspectives to the
issue of standards is the elasticity of the terms that

constitute the standards. What constitutes a "compelling
state interest", an interest that is "legitimate", or a
"rational basis" is ultimately defined in part by the

justices themselves, employing past precedent as guidance
but without any objective definition fixed for all time.

67

479

68

489 U.S

U.S.
.

at 213.
at 222

.
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The use of precedent, while setting some parameters,
still

leaves significant case-by-case interpretive authority
with
the justices. The justices who favor the "natural order"

perspective have employed that flexibility to hold the
states to a very stringent standard that favors the

challengers of state laws involving party organization and

nomination procedures.

The Role of Government
The "natural order" justices'

suspicion of extensive

state management of the electoral process, evident in their

views of competition, parties, and judicial standards, may
also be seen in their attitudes toward state laws in the

area of party organization, registration, and nomination
methods. These justices are skeptical of the interests

advanced by the states in these cases, showing a preference
for the concerns of parties and for claims of national

interest. The latter theme is particularly evident in the

presidential nomination cases of Cousins and La Follette

.

The solicitude of the "natural order" justices for

national interests as opposed to state concerns is

reflected in Brennan's Cousins opinion. He asserts that the
key issue in that dispute is "whether the Appellate Court
was correct in according primacy to state law over the

National Political Party's rules in the determination of
the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the

Party's National Convention"; he then indicates that they
144

were not correct in doing so. 69 National interests are
thus to be preferred, particularly as regards presidential

nominations; it matters not that the party is a private,
not a public,

concern,

since the process is one of public

significance

Brennan is unconvinced by the counterargument that
Illinois had "a compelling interest in protecting the

integrity of its electoral processes and the rights of its
citizens under the State and Federal Constitutions to

effective suffrage"

.

He responds by noting that a national

party convention is involved, whose delegates have a
"special function",

i.e.,

they "perform a task of supreme

importance to every citizen of the Nation regardless of
their state of residence", namely, the nomination of

presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 70 Such
national concerns, in Brennan'

s

view, weigh decisively

against any claim of state interest.

Brennan pushes the state vs. nation question still
farther, bluntly stating that "the States themselves have

no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the

selection of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates". He also asserts that,

if the states were

allowed to set their own rules, you could have 50 different
standards for the "vital process" of choosing nominees,

69

419 U.S. at 483.

70

419 U.S. at 489.
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"an

obviously intolerable result". 71 Cousins thus stands for
the proposition of a nationalized presidential election
system,

a modification of federalism congruent with 20th

century American political history. Brennan describes the

Convention as serving "the pervasive national interest in
the selection of candidates for national office,

and this

national inte rest is greater than any interest of an
individual State". 72 Brennan and the majority justices
thus accept the nationalizing of the presidential selection

process brought about by the Democratic reforms that lie at
the heart of the facts of Cousins

73
.

The nation/state political balance was also at issue
in La Follette
to Stewart,

party
a

.

The pivotal question in the case, according

is whether Wisconsin and its state Democratic

"may compel the National

delegation chosen in

a

[Democratic]

Party to seat

way that violates the rules of the

Party". 74 The question is not the constitutionality of the

Wisconsin open primary per se
a national

71

Supp.

,

but whether it is binding on

party whose rules specify a different process.

419 U.S. at 490, quoting Wigoda V. Cousins
86 (ND 111. 1972).

,

342 F.

82,
72

419 U.S. at 490; emphasis added.

It must be noted that the current of political
events has not fully favored this emphasis. In practice,
the Democratic Party has modified its movement toward
uniform national rules, while the Republican Party has
continued to allow state parties to shape many delegate
selection procedures.
73

74

450

U.S. at 121.
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In this area,

the answer given by the La Follette

justices favors the national party's interests, but it may
also be seen as favoring a more general policy of minimal
state intervention in the electoral process. Stewart

asserts that,

"even if the State were correct,

the State

may not choose for the party" in this situation. 75 Barring
any unconstitutional standards, the stringency of

membership is an issue that belongs only to the parties,
not to government

The justices in La Follette do not dismiss the states
out of hand; they admit that the states have important

regulatory interests. They conclude, however, that the
interests asserted- -the integrity of the electoral process,

secrecy of the ballot, voter participation, and the

prevention of harassment of voters- -all involve the
primary

,

which is not at issue in the case. 76 For the

"natural order" justices, the issue of binding delegates is

distinguishable and totally separate from the primary
itself. Even if the ultimate purpose of the primary is lost

by such a distinction, these justices see the national
interest as the central factor in this case.
The Tashi ian case reveals the approach of the "natural
order" justices to conflicts between state government

interests in their own "internal" electoral processes and

75

76

450 U.S. at 123

.

450 U.S. at 125.
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state party autonomy. Marshall's opinion views

Connecticut's interests as insufficient to burden the
associational rights of the state's Republican Party. While
he accepts the authority of Article
of the Constitution

(the times,

1,

places,

Section

4,

Clause

1

and manner clause)

which gives states a role in controlling their own
electoral processes,

its "authority does not extinguish the

State's responsibility to observe the limits established by
the First Amendment rights of the State's citizens". He

notes that the clause by itself is not enough to abridge
such rights,- more compelling interests must be asserted. 77
This position is reaffirmed by Marshall's opinion in Eu

78

Marshall also finds the other interests asserted by

Connecticut to be insufficient. He dismisses the alleged

administrative burden with familiar language about using
cost arguments to shield the established parties from

competition. The state's concern with raiding is also found
to be inapplicable to the Connecticut facts,

since

independents are not moving from another party's primary
and since independents could join a party at a late date

under existing state law. The state interest in avoiding
voter confusion is also unfounded and insufficient, since
the past decisions of the justices "reflect a greater faith
in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves

77

479 U.S. at 217.

78

489 U.S. at 222.
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about campaign issues"; Marshall cites Anderson's emphasis
on the contradiction of restricting information in order to

promote more informed decisions by voters. 79
The "natural order" justices' lack of deference to

state laws is also reflected in the fairly equal respect

they give to official political party documents and state
statutes. Stewart in La Follette

.

for example, begins his

opinion by noting that the Charter of the Democratic Party

established the "Democrats only" policy for the nomination
process. He also carefully reviews the history of official

party pronouncements on this issue, with particular
reference to Wisconsin's situation. 80
This same respect is evident in Stevens' Marchioro
opinion, which found for the State of Washington on the

grounds that the Democratic Party charter, not state
statutes specifying party structures, was responsible for
the refusal of the Party to add members to the State

Committee. The State Committee decision and activity was

authorized by the Party's own charter, and both state law
and party rules agreed that the state convention was the

ultimate ruling body of the Party. The decisions in

question were made because of a delegation of authority by
the convention

79

80

Tashiian
450

since the source of the complaint is

;

,

479 U.S. at 217-20.

U.S. at 109.
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ultimately the party itself, there is no burden, and the
challengers have no case. 81
As Marchioro reveals,

this respect for party documents

can be a double-edged sword; even the "natural order"

justices will not blindly dismiss state claims or blindly
favor party assertions. These justices do realize that
there is a role for states. As Stewart makes clear in

Kusper

,

"the administration of the electoral process is a

matter that the Constitution entrusts largely to the
states". 82 Nonetheless, Kusper also confirms that a

state's actions cannot infringe on constitutional

protection in the process of using proper state authority.
Illinois had done so by locking voters into their current

affiliations for a significant time.
The justices who favor the "natural order" perspective

also demand that a state convincingly connect its statutory

actions to the achievement of its asserted interests. In
his Eu opinion, Marshall considers two state interests:

"stable government and protecting voters from confusion and

undue influence"

.

He immediately admits that the former is

compelling; however, he contends that California has not

made a case that connects its interest in a stable polity
to the endorsement ban. No evidence is presented on the

effect of the ban, and Marshall is struck by the fact that

81

442 U.S. at 193,

82

4 1 4 U.S.

198-99.

at 57.
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California is "virtually the only State" with such a ban.
He is also skeptical of the asserted interest because of a

claim made by California in the lower court that "this

action is not justiciable because the State has never
enforced the challenged election laws "
In making these arguments,

83

Marshall cites Arthur M.

Weisburd's 1984 Southern California Law Review article on
constitutional protection of party nominating methods,

which makes an even stronger argument for party freedom
than Marshall's opinion. Weisburd argues that primary

election statutes in general "appear to be
unconstitutional", that the state interest in party

democracy ultimately denies associational rights, and that
"party organizations and party leaders enjoy the same free

speech protection as other associations and individuals"

Weisburd's article is strongly supportive of Marshall's
argument,

and more, arguing from past Court decisions that

strict scrutiny should be extended to the whole concept of

state-mandated primaries. 84
With regard to the state claim of confusion and undue
influence in Eu, Marshall accepts the legitimacy of the
interest but sees it as unsupported by

83

sufficient

489 U.S. at 226; emphasis added.

Weisburd, "Candidate-Making and the Constitution",
280-81. This is a step which the justices have not
p.
yet taken and are not likely to take in the foreseeable
future, given the more conservative composition of the
current Court and the public's attitudes toward primaries.
84

277,
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evidence. He cites the Anderson / Tashi ian concern about the

restriction of political communication to voters, as well
as the Jenness Buckley acceptance of preventing fraud and

corruption,

to argue that California's ban does the former

but shows no evidence for the latter. Marshall also cites

Malcolm Jewell and the results of the 1982 New York State
Democratic primary for governor to argue that voters in
fact pay little attention to party endorsements in making

their voting decisions. 85 The results of the 1990

gubernatorial primaries in Massachusetts, where both
candidates endorsed by preprimary conventions were
defeated,

is further confirmation that a party endorsement

does not a secure victory in the subsequent primary.

Discussing California's restrictions on party
organization and leadership, Marshall accepts that states
may restrict parties in these areas "when necessary to
ensure that elections are fair and honest"; this includes

eligibility requirements for voters and various
specifications of primary procedures. He notes, however,
that "none of these restrictions

...

involved direct

regulation of a party's leaders", and distinguishes the

Marchioro case in a footnote; any restrictions on party
members were an "indirect consequence". California

justified its laws on the basis of the "democratic

management of the political party's internal affairs";

85

489 U.S. at 228-29,

including note 19.
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Marshall rejects this type of claim on the now familiar

ground that the state cannot judge for the party. 86 Unless
fairness and honesty are demonstrably implicated and

connected to the state laws, the state has no proper role
in managing the internal affairs,

and occasional

disharmonies, of a party. 87
The "natural order" justices have also used historical

evidence to evaluate state claims of authority derived from
the Constitution.

In Tashiian

.

for example,

Connecticut

claimed that the Republican Party's inclusion of
independent voters in the U.S. Congress, but not state
legislative, primaries would violate the Constitution's

Qualifications clause. In responding to this argument,
Marshall's opinion cites Federalist 52 and the Records of
the Constitutional Convention to argue that the

Qualifications clause is concerned with federal election
disenf ranchisement

,

not absolute symmetry between states

and federal electorates.

88

This citation of Madison by Marshall is well chosen,
as Madison's discussion of this issue emphasizes how

critical it was to enshrine the federal voting right in the
Constitution, as not to have done so "would have rendered

86

489 U.S. at 232

.

As noted earlier, discrimination, particularly on
the basis of race, is a valid ground for state
87

intervention
88

479 U.S. at 228.
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too dependent on the state governments that branch of the

federal government which ought to be dependent on the

people alone". Madison also feels this right will be safe

under the Qualifications Clause because the right to vote
in state legislative elections is protected by state

constitutions

89

The Records of the Constitutional Convention cited by

Marshall also appear to bear out his argument. In opposing
a

property qualification for federal voting, James Wilson

notes that
It was difficult to form any uniform rule of
qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary
innovations he thought too should be avoided.
It would be very hard and disagreeable for the
same persons, at the same time, to vote for
representatives in the State Legislature and to
be excluded from a vote for those in the National
Legislature 90

The key concern is federal disenf ranchisement

,

and its

possible impact on political acceptance of the new national
order; this point is noted by Oliver Ellsworth and John

Rutledge.

91

Thus,

as Marshall notes,

the intent is not the

limitation of the federal vote, but the insurance that the

89

165

Madison, Essay 10,

in The Federalist Papers

,

p.

.

James Wilson, quoted in James Madison notes for
August 7, 1787, in Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 Volume 2 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), p. 201.
90

,

91

Farrand, Records

,

Volume
154

2,

pp.

201-205.

vote is not limited by Congress or state governments; he
sees no such limitation in the Connecticut case. 92

The "natural order" justices reveal in these cases a
lack of deference and some skepticism toward state statutes

and the interests asserted to support them. While not

blindly dismissing the arguments of the states, these
justices put a high value on the interests of party and

voter choice, as well as any processes (such as

presidential selection) with national repercussions. For
state infringement on such freedoms and interests to be
justified,

the "natural order" justices set a standard of

compelling state interest and require strong evidence that
such interests are in fact advanced by the state laws at
issue in each dispute. The parties and their freedom of

association, not state laws, receive the benefit of the

doubt

The "Constructed Order" Viewpoint
The justices who favor the "constructed order"

perspective are at odds with the "natural order" justices,

maintaining that states have the constitutional right to
play a wide-ranging role in managing party registration and
the nomination process, and even internal party

organization,

in the interests of fair and honest

elections. They are less concerned with competition, at

92

Tashiian

,

479 U.S. at 228-29
155

least as the majority understands it, and they are much

more inclined to favor the rights of individual states over
those of state or national parties. They also do not share
the same concern with party self-determination held to the

"natural order" justices, and they hold the states to a

much more lenient standard of evidence and judicial
scrutiny
This viewpoint has been consistently in the minority
in these opinions,

in contrast to the ballot access

decisions. This indicates that the balance of opinion among
the justices has gravitated to the "natural order" view of

parties as internally autonomous but not identical to the
"party in government",
the party label,

i.e.

elected officeholders who hold

as opposed to the "constructed order" view

of parties as state-managed but valuable electoral

organizations. An examination of the "constructed order"

viewpoint in these cases bears this out.

Party Competition and Choice
The "constructed order" justices see the free actions
of individuals and organizations,

not state laws,

as a key

explanatory factor in understanding the limitations of
political choice and competition. In his majority opinion
in Rosario

,

for example,

Stewart emphasizes that the

plaintiffs were unable to register before New York's cutoff
date because they failed to do so, not because of the law;
he also stresses their admission that they had failed to do
156

so.

93

Thus,

competition and the ability to participate is

limited by free human inaction as much as by law, a point
that is telling for Stewart.

This logic is evident in Stewart's further remarks in

Rosario

.

In dismissing the argument that a series of past

Court cases on disenf ranchisement apply to the New York
law,

he asserts that in those cases "the State totally

denied the electoral franchise to a particular class of
residents, and there was no way in which the members of
that class could have made themselves eligible to vote"

Section 186 of the New York statutes, on the other hand,
"did not absolutely disenfranchise the class to which the

petitioners belong", but "merely imposed a time deadline on
their enrollment". As Stewart puts it,

"if their plight can

be characterized as disenf ranchisement at all,

it was not

caused by Section 186, but by their own failure to take
timely steps to effect their enrollment"

.

He dismisses the

claims of impaired association with political parties using
the same logic.

94

The element of free choice is also crucial for

Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Kusper v

.

Pontikes.

He notes that disenf ranchisement of Harriet Pontikes was

brought about "by her personal and voluntary decision", a
situation which only "lightly brushes" voting and

93

410 U.S. at 755.

94

4 10

U.S. at 757-58.
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associational rights. He places great emphasis on the fact
that the past precedents cited by the majority all involved

infringements on the rights of a "discrete class" of
persons,

infringements that were "the result of an

involuntary condition not directly tied to the franchise"
The pivotal characteristic was that these cases involved
"direct impairment" of participation in the electoral

process "without voluntary action" on the part of the
plaintiffs. 95 Volition is the critical consideration for
Blackmun, as it is for the majority in Rosario

.

Blackmun also emphasizes volition in his discussion of
the statutes and their focuses.

In New York,

an arbitrary

time limit controlled who could vote in a primary. In
contrast,

the Illinois statute called for an actual vote, a

volitional act, as the standard for controlling primary
voting. The latter is characterized as "more rational" by
Blackmun,

another indication of the centrality of free

choice to his disposition of these matters. 96
In addition to the issue of volition and choice,

Blackmun notes that the prevention of voting in "one

primary of one party" is a "meager restraint" upon freedom
of association;

Illinois voters are otherwise "fully free

to associate with the party of her varying choice". A voter

does not have the right to participate in all elections on

9B

414 U.S. at 62

96

Kusper

,

(Blackmun, J.,

414 U.S. at 64

dissenting).

(Blackmun,

158

J.,

dissenting).

an open basis; the states and parties can limit voting to

this extent.

Blackmun notes further that this situation

mainly involves personal desire to undo an affiliation, and
treats this with some skepticism. Ultimately, the Illinois

statute places only a "minor burden" on "a few uniquely

situated citizens" in order "to preserve an otherwise

vulnerable structure", the primary. 97
Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian
O'Connor,

,

joined by Rehnquist and

is even more concerned with free choice and

participation. He begins his argument as follows:
Both the right of free political association and
the State's authority to establish arrangements
that assure fair and effective party
participation in the election process are
essential to democratic government. 98
In essence,

the free process itself is not sufficient to

insure fair and effective party action; the states have an

important structuring role. This is a clear example of the

view that party competition and democracy are best

preserved by a "constructed order" of politics.
In addition to defending the state role,

Scalia takes

issue with the majority's view of freedom of association

and asserts that the majority "exaggerates the importance
of the associational interest at issue,

if indeed it does

not see one where none exists". The Connecticut Republican

Party's ability to associate is not restricted, nor is the

97

Kusper
dissenting)
98

,

414 U.S. at 61-64

479 U.S. at 234

(Scalia,
159

(Blackmun, J.,

J.,

dissenting).

association of their members. The key is that the party
wants to allow nonmembers to participate in candidate
selection,

a

desire which Scalia sees as a "fanciful"

definition of freedom of association and as "casual
contacts". 99 Scalia thus takes a narrower view of

membership and legitimate participation than the "natural
order" justices do.

Powell's dissent in La Follette does not seem to share
this narrower view. His sense of the Wisconsin law is that
it "does not impose a substantial burden on the

associational freedom of the National Party, and actually

promotes the free political activity of the citizens of
Wisconsin"

.

Powell cites the founding history and purposes

of the primary,

its grounding in expanding participation

and giving meaningful control to citizens rather than party

bosses

100

Contrary to Scalia, Powell asserts that by keeping its

primary open, not closed, Wisconsin promotes politics. As
he puts it,

the Democratic Party's effort to use Rule 2A to

open up participation "has the ironic effect of calling
into question a state law that was intended itself to open

up participation in the nominating process and minimize the

influence of party bosses". He describes the Wisconsin law
as attempting "to ensure that the prospect of public party

99

100

Tashiian

,

479 U.S. at 235

450 U.S. at 127

(Powell,

160

(Scalia,
J.,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting).

affiliation will not inhibit voters from participating
in
Democratic primary".

101

a

While these two positions are

seemingly in conflict, both justices agree on the

legitimacy of the choices made by state governments. Like
the "natural order" viewpoint,

the political results of

this "constructed order" viewpoint can be contradictory.

The "constructed order" justices are much less

concerned with giving maximum protection to the free

competition and choices of parties. While those concerns
are not dismissed,

these justices feel that the states have

an essential role to play in preserving and structuring the

electoral process, a role enshrined in the Constitution.

They feel the majority has given insufficient weight to the
rights of states, all in the name of minimal and tenuous

associations between parties and individuals. As a result,
they contend that fair and honest political competition and

democratic choices are hindered rather than helped by the
decisions of the Court.

Party Structure and Functions
On the issue of party structure and membership, the

"constructed order" justices seem to follow their ballot
access opinions, which stress the proper state role in

insuring party integrity. Their opinions, however, would
also result in contradictory political outcomes, as some

101

La Follette
dissenting)

,

450 U.S. at 128,

161

136

(Powell,

J.,

favor expanded choices and party boundaries, while others

favor restricted boundaries. Like the "natural order"
justices,

the "constructed order" justices do not appear to

favor a particular type of party organization or electoral
structure, but rather believe that the states have the

right to some authority over those matters, and their

choices are owed some deference by the Court.
In Rosario,

Stewart initially shows little concern for

the boundaries of a party, detailing how New York voters

could easily move from one party registration to another

with minimal difficulty and were not unavoidably "locked
in"

to a particular party affiliation.

102

Rehnquist's

dissent in Kusper is also not wedded to any particular form
of party enrollment,

as his acceptance of the differing

statutory schemes of New York and Illinois indicates. 103
The unifying factor in these views is that the states can

make these choices, as long as the disenf ranchisement that
occurs is due to individual action and is not the result of
a full statutory bar.

With regard to the boundaries of parties, the
"constructed order" justices most often defer to state
political cultures and expressed state interests, rather
than to any abstract standard or model. These justices, for
example,

reach contrasting positions on the issue of

102

410 U.S. at 759.

103

414 U.S. at 67

(Rehnquist, J.,
162

dissenting).

raiding and crossover voting. In Rosario

.

Stewart

emphasizes the prevention of raiding as an important state
goal and argues that the general election timing of the

registration deadline acted as a "deterrent" to such
raiding.

104

Blackmun's dissent in Kusper also believes

that preventing raiding is of "unquestioned" legitimacy,

and implicitly favors a well -bounded party by noting that

those most affected by the Illinois statute are likely to
be "party switchers", who "clearly are the group most

amenable to organized raiding". 105 Rehnquist's dissent in
Kusper also recognizes the prevention of raiding as a

legitimate state interest. 106
Powell's dissent in La Follette

.

however,

takes a

strongly contrasting view of party membership and party
boundaries. In allowing secret and limited voter

affiliation at its primary, Wisconsin, Powell argues, is
exercising a legitimate and compelling state choice. He
does note that "the Democrats remain free to require public

affiliation from anyone wishing any greater degree of

participation in party affairs", and that the caucuses and
delegates must be publicly affiliated. 107 He would,
however, vote to uphold Wisconsin's right to use the open

104

410 U.S. at 760-62.

105

414 U.S. at 63-65

106

414 u s> at 69

107

450 U.S. at 129-30

(Blackmun,

J.,

dissenting).

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
(Powell,
163

J.,

dissenting).

primary and have it accepted. While this view seems at odds
with the opinions noted above, they are united in their
deference to and defense of the choice made by the

particular state; the needs and political realities of each
situation are seen as worthy of serious weight in judging
these conflicts.

Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian is also concerned with
the issue of party membership. Scalia sees a lack of

meaningful contact between the party and independent voters
in this case,

arguing that the "casual contacts" implied

here do not really constitute freedom of association.
Implicitly, he is arguing that parties must have reasonable

boundaries if their freedom of association is to have any
clear parameters. This is made clearer in his assertion
that the State can legitimately limit the selection process
to party members in order to protect against the dilution
of the votes of those members by "outsiders".

108

Nor does Scalia's Tashi ian dissent agree that

Connecticut's action is protecting the Republican Party
from itself. He puts great emphasis on the fact that the

decision to allow independents
was not made by democratic ballot, but by the
Party's state convention-which, for all we know,
may have been dominated by officeholders and
office seekers whose evaluation of the merits of
assuring election of the Party's candidates,
vis-a-vis the merits of proposing candidates
faithful to the Party's political philosophy,
diverged significantly from the views of the

ice

479 u s

_

at 235-36

(Scalia,
164

J.,

dissenting)

Party's rank and file. 109
In essence,

Scalia argues that democracy may have been

distorted by the state convention. His description is an
implicit reference to the fact that Lowell Weicker, more
liberal than most of the Connecticut Republican Party, was
a

major backer of this change in order to advance his own

chances of nomination. This is seen by Scalia as a

distortion of the party, an unusual focus on the
ideological character of a party. He asserts,

"I

had always

thought it was a major purpose of state- imposed party

primary requirements to protect the general party

membership against this kind of minority control", citing
Nader v. Schaef f er

110
.

Powell's dissent in La Follette admits that Wisconsin
"has,

to an extent,

regulated the terms on which a citizen

may become a 'member' of the group of people permitted to
influence that decision", i.e., the selection of a

presidential nominee. He argues, however, that this is only
an issue if the party has "a particular ideological

orientation or political mission"

.

The Democratic Party, as

well as our other major parties in history, he concludes,
.

have been much more malleable in their ideas and

membership

111

109

479 U.S. at 236

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

110

479 U.S. at 236

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

111

450 U.S. at 131

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).
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Powell puts great weight on the nonideological

character of the major parties. With regard to the

Democratic Party,

"it can hardly be denied that this Party

generally has been composed of various elements reflecting
most of the American political spectrum"

.

He admits the

party has taken positions, but focuses on their shifts over
time. On this basis,

he argues that "it is hard to see what

the Democratic Party has to fear from an open primary

plan"

.

In fact,

an open primary will allow voters to go to

the party that speaks to their ideological concerns, which

should add to party support. 112

Powell's citation of Robert Horn in his opinion is
interesting,

in that Horn discusses the permeability of

parties in the context of lamenting this lack of discipline
and cohesion. He states that the major parties in America
"are prepared to welcome almost anyone with open arms and

strive to make almost anyone feel at home in their midst";
his discussion is in the context of the rights of groups

under the Constitution, a product of the American ideal of

majority rule. But in discussing the then contemporary 1950

APSA Report and related calls for responsible parties, Horn
seems to have grave doubts about the potential for changing

parties. He states that "surely those who think our parties
are now inadequate for their tasks ought to pause before

112

450 U.S. at 131-33

(Powell,
166

J.,

dissenting).

laying this additional burden on them".

113

He seems to

favor Powell's position, but not the positions of those
states seeking to preserve the boundaries of their parties.
In a footnote,

from Austin Ranney'

Powell also offers a lengthy quotation
s

Curing The Mischiefs of Faction

,

citing the virtue of the American party trend to
accommodation.

114

The overall point of Ranney'

s

work is to

highlight the often unintended consequences of party reform
throughout American history and to suggest that "party

reform is one of the easier forms of social engineering"
and therefore often adopted despite the unlikely chances of
success.

115

Powell also cites Frank Sorauf on the

differences between open and closed primaries, as well as
on the Progressive focus on curing ills of democracy with

more democracy.

116

Robert A. Horn, Groups And The Constitution
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), pp. 97-99,
103-4
113

114

450 U.S. at 132

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

Austin Ranney, Curing The Mischiefs of Faction:
Party Reform In America (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1975), p. 210. A number of
other prominent political scientists have echoed this
assessment. See for example Julius Turner, "Responsible
Parties: A Dissent From The Floor", American Political
Science Review 45 (March 1951), pp. 143-52; Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Dismantling The Parties (Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 1978); and Edward C.
Banfield, "In Defense Of The American Party System",
Robert A. Goldwin, ed., Political Parties, U.S.A. (Chicago:
Rand McNally and Co., 1961), pp. 21-39.
115

m

450 U.S. at 133-34 (Powell, J., dissenting), citing
Frank Sorauf, Party Poli tics In America, 4th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1980), pp. 203-5.
116
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Powell's dissent places little importance on the

participation of unaffiliated voters, stating that the
resulting delegates will likely not differ much from those
of other states and regions. He also takes issue with the

distortion argument, contending that the national party's
alternative methods, such as a caucus,

"would be as least

as likely as an open primary to reflect inaccurately the

views of a State's Democrats". The ease of affiliation in

Wisconsin also weakens the national party's argument. 117
The views of the "constructed order" justices on the

proper boundaries of party membership are thus as

contradictory as those of the "natural order" justices, in
that both expanded and restricted participation are favored
in different cases. What unites these justices and

separates them from the "natural order" viewpoint is that
they defer to whatever choice a particular state has made
in structuring its party registration or nomination

methods. The differences are thus less over the character
of parties and electoral methods per se and more over who

should have the authority to make those choices: the

parties or the state governments.

Standards of Evidence and Burden
It is clear that the "constructed order" justices hold

the states to a much more lenient standard of review than

117

La Follette
dissenting)

,

450 U.S. at 132-33

168

(Powell,

J.,

do the "natural order" justices. In Rosario

.

Stewart notes

that the New York limitation is "not an arbitrary time

limit unconnected to any important state goal". It is

motivated by desires to prevent interparty raiding and to
preserve the integrity of the electoral process, which it

accomplishes by forcing voters and politicians into
"deliberate inconsistencies" that occur by encouraging

registration in one party and general election voting for
an opposing party. The timing of primary and general

elections appears to be crucial in the majority's decision
to uphold the statute.

116

Thus the standard seems one of reasonableness. In

dismissing the substitution of a law whereby party
registrants could be challenged, Stewart emphasizes that
the state is not bound to use "ineffectual means" simply to

protect fundamental rights. 119 Blackmun in Kusper
reaffirms these lenient standards. In discussing the
Illinois statute, he finds the asserted state interest in

protecting the ballot box and the party system "clearly
legitimate" and the statute "reasonably related to the

fulfillment of that interest". 120
In these opinions,

there is no talk of strict

scrutiny, but instead an emphasis on reasonableness and

118

410 U.S. at 760-61.

119

Rosario

120

,

410 U.S. at 762.

414 U.S. at 63

(Blackmun,
169

J.,

dissenting).

legitimacy, a much lesser hurdle than "compelling state
interest". In fact, Blackmun concludes his opinion in

Kusper by emphatically stating that the "incongruity"

between Kusper and Rosario "underscores what

I

believe to

be the potential mischief that results from an easy and

all-too-ready resort to a strict- scrutiny standard in
election cases of this kind". 121 Rehnquist's dissent in
Kusper shares this emphasis on legitimacy as the proper
122

standard

Powell's La Follette dissent accepts the standard test
in this area:

"if the law can be said to impose a burden on

the freedom of association,

then the question becomes

whether this burden is justified by a compelling state
interest". He does not agree that the Wisconsin law creates
a burden,

however, nor does he accept the majority's

distinction between the primary and the voting of delegates
at the convention.

He sees little burden on association,

and a strong argument for compelling state interest.

123

He

writes
am unwilling-at least in the context of a
claim by one of the two major political
parties-to conclude that every conflict
between state law and party rules concerning
participation in the nominating process creates
a burden on associational rights. Instead, I
would look closely at the nature of the
intrusion, in light of the association involved,
I

121

414 u.S. at 65

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).

122

414 u

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

123

450 U.S. at 128

at 69

(Powell,
170

J.,

dissenting).

to see whether we are presented with a real
limitation on First Amendment freedoms. 124
In other words,

claims against freedom will not be

themselves accepted without scrutiny.
As for the state,

Powell's reference to Rosario

appears to indicate that "a particularized legitimate
purpose" is sufficient. In La Follette

he sees the

.

majority ruling "without any serious inquiry into the
extent of the burden on associational freedoms and without
due consideration of the countervailing state

interest".

125

Stevens'

concurrence in Eu, which consists

almost solely of a quote of Blackmun's opinion in Illinois

Board

is grounded in the same belief that the majority has

,

taken its standard too far with "too easy phrases". 126
That the "constructed order" justices choose

rationality over compelling interest is confirmed by
Scalia's dissent in Tashj ian

.

He argues from past Court

experience that accommodation of freedom with fair and
effective state action "does not lend itself to bright line
rules"

.

Instead,

it "requires careful inquiry into the

extent to which the one or the other interest is

inordinately impaired under the facts of the particular
case"

.

Scalia cites Anderson and Storer to support this

124

450 U.S. at 130-31

125

450 U.S. at 136,

126

489 U.S. at 233-34

(Powell,

138

J.,

(Powell,

J.,

(Stevens, J.,
171

dissenting).
dissenting).
concurring).

position. 127 He also proposes a major modification of the

majority's compelling state interest standard, in that he
gives equal weight to freedom of association and state

interest by his phrasing ("the one or the other interest")
He is clearly unwilling to hold the states to a more

demanding standard.
Scalia's Tashi ian dissent joins this lenient standard
to an argument for the predictability of decisions. He

asserts that predictability in this area of the law is
"important", adding that "today's decision already exceeds
the permissible limit of First Amendment restrictions upon

the State's ordering of elections".

128

The argument of the

majority is turned around; the issue is not the limits of
the State's power, but the limits of First Amendment

restrictions on that power. This is clearly a pro-state
standard at work.
The "constructed order" justices, though clearly in a

minority in these cases, assert a clear case for

a standard

more responsive to state interests. While the compelling
state interest standard is not disputed per se

,

these

justices seek to apply it more leniently to the states, and
look at challenges to state laws more critically. In
general,

this reflects a more deferential attitude both to

state governments and the diverse political cultures of the

127

479 u s> at 234

128

479 U.S. at 234-35

(Scalia,

J.,

(Scalia,
172

dissenting).
J.,

dissenting).

states. The interpretation of "compelling" by the

"constructed order" justices is much different than that of
the "natural order" justices.

The Role of Government

That the "constructed order" justices accept the broad

premise of freedom of association is indicated by

Rehnquist's concurrence in Cousins

,

one of the pivotal

decisions made by the justices in this area. He begins by

emphasizing that he supports the freedom of association of
the plaintiff delegates and agrees with the majority that
the interests of Illinois are not sufficiently compelling
to prevent the seating of the plaintiffs. 129

The differences between the justices are not over
outcomes, but rather over ideas and principles. Rehnquist

insists that,

in reaching their conclusion,

the Cousins

majority has engaged questions beyond the scope of the case
at hand and put forward "gratuitous observations"

.

He sees

the majority as incorrectly dismissing the interests of

states in the presidential selection process, and of

supporting its claim of "national interest" solely with a

dissenting opinion in Newberry

v.

United States that does

not give credence to constitutional provisions such as

Article

II,

Section

1,

which Rehnquist believes gives the

states a role with presidential electors. As he sees

129

419 u s> at 491

(Rehnquist, J.,
173

concurring).

it,

Under our constitutional system, the States also
have residual authority in all areas not taken
from them by the Constitution or by validly
enacted congressional legislation. The question
for us, therefore, is not whether the States have
a "constitutionally mandated role" in the task of
selecting Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates, but whether the authority of the
State of Illinois is sufficient in this case to
authorize an injunction flatly prohibiting
petitioners from asserting before the Democratic
National Convention their claim to be seated as
delegates 130
.

Thus, while Rehnquist supports the outcome of the majority,

he does it on much narrower ground regarding the state
role,

which should not be restricted in a cavalier manner.
Stewart's opinion in Rosario indicates that the

states have a full right to be involved in the management
of the electoral process in order to protect the integrity
of the existing political system;

the latter emphasis is

more implied than stated. The critical emphasis seems to be
on the word "integrity"; the "constructed order" justices

would seem to equate this term with stability. Yet this
emphasis is not fully clear. Stewart himself notes that

much party shifting is still possible under the New York
system.

131

The more basic concern is thus with the

sanctity of the state's right to choose how it pursues its
rather than the chosen methods or objectives

objectives,

per se

.

That this was the case seems clear in the opinions

of these justices following Rosario.

130

Cousins
concurring)

,

419 U.S. at 496

.

131

410 U.S. at 759.
174

(Rehnquist, J.,

Blackmun's dissent in Kusper puts great stock in the

difficulty of managing the electoral process and the
challenge this task presents to the states; we hear this in
his description of the statutory structure as "complex".
His discussion of raiding also indicates that the states

should have room to make choices. While he admits the

existence of raiding is debatable, he characterizes the

legitimacy of trying to prevent it as "unquestioned"

.

Most

importantly, he refers to Illinois' history of significant

party regimentation to argue that the justices should be
cautious in second guessing the choice of methods to deal

with such political realities. 132 This echoes Rosario in
its emphasis on allowing the states to choose,

rather than

mandating a particular method of dealing with electoral
issues. Blackmun makes this association clear:

By resorting to a standard of rigid and strict
review, and by indulging in what I fear is a
departure from the appropriately deferential
approach in Rosario the Court places itself in
the position of failing to give the States the
elbow room they deserve and must possess if they
are to formulate solutions for the many and
particular problems confronting them that are
associated with the preservation of the integrity
of the franchise. 133
,

Thus,

we see clearly stated the deference that "constructed

order" justices pay to the authority of the states, and

their acceptance of the states as a major manager and

problem solver of the electoral process.
dissenting).

132

414 U.S. at 63

(Blackmun,

133

414 U.S. at 63

(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175

J.,

This emphasis is mirrored in Rehnquist's Kusper
dissent. Rehnquist emphasizes that Illinois, unlike New
York,
day,

does not require party enrollment prior to election

with the result that Illinois has chosen a different

approach to protecting its process from interparty raiding,
a

legitimate interest. While neither state's approach is

"perfect", both are legitimate and constitutionally

permissible. 134 Rehnquist shows great deference to the
right of individual states to choose their own methods for

managing the electoral process, as well as a standard of
review based on legitimate rather than compelling state
interests

Powell's partial dissent in Cousins goes even further
to defend the role of states

.

He maintains that while the

plaintiff delegates bring valid claims, the state of
Illinois "has a legitimate interest in protecting its

citizens from being represented by delegates who have been
135
rejected by these citizens in a democratic election".

The states, rather than a national political party, should

have power over delegate representation procedures.
Powell also asserts a positive view of state purposes
in his La Follette dissent. He notes that the Wisconsin

open primary was designed to maximize participation, an
implicit argument that state action can be a positive force

134

414 U.S. at 65-69

135

419 U.S. at 497

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

(Powell,
176

J.,

dissenting).

for promoting democratic ideals. He also defends the state

by asserting that the case "involves a state statutoryscheme that regulates delegate selection only indirectly",

which "differs substantially from the direct state
interference in delegate selection at issue in Cousins "
Powell cites Marchioro to support this contention. 136

Powell's dissent also notes that the state party in

Wisconsin has taken a position favoring the state law. To
him,

this carries an equal if not greater weight than the

claims of the national party. He sees the history of party

regulation as "a continuing accommodation of the interests
of the parties with those of the States and their

citizens"

.

He also sees the nonbinding primary as

inadequate for the state goals, since the primary's purpose
is to "give control over the nomination process to

individual voters"; the state's purpose is deserving of

adequate means. 137
The solicitude with which the state role is viewed is

evident in Scalia's dissent in Tashi ian

.

In arguing against

the freedom of association claims of the Connecticut

Republican Party, Scalia asserts that freedom is not
impaired and that "the State is under no obligation
let its party primary be used,

...

to

instead of a party- funded

opinion poll, as the means by which the party identifies

136

450 U.S. at 128-29

137

La Follette
dissenting)

.

(Powell,

J.,

450 U.S. at 133-34,

177

dissenting).
137

(Powell,

J.,

the relative popularity of its potential candidates among

independents". He also states that there is not
any reason apparent to me why the State cannot
insist that this decision to support what might
be called the independent's choice be taken by
the party m embership in a democratic fashion
rather than through a process that permits the
members' votes to be diluted- and perhaps even
absolutely outnumbered-by the votes of
outsiders 138
,

.

This is an explicit assertion that the states may properly

"construct" the electoral process in order to preserve

competition
Scalia goes even further to assert that, even if the

party faithful wanted to allow independents,

"there is no

reason why the State is bound to honor that desire",

comparing this desire to a desire to use conventions or an
executive committee to choose nominees and finding them

unacceptable even if democratically approved. This is so
because
the validity of the state- imposed primary
requirement itself, which we have hitherto
considered "too plain for argument", American
Party of Texas v. White 415 U.S. 767, 781
presupposes that the State has the right
(1974)
to "protect the Party against the Party itself".
Connecticut may lawfully require that significant
elements of the democratic election process be
democratic-whether the Party wants that
or not. It is beyond my understanding why the
Republican Party's delegation of its democratic
,

,

138

479 U.S. at 236

(Scalia,

added
178

J.,

dissenting); emphasis

choice to a Republican Convention can be
proscribed, but its delegation of that choice to
nonmembers of the Party cannot 139
Thus,

Scalia seeks to roll back freedom of association to

the extent that it treads on state authority to "protect"
the democratic process. He characterizes Connecticut's

power to specify democratic votes by members in this area
to be "plainly and entirely constitutional".

140

Thus,

he

argues for a democratic structure constructed in part by

statute
Stevens' dissent in Tashi ian

joined by Scalia,

,

focuses on another aspect of participation: the

qualifications of voters, and the role granted to the
states in this area by the Qualifications Clause of the

Constitution. Stevens views this clause as the fulcrum of
the case,

and finds the Connecticut Republican Party's plan

unconstitutional for that reason. Its "facial disparity"
and "the more stringent qualifications for electors to the
state legislature" would clearly violate the Constitution.
He does not accept the majority's "freewheeling

interpretation" or their characterizations of the Founders'
intent or Oregon v. Mitchell

141
.

In this way,

Stevens

seems to be protecting a particular view of participation

and of states rights.

139

479 U.S. at 236-37

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting);

empha s e s added
(Scalia,

140

479

141

479 U.S. at 230-31

U.S. at 237

J.,

dissenting).

(Stevens, J.,
179

dissenting).

Like the majority justices, Stevens's opinion in

Tashjian cites the debates of the Constitutional Convention
to buttress his argument on the Qualifications Clause,

emphasizing that the original draft of the clause by the
Committee on Detail, which was argued about in the notes
cited by the majority, specified that the qualifications of

electors "shall be the same". 142 His citation of the

Committee's draft is accurate. 143 But he neglects the
critical fact that the final and enacted Constitution does
not state that the qualifications shall be the same; it
says simply that "the Electors in each State shall have the

Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous

Branch of the State Legislature". 144 The implication is
not necessarily absolute symmetry, but simply federal

qualifications that are not less than the states'
The "constructed order" justices ultimately take a

strongly solicitous view of state purposes and interests,

granting them significant deference. It is clear that the
deference is not total; the basic legitimacy of freedom of

association is not challenged. These justices are
nevertheless in agreement in asserting that such freedom
has been given too much credence, and legitimate state

purposes have been short-changed with easy phrases.

142

479 U.S. at 232

143

p arran d

144

(

Records

(Stevens,
,

Volume

J.,
2,

U.S. Constitution, Article
180

p.
I,

dissenting).
178.

Section

2.

Conclusions: Parties. States, and the Power of Choice
The "natural order" justices' opinions involving party

organization, party registration, and nominating methods
reveal a definite preference for an electoral process

governed more by the parties and the free choices of voters
than by state-mandated statutory schemes. These justices do
not favor a particular type of party organization or

nominating method, but rather favor choices, however
different, made by parties themselves. In this sense, these

opinions have no particular theory of party organization or
membership. What they do reflect is a preference for free

competition and free choices by voters and parties as the
best method of promoting competition and democracy. The

parties themselves are viewed as the proper decisionmaker.
The "natural order" perspective is skeptical of state

claims of ensuring democracy by statute. A high standard of

both scrutiny and evidence is applied to state claims, and
most of these claims are found wanting

significant exception)

.

(

Marchioro is the

The overall outcome and perspective

is a "precedential environment" friendly to party claims

and doubtful of state interests, one that has carried the

majority of justices in the decisions of the Court in this
area
The "natural order" justices make a more limited use
of political science in these decisions than in the ballot

access opinions, perhaps because they find themselves in a

majority and thus have less need of extrajudicial evidence
181

for arguments. Eu is noteworthy in that this most recent of

nomination/party organization opinions makes virtually no
use of political science references, except for a citation
to a statement in the record by political scientist Malcolm

Jewell; this is particularly ironic because political

scientists were a critical force in challenging

California's statutes. Nonetheless, the earlier and now

precedential opinions in this area do make telling and
effective use of authorities like David Adamany, Arthur
Weisburd,

and the Records of the Constitutional Convention.

The "constructed order" justices, whose opinions have

often been in dissent in these cases, offer a striking,
though by no means absolute, contrast to the "natural
order" justices' treatment of parties and the state. Their

trust seems to lie much more with the actions of popularly

elected state legislatures, and much greater deference is
given to legislative actions and the interests asserted in
support of them. The "constructed order" justices also pay

attention to very different concerns than those which are

noticed by the "natural order" justices. These include the
asserted interests of state governments; the political
context of the cases; and the practical political
implications,

small or large, of the Court's decisions.

The "natural order" justices appear to favor broad and

universally applied principles, with less attention to

particular political context. The essence of the
"constructed order" viewpoint is that state governments
182

have a perfectly valid right to protect the boundaries of

political parties and to be a player in shaping the party
system. The states do play a role in preserving a

particular political order, a role which these justices are
either not prepared to usurp or believe is fully

legitimate
It is interesting to note that citation of outside

authority such as political science and historical accounts
seems to occur more frequently in these dissenting

opinions. Particular justices appear to use these sources
as a way to make their policy stances clear and argue their

view of the political/constitutional order.
The jurisprudence of the Court in this area is thus

divided between a "natural order" viewpoint that values
freedom of association highly and suspects the effects of
state regulation, and a "constructed order" viewpoint that
is much more sensitive to state interests and the actions

of politically elected legislatures. The former viewpoint

has held the majority in cases involving party organization

and nomination processes, but the latter viewpoint has

maintained a continuous and active counterargument among
the justices. The critical difference between the two is

not so much the political outcomes they favor, but who

should have the authority to shape the electoral process
and make the particular choices among political

alternatives

183

CHAPTER

4

THE SUPREME COURT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE: HOW MUCH
CAN THE GOVERNMENT REGULATE?

Once a party organizes itself, nominates candidates,
and gains access to the ballot, its candidates must

campaign for the vote

.

A key ingredient of modern

campaigning is money. A lack of money limits communication
with the voters, thereby damaging a candidate's chances of
election. At the same time, money has long been seen as a

source of political corruption, and state and federal

governments in the U.S. have attempted to regulate campaign
finance since the late nineteenth century.

Early examples of government efforts to stem the
"corruption" of campaign finance met with mixed results.
The 1883 Pendleton Act restrictions on soliciting political
funds from federal employees, the first in a series of acts

reducing the "political" nature of public employment, had a

noticeable impact on the financial relationship of
government employees and political campaigns. In contrast,
despite the 1907 Tillman Act prohibition of direct

corporate contributions, much corporate money still flowed
into the coffers of political parties. Both types of

governmental initiative grew out of the Progressive

hostility toward the perceived political power of "big

184

money", as well as the Progressive distrust of political

party "machines".

1

In general, most of the pre- 1971 campaign finance laws

were poorly monitored and enforced. Not until the 1974

Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA)

agency,

was an enforcement agency created in this area. That
the Federal Election Commission (FEC)

and the

,

various provisions of the FECA, have been the focus of most
of the Supreme Court litigation on campaign finance in

recent years. 2

1

The Progressive foundation of continuing efforts to
regulate and reform campaign finance is well noted by Frank
Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), especially chap. 1,
"The First Ninety Years"
The 1940 Hatch Act placed further
restrictions on financial contributions by government
employees, while the 1943 Smith/Connally Act and the 1947
Taft/Hartley Act broadened the restriction on direct
corporate contributions to include labor union
organizations as well. Margaret Latus Nugent and John R.
Johannes, eds
Money, Elections, and Democracy: Reforming
Congressional Campaign Finance (Boulder, CO: Westview
.

.

Press,

1990)

,

,

pp.

3-4

For a brief history of campaign finance regulation,
see Herbert Alexander, Financing Elections: Money,
Elections, And Political Reform 4th ed. (Washington, DC:
CQ Press, 1992), particularly chap. 2. The literature on
campaign finance is extensive, with the focus of many works
being reformist and centered upon the patterns of
contributions and expenditures and their implications for
democracy. A representative sample includes Alexander
Heard, The Costs of Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1960) /Elizabeth Drew, Politics and
Money: The New Road To Corruption (New York: Macmillan,
1983); Michael J. Malbin, ed., Parties, Interest Groups,
and Campaign Finance Laws (Washington, DC: American
Robert Mutch, Campaigns,
Enterprise Institute, 1984)
Brooks
Congress and Courts (New York: Praeger, 1988)
1988);
Knopf,
A.
Alfred
Jackson, Honest Graft (New York:
and
Elections
Mnnpy.
and Nugent and Johannes, eds.,
Democracy A recent study which critiques a number of the
2

,

;

;

.
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The identification of money with both speech and

corruption produces the dilemma facing the justices and
campaign finance regulators. While officials strive to
reduce corruption by regulating campaign finance, they must
do so without abridging the free speech of individuals or

groups. This conflict is reflected in Supreme Court

jurisprudence in this area, where the majority's position
is that money

constitutes a form of speech protected by

the Constitution.
In general,

3

the differences over how to handle this

dilemma divide the "natural order" and "constructed order"

viewpoints along the same fault lines revealed by the
ballot access and nominations decisions, with the

"constructed order" being more supportive of the

government's right to regulate. At the same time, the

breadth of the division is blurred by

a shift in the

stances of Brennan and Marshall, two of the most consistent

advocates of the "natural order" perspective. Unlike the
other areas examined in this dissertation, campaign finance

regulation is often approved by these justices on the
grounds that preventing corruption is a compelling state
interest.

In this area of jurisprudence,

the perception

reformist arguments about campaign finance is Sorauf's
Inside Campaign Finance Contrary to claims of everincreasing campaign spending and PAC proliferation, Sorauf
finds that the growth of PACs, contributions, and spending
have all stabilized since the mid-1980' s.
.

Only Justice Byron White consistently dissented from
the majority's identification of money as speech.
3

186

that unregulated campaign money has a potent and

detrimental effect on political competition significantly

moderates the stance of the "natural order" perspective
that state laws damage healthy competition.

While most justices since the decision in Buckley

v.

Valeo have supported the position that money is speech,
they have also upheld a variety of federal and state

efforts to regulate campaign money. With the exception of

Burger and Scalia, the dividing line between the justices
in this area has not been if government can regulate, but

how extensively it may in order to prevent corruption of
the electoral process. It is not that the justices who

normally support the "natural order" have changed their
standards; they simply find campaign finance to be an
exception, a case where state action can enhance democracy.

Nonetheless, Rehnquist and White, the Justices who most

consistently advocate the "constructed order" perspective
in these cases,

are still willing to allow a wider range of

government regulation than their "natural order"
counterparts. Thus, although the judicial fault lines have
shifted, questions of authority (government control of

campaign finance practices) and democracy (how to preserve

political competition) continue to divide the two

perspectives
The justices' treatment of specific campaign finance

statutes reflects this balance. They have upheld FECA

contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and public
187

financing of presidential campaigns 4

;

FECA limits on

contributions by unincorporated associations to

multicandidate committees 5

an FEC prohibition of

;

corporate solicitation of nonmembers for political funds

6
,-

and a Michigan statute prohibiting the independent use of

unsegregated corporate treasury funds to support or oppose
candidates for state office. 7 In contrast, they have
struck down FECA expenditure limitations, independent

expenditure limitations, and limits on expenditures of
personal or family funds 8

;

a Massachusetts law barring

corporate and union expenditures in referendum campaigns 9

;

a New York State prohibition on enclosing policy statements

in electricity bills 10

;

FEC limits on independent

expenditures by political committees on behalf of publicly
funded presidential candidates 11

Buckley v. Valeo

4

(1990)
8

9

765

(1976)

453 U.S.

,

FEC v. National Right To Work Committee (NRWC)

197
7

1
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.

6

U.S.

424 U.S.

and limits on

California Medical Association v. FEC

5

(1981)

,

;

(1982)

Austin

v.

,

459

.

Michigan Chamber of Commerce

,

494 U.S.

652

.

Buckley

,

424 U.S.

1.

First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

(1978)

,

435 U.S.

.

Consolidated Edison of N.Y. v. Pub lic Service
Commission of N.Y. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
10

,

FEC v. National Conservative Po litical Action
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
Committee (NCPAC)
11

,
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independent expenditures by political, non-business
corporations. 12 In broad terms, the majority of justices
have favored contribution limits, particularly with regard
to corporations and candidates; they are more skeptical of

expenditure limits and limits on independent or general

policy issue spending.
The two central concerns of justices in campaign

finance cases

--

the danger of corruption, particularly by

corporate wealth, and the relationship between money and
--

speech

are rooted in differing ideas of how to promote

political competition. The "natural order" perspective
seeks to support competition by striking down expenditure

equating money with speech, and supporting public

limits,

financing of presidential elections, while preventing

corruption of that competition by supporting contribution
limits and disclosure requirements. The most extreme

variant does not even support these governmental intrusions
into the competitive process. The "constructed order"

perspective shares the concern for competition, but is more
deferential to government regulatory efforts in this area
as the best method of preserving competition. This position

on campaign finance is congruent with their government-

friendly stance in ballot access and nomination cases. The
most extreme variant here denies that money is a form of

protected free speech.

12

(MCFL)

,

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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It is notable that both the "constructed order" and

the "natural order" perspectives have justices who argue

for and against protection of the interests of minor

political parties in campaign finance regulation. On a

broader level, neither perspective defends any unique or
assured role for political parties in the campaign finance
arena. While the justices' decisions have led indirectly to

more campaign money being channelled through party
committees,

their opinions do not enshrine any

associational protections for parties in this area of the
electoral process. 13

While campaign finance disputes involve a wide array
of groups and individuals, most of these cases have not

involved political parties directly. Nevertheless, such

regulation has a profound effect on the electoral system in
which parties function, so it is reasonable to ask how the
opinions of justices in this area relate to their views on

13

The justices' upholding of FECA contribution limits
in 1976 meant that those individuals and groups wishing to
funnel large amounts of money into the political process
could no longer do so directly through candidates, and
contributions to political action committees were limited
as well. An alternate "route" for campaign money- -through
party committees- -was established by a 1979 amendment to
the FECA which allows unlimited contributions to state and
local party organizations for voter registration and "get
out the vote" activities for presidential candidates, as
well as the production of election paraphernalia for
federal candidates. These contributions, now known as "soft
money", often flow legally through national party
committees, strengthening those organizations as well.
Thus, the justices' defense of contribution limits has
played a part in increasing the role of parties in campaign
financing
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parties and the electoral process. Analysis of these
opinions reinforces the thematic findings of the previous
chapters, with an important twist: while the essential

differences between the "natural order" and "constructed
order" persist,

the former's concern for party

associational rights is overridden by fears of corruption,

resulting in more "common ground" between the two

perspectives

The "Natural Order" Perspective
The "natural order" perspective favors a limited

regulatory role for government with regard to campaign
finance,

similar to its skepticism about government

management of ballot access and party

organizational\nomination procedures. Unlike the latter
cases,

the "natural order" is more accommodating

however,

to regulation,

seeing government as having an important

role to play in controlling the corrupting influence that

concentrated wealth and unlimited contributions may have on
candidates, the party system, and the electoral process.

Restriction and disclosure of contributions, as well as
public funding of major party presidential campaigns, are
seen as permissible to prevent such corruption. The
"natural order" therefore finds more common ground with the

"constructed order" in this area of disputes.
Ironically,

the only justices who consistently follow

the antigovernment skepticism of the "natural order"
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perspective in the campaign finance cases are Burger, who
shifts between the two perspectives in other areas, and
Scalia, who supports the "constructed order" deference to

government statutes and interests when ballot access and

nomination\organization procedures are involved. In this
area,

however,

supporting the "natural order" perspective

is consistent with their own positions over time. Burger's

opinions in other cases, particularly the filing fee cases
of Bullock and Lubin discussed in Chapter Two,

reflect a

strong sensitivity to issues of financial requirements or

regulation in the electoral process. Scalia'

s

"departure"

in these cases is consistent with his longstanding

sensitivity to First Amendment free speech concerns. 14

Party Competition and Choice
In seeking to further healthy political competition,

the "natural order" justices are equally concerned with

enabling free speech and preventing corruption. The seminal
case is Buckley v. Valeo

.

Buckley

,

which involved a

challenge to the constitutionality of the Federal Election

Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA)

,

led the justices to

an examination of all the major provisions of that Act. The

original Act, passed in 1971, led inadvertently to the

On Scalia' s broad reading of First Amendment
freedoms, and his particular displeasure at their narrowing
by the majority in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Comme rce
(to be discussed in this chapter), see David G. Savage,
Turning Right: The Making Of The Rehnqu ist Supreme Court
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1992), pp. 328-29.
14
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fundraising abuses of the 1972 Nixon campaign that occurred
just prior to the law's taking effect. These abuses,

revealed by the Watergate investigation, produced the
reforms contained in the 1974 Amendments: expenditure and

contribution limits for all campaigns for federal office;
reporting and disclosure requirements of all contributions
of $250 or more,-

a

system of public financing for the

presidential election process; and the establishment of

a

Federal Election Commission (FEC) to monitor and enforce
these regulations. Buckley represented a quick, but largely

unsuccessful, effort by opponents of the law to challenge
the constitutionality of the FECA.

The per curiam majority opinion focuses on the two

concerns emphasized by the "natural order" justices in this
area of jurisprudence:

(1)

whether money is speech

protected by the First Amendment from state limitation, and
(2)

whether large and undisclosed contributions were a

threat to corrupt fair political competition. The answers
to these questions of authority and democracy have

important implications for the role that political parties
can and will play in the electoral process. The ability of

parties to raise and spend money shapes the volume of their
"speech", while corruption can pervert the balance of

intraparty and interparty competition.
Buckley begins with a strong defense of free speech,

quoting New York Times

v.

Sullivan to argue that "debate on

public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide193

open",

as such debate affects "the ability of the citizenry

to maKe informed choices among candidates for office".

15

In considering the constitutionality of the FECA

expenditure and contribution limitations, the justices
address the question of whether money is a form of free
speech. For the "natural order" majority,

the answer is

mixed; money is speech, but it is worthy of full

constitutional protection only if it is direct speech.
The "natural order" finds that expenditures constitute

direct speech, asserting that "this Court has never

suggested that the dependence of a communication on the

expenditure of money operates to introduce a nonspeech
element" into the action. For the "natural order" justices,
the use of money in the political process is fully

protected by the First Amendment. Expenditure limitations
are compared to "being free to drive an automobile as far

and as often as one desires on a single tank of gas". 16

15

424 U.S. at 14.

Buckley 424 U.S. at 15-16, 19, 39, including n. 18
on p. 19. With regard to other expenditure limits,
corruption is seen as an "inadequate" justification for the
ceiling on independent expenditures, since the restriction
"prevents only some large expenditures". Nor is the
corruption danger as great; since the candidate has no
connection to the expenditures, there is an "absence of
prearrangement and coordination" The limits on personal
expenditures are also found to be unjustified by the
interest in preventing corruption. Marshall dissents on
personal expenditures, noting that the ceilings are
substantially higher than those for other contributions,
and that they are justified by the governmental interest ±r.
"promoting the reality and appearance of equal access to
the political arena". He cites the Court's ballot access
opinions as supportive of that interest. Those opinions
16

,

.
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In contrast to their ballot access opinions,

the

"natural order" justices do not appear as concerned about

financial equality among candidates as they are about equal

ballot access. The goal of "equalizing the relative ability
of all voters to affect electoral outcomes" by limiting

expenditures is not viewed as constitutionally
legitimate. 17 In a confrontation between free competition

and enforced equality of expenditure, the former value will
be upheld under the First Amendment, despite the "natural
order" concerns with corruption.

The justices in Buckley
(Brennan,

who joined the full opinion

Marshall, Powell, and Stewart), while protecting

the use of money in politics, do not endow the collection
of money,

i.e.

contributions, with the same constitutional

protection. Contributions are not seen as direct speech,
but as promoting someone else's speech and,

thus,

are not

entitled to the same stringent protection. They are

outweighed by a compelling governmental interest in the

prevention of corruption, real or apparent. The justices

used that interest to strike down governmental action,
while here it is cited to support governmental regulation.
The promotion of access is the ultimate value for Marshall.
424 U.S. at 45-47, 53.
The government may properly limit expenditures by
publicly funded candidates, as well as some corporate and
union expenditures. The FECA puts expenditure limits on
presidential candidates who accept public funding; these
were upheld in Buckley Direct contributions of
unsegreaated corporate and union funds to federal candidate
campaigns are prohibited by a variety of statutes,
including the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act.
.

17

Buckley

,

424 U.S. at 17.
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argue that large contributions do not accurately reflect
the speech of the community,

thereby warping the

competitive process. 18
In responding to free speech concerns,

the justices

argue that contribution limits "do not undermine to any

material degree the potential for robust and effective

discussion of candidates and campaign issues". Moreover,
they also see no evidence of adverse impact on campaign
funding,

simply a need to raise funds from more

contributors and shift contributor expenditures to direct
expression. The limits restrict only one important means of

associating, leaving many other avenues of competition and

18

424 U.S. at 26-27. The Justices do not take
positions on the issues of equalizing citizen ability or
opening up access for poor candidates, which contrasts with
their solicitude toward such candidates and citizens in
filing fee and signature requirement cases. In fact, in
Austin vs. Michigan Chamber of Commerce Marshall
implicitly argues against the propriety of equalization,
noting that the Michigan act in question "does not attempt
'to equalize the relative influence of speakers on
elections'", as Justice Kennedy contends, but instead
assures "that expenditures reflect actual political
support". 494 U.S. at 660.
Limits on contributions by political committees, the
organizational requirements for such committees, and a
yearly limitation on total contributions by an individual
are upheld on the basis of avoiding evasion of the
individual contribution limits; they are not seen as
favoring "established interest groups". The Justices'
approval of the exemption of volunteer time services from
limits, while still upholding limits on material
assistance, indicates that participation per se is not seen
as a source of corruption. The key danger is large
contributions of other people's money to a candidate's
campaign. Buckley 424 U.S. at 35-38.
,

,
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expression open. 19 The limits thereby protect democratic

competition from corruption without fundamentally limiting
the realm of speech and association.

The concern of the "natural order" justices with

corruption also led them to uphold the reporting and
disclosure requirements of the FECA
Brandeis,

20

Like Louis

they held that "sunlight" is "the best of

disinfectants". 21 FECA "impose

[s]

no ceiling on campaign-

related activities" and thereby survives the "exacting
scrutiny" to which such items are subject under the NAACP

freedom of association precedents. 22 At the same time, the
Buckley majority upholds the public funding of qualified

presidential candidates as a proper effort to enhance
competition. They argue that public funding "furthers, not

19

Buckley 424 U.S. at 20-22, 28-29. This language is
very similar to the "alternate means of access" emphasized
in the ballot access opinions.
,

20

Buckley 424 U.S. at 61-62, citing Burroughs v.
290 U.S. 534 (1934). The justices cite federal
campaign finance disclosure laws enacted in 1910 and 1925,
and the upholding of the latter statute in Burroughs as
legal precedent for the requirements.
,

U.S.

,

,

424 U.S. at 67, citing Louis Brandeis, Other
People' s Money (New York: National Home Library Foundation
ed.
1933), p. 62. The title of Brandeis' book reflects the
"natural order" view of the pivotal source of corruption in
campaign finance. The connection between disclosure and
uncorrupted party/candidate competition is evident in the
justices' distinction between candidate related independent
spending and spending unrelated to a political candidate.
They approve the FECA's reporting requirements on the
former on the grounds that it helps voters to be aware of
what groups are supporting a candidate. 424 U.S. at 81.
21

(

22

424 U.S. at 64-72.
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abridges, pertinent First Amendment values" because it will

"facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation
in the electoral process,

people"

goals vital to a self-governing

23
.

The restrictions on speech within the public financing

scheme are justified by an argument drawn from a unanimous

ballot access opinion, Jenness v. Fortson

.

In this view,

"Congress may legitimately require 'some preliminary

showing of a significant modicum of support'

.

.

.as an

eligibility requirement for public funds". 24 They also

distinguish their application of this principle in the
ballot access cases from public financing in the following

manner
Our decisions finding a need for an alternative
means turn on the nature and the extent of the
burden imposed in the absence of available
alternatives. We have earlier stated our view
that Chapter 95 [the law governing public funding
of the presidential general election campaign] is
far less burdensome upon and restrictive of
constitutional rights than the regulations
involved in the ballot access cases. 25
The justices argue that "any risk of harm to minority

interests is speculative" and that "campaigns can be

successfully carried out by means other than public

23

424 U.S. at 92-93.

24

Buckley

2B

Buckley

,

424 U.S. at 96.

,

424 U.S. at 101
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financing,

arguing that they have been up to this date, and

this avenue is still open to all candidates". 26
In judging the fairness of public funding,

the

critical element for the "natural order" justices is not
equal results, but equal opportunity to be part of the

competition. Any failure of minor parties to gain public

funding does not directly restrict their ability to run

candidates or obtain votes; it simply forces them to rely

more on private contributions, which candidates with public
funding are wholly denied. 27 In other words, claims of

restricted competition must be genuine and significant.
Unlike the moderation of the majority, Burger's
dissent in Buckley represents the "natural order"

perspective taken to its furthest extent of antigovernment
skepticism. Burger finds virtually all the provisions of
the FECA to be unconstitutional, arguing that many of them

do more to damage competition than to assist it. Burger's

major argument is that contributions and expenditures are

worthy of equal First Amendment protection, and that
restrictions on either are therefore unconstitutional. 28
Burger asserts that
We do little but engage in word games unless we

26

424 U.S. at 101.

Buckley 424 U.S. at 94. It is important to note
that private contributions can be indirectly channeled to
the support of publicly funded presidential candidates
through independent expenditures and "soft money".
27

,

28

424 U.S. at 235

(Burger,
199

C.J.,

dissenting).

recognize that people-candidates and
contributors -spend money on political activity
because they wish to communicate ideas, and their
constitutional interest in doing so is precisely
the same whether they or someone else utters the
words 29
.

He argues that both types of limitations will "drastically"

change or "foreclose" some candidacies. 30 Since

competition will be reduced by the limits, they are
logically insupportable. On this point, Blackmun's dissent
in Buckley joins Burger in failing to see "a principled

constitutional distinction" between the contribution and

expenditure limits, and he too would invalidate both. 31

Burger also takes Congress to task on the content of
their disclosure requirements, arguing that they gave
"little or no thought" to the matter and simply "lifted

figures out of a 65-year-old statute". He sees the claim of

corruption by small contributions as "too extravagant to be
maintained", asserting that "Congress has used a shotgun to
kill wrens as well as hawks"

.

He also argues that "the

public right to know ought not to be absolute when its
exercise reveals private political convictions"

.

Citing the

secrecy of the ballot, he argues that "secrecy and privacy
as to political preferences and convictions are fundamental
in a free society".

In rebutting the majority,

he argues

29

424 U.S. at 244

(Burger,

C.J.,

dissenting).

30

424 U.S. at 244

(Burger,

C.J.,

dissenting).

31

424 U.S. at 290

(Blackmun,
200

J.,

dissenting).

they "failed to give the traditional standing to some of
the First Amendment values at stake here". 32

Burger also objects to the public funding of

presidential elections, viewing it as "an impermissible
intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private
political process". 33 The danger he sees in public
financing is that government financing of conventions and
the electoral process could subvert the private nature of

these processes and provide "a springboard for later

attempts to impose a whole range of requirements on

delegate selection and convention activities". 34

Justice Burger in Buckley finds the rationing of
political expression in the FECA unacceptable. As he puts
it,

"freedom is hazardous, but some restraints are

worse". 35 In his view, Congress' restrictions,

requirements, and resources run afoul of the First

Amendment and also invidiously discriminate against
challengers outside the major parties. This is a much more

antigovernment argument than is evident in some of Burger's
other opinions, but it is likely due to Burger's particular

,

424 U.S. at 237-39

(Burger,

C.J.,

,

424 U.S. at 237-39

(Burger,

C.J.,

32

Buckley
dissenting)
33

Buckley
dissenting)
34

424 U.S. at 250

35

424 U.S. at 256-57

(Burger,

C.J.,

(Burger,
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dissenting).

C.J.,

dissenting).

concern with the role of money in politics, evident is his

Bullock and Lubin opinions. 36
The majority opinion in Buckley sets the tone for the
justices'

later opinions. The modified "natural order"

perspective has continued (with some dissent) to defend the
free expenditure of money in campaigns or political causes,

but has also continued to uphold limitations on

contributions on the grounds that large, unreported

contributions pose a particular danger of corrupting the

competitive process. The influence of corporate
contributions and spending has received particular

attention in both of these areas, while the conflict

between free speech and controlling corruption has
continued to be the center of division and debate.
Justice Powell's majority opinion in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

,

which invalidated a

Massachusetts law barring corporate and union expenditures
in referendum campaigns,

does show some divisions in the

"natural order" Justices' deference to the prevention of

It must also be noted that Burger argues against
the majority's opinion on the ground that it "does violence
to the intent of Congress in this comprehensive scheme of
campaign finance". Burger asserts that "the whole of this
Act is greater than the sum of its parts", and thus a
36

piecemeal treatment violates congressional intent:
What remains after today's holding leaves
no more than a shadow of what Congress
contemplated. I question whether the residue
leaves a workable program.
choices.
In his own way, Burger still respects legislative
dissenting).
C.J.,
(Burger,
424 U.S. at 235-36
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corruption as a governmental interest. 37 Powell, joined by
Stewart, Blackmun,

Stevens,

and Burger, asserts that the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in limiting
First Amendment corporate rights to business issues. He

argues that,

"if the speakers here were not corporations,

no one would suggest that the State could silence their

proposed speech"

.

Speech cannot be limited simply because

of concerns with the nature of corporate power;

"may consider,

in making their judgment,

the people

the source and

credibility of the advocate". 38
In arguing that speech is "indispensable to decision

making in a democracy", Powell cites Thomas Emerson's
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment and

Alexander Meiklejohn's Free Speech and its Relation to Self
Government

39
.

This general view is not disputed by these

constitutional scholars. Emerson does note that "certain
restraints on expenditure of money in political campaigns"
could be exceptions from the general rule that restrictions

designed to "purify" the democratic process are usually
invalid under law. He does not, however, elaborate on

37

Bellotti

,

435 U.S.

38

435 U.S. at 777-80,

39

435 U.S. at 777.

765

(1978).

792.
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possible exceptions; his conclusions accept the need for

positive government protection of free expression. 40

Alexander Meikle j ohn'

s

work describes the core of the

First Amendment's meaning as facilitating the "thinking

process" in "self-government"; free speech is a necessity
of such governance. He adopts an absolutist view of the

First Amendment, noting that "its great declaration is that

intellectual freedom is the necessary bulwark of the public
safety". 41 In the case of corporate spending on a

referendum,

it would likely be seen as part of this

thinking process; however, a sharp rebuke by Meikle j ohn to
the "speech" of modern commercial media and its money-

making focus suggests that this conclusion requires some
qualification

42

Arguments could be made that corporations should be
judged by the same standard as individuals, since Congress

Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory Of The
First Amendment (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 103-5,
115-16
40

.

Alexander Meikle j ohn, Free Speech And Its Relation
To Self -Government (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press,
41

1972)

,

pp.

26-27,

68

Meiklejohn, Free Speech p. 104-5. In words first
penned in 1948, before the full rise of television,
Meiklejohn took this view of the First Amendment and modern
commercial media: "We have used it for the protection of
private, possessive interests with which it has no concern.
It is misinterpretations such as this which, in our use of
the radio, the moving picture, the newspaper and other
forms of publication, are giving the name 'freedoms' to the
most flagrant enslavements of our minds and wills". Whether
this would also apply to corporate- sponsored communication
is unclear.
42

,
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and states have legislated (and the Court has upheld)

restrictions on direct corporate spending in election
campaigns; referendum speech might hold the same threat of

corruption that motivated the restrictions on corporate
funding of candidates. The Bellotti majority does not reach
that conclusion. Powell rejects for lack of evidence the

argument that corporate wealth has altered referenda
results

43

In contrast to Powell's opinion,

"natural order"

Justices Brennan and Marshall join a dissent with Justice
White in Bellotti

44
.

In contrast to the majority,

Brennan

and Marshall are more concerned with the corrupting impact
of corporate business money on the political process and

less ready to make the distinction between referendum

spending and candidate campaigns. Thus, even within the
"natural order" viewpoint, there are differences of opinion
as to how far the government may proceed in restricting

speech. A crucial reason for those differences is a

division of opinion on the degree of corruptive danger
posed by corporate money in politics. 45

43

435 U.S. at 789.

44

435 U.S. at 803

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

Justice Powell's opinion in Consolidated Edison of
joined by
Public Service Commission of N.Y.
N.Y.
White,
(notably)
and
Stewart,
Burger,
Marshall,
Brennan,
Commission
Service
Public
State
York
New
which overturned a
prohibition on the inclusion of policy statements in
monthly utility bills, argues that subject matter
discussion cannot be restricted in such a forum. If
customers do not like it, they can ignore it, and the cost
45

v.

,
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Marshall's opinion in California Medical Association
v

-

FEC

which upheld FECA limits on contributions by

>

unincorporated associations to multicandidate political
committees,

reemphasizes the "natural order" justices'

general approval of contribution limits as a proper means
of guarding against corruption. 46 Marshall notes that

of the insert can be segregated from general corporate
funds Consolidated Edison of N.Y. v. Public Service
Commission of N. Y.
447 U.S. 530 (1980). Bellotti and
.

.

Consolidated Edison demonstrate that corporate spending on
politics per se is not seen as corruption by most of the
"natural order" justices; the connection to candidates is
important
Justice White's participation is notable because it is
the only instance where he voted to strike down a
government prohibition or regulation in these cases; he is
the most consistent advocate of the "constructed order"
perspective
A small but important note of skepticism about the
case is raised by Justice Marshall in a separate
concurrence. Marshall agrees with the overall decision, but
is skeptical of the separability of the cost of the
inserts. Consolidated Edison 447 U.S. at 544 (Marshall,
J., concurring)
As his dissent in Bellotti demonstrates,
and further cases reinforce, Marshall is more skeptical of
corporate funds in politics than many of the other Justices
who adopt the "natural order" perspective, even when he
votes to protect corporate speech.
,

.

46

California Medical Association v. FEC 453 U.S. 182
Marshall's opinion is joined in full by Brennan,
(1981)
White, and Stevens. White's joining of the opinion is
consistent with his greater deference to government
regulation in this area. Justice Stewart filed a dissent
joined by Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist, but it objected to
the decision on jurisdictional rather than substantive
grounds
A concurrence by Blackmun, while supporting the
general direction of Marshall's majority opinion, asserts
that contributions are entitled to full First Amendment
protection, and sees the key distinction as between
contributions to candidates and independent political
expenditures; the former is involved here, and on that
basis the restriction should be upheld. 453 U.S. at 202-3
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The assertion that
contributions have full First Amendment status is
,

.
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corporations and unions are more restricted in their
campaign finance activities than the unincorporated

associations at issue here. 47 As in earlier decisions,

corruption is identified more closely with direct financial
ties to candidates, and less with political spending per
se

.

The "natural order" justices' willingness to protect

expenditures made independently of candidates, particularly
by organizations other than business corporations,

evident in Brennan's opinion in FEC

Citizens For Life,

Inc.

(MCFL)

v.

is

Massachusetts

which finds the FECA

.

restriction on independent expenditures unconstitutional in
so far as the danger of wealthy corporations is not

involved. 48 Brennan,

joined by Marshall, Powell, Scalia,

and a concurrence by O'Connor,

finds that the MCFL's

"Special Edition" election newspaper violates Section 316
of the FECA,

which prohibits corporate spending of

unsegregated treasury funds on federal elections. But
applying that statute to the MCFL is judged to be
unconstitutional, since MCFL "does not accept contributions
from business corporations or unions", deriving resources

consistent with Blackmun's dissent in Buckley however,
this case demonstrates that he will uphold restrictions on
contributions in certain situations.
;

47

453 U.S. at 195,

199-200.

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
48
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solely from "member" voluntary contributions. 49 The logic
of Brennan's opinion reveals that the "natural order"

Justices continue to see large aggregations of unsegregated
corporate wealth used to support political candidates, not
the corporate form per se

,

as a critical nexus of

corruption in campaign finance; the government can only
infringe on speech and association in the former
50

instance

The fulcrum of Brennan's argument against the FEC

position is that "voluntary political associations do not
suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by

assuming the corporate form"

.

Any fear of massive secret

spending through such entities is obviated by the

disclosure provisions which still apply to them. As a
"the concerns underlying the regulation of

result,

corporate political activity are simply absent with regard
to MCFL"

51
.

479 U.S. at 241-42. The violation occurred because
the newspaper was an expenditure of corporate treasury
funds to promote particular candidates, which is prohibited
by Section 441 (b)
49

The skepticism of Brennan, and particularly
Marshall, appears to extend beyond candidates to causes
note again their positions in Bellotti and Consolidated
Edison
50

.

479 U.S. at 259-63. A concurrence by O'Connor joins
the majority, but views the central burden on MCFL
differently. She argues that the additional organizational
requirements entailed by section 316 are the largest burden
on MCFL. 479 U.S. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
51
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If MCFL is not governed or seen as a normal

corporation under these rules, the question becomes what
makes it and others unique. Brennan offers three criteria:
(1)

the organization must be expressly formed to promote

political ideas, not to do business;

(2)

shareholders who claim its assets; and

it must have no

(3)

it cannot be

established by, or receive contributions from, business
corporations or unions. Such corporations avoid the

corrupting dangers the campaign finance laws were designed
to address.

52

Justice Marshall's opinion in Austin
Chamber of Commerce

,

v.

Michigan

which upheld section 54(1) of the

Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibiting corporations from
using corporate treasury funds independently to support or
oppose candidates for state office, reinforces and expands
past precedent and the distinctions enunciated in

Massachusetts Citizens For Life

53
.

Marshall notes that

"state law grants corporations special advantages", quoting

Massachusetts Citizens For Life to argue that these
advantages "permit them to use 'resources amassed in the

52

4 7 9 U.S.

at 263-65.

Michigan Chamber of Commerce 494 U.S.
Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens,
652 (1990)
White, and Rehnquist, upheld the statute on the grounds
that "the provision is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest", using a strong standard of
review but finding that standard met. 494 U.S. at 655. The
positions of White and Rehnquist are consistent with their
"constructed order" deference to governmental statutes, and
reveal another case in which the two perspectives have come
together in this area of cases.
53

Austin

v.

,

.
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economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the

political marketplace'". In exchange for the legal

privileges it provides, the state can properly restrict
corporate political expenditures in order to prevent undue

political influence. 54
Brennan's concurrence

in Austin rests on an analysis

that distinguishes the Chamber from a corporation like
MCFL,

one that is implicitly relevant to party

organizations. While sharing the majority's view that it is
"first and foremost a business association", he argues that
the state law also "protects the small businessperson"

because without it "a member faces significant

disincentives to withdraw, even if he disagrees with the
Chamber's expenditures in support of a particular
candidate"

.

It also protects dissenting shareholders of

member corporations from having their funds used for
political campaigns.

55

Democracy and dissent are thus

protected by the state action, a result which the "natural
order" perspective favors for business as well as political

parties

494 U.S. at 658-61. Marshall argues that the
Chamber of Commerce does not fit the criteria for
distinction laid out in Massachusetts Citizens Brennan's
concurrence in Austin also argues that the Michigan law is
not a complete ban on either corporate political
participation or political expenditures, citing segregated
funds and PACs 494 U.S. at 669 (Brennan, J., concurring).
This is reminiscent of the "alternative means of access"
analysis in the ballot access opinions.
54

.

.

55

494 U.S. at 672-73

(Brennan,

210

J.,

concurring).

Justice Stevens concurs in Austin on two grounds.
First,

he sees "the danger of either the fact,

or the

appearance, of quid pro quo relationships" as sufficient

grounds in this context for the state regulation "of both

expenditures and contributions"

.

In addition,

he finds the

difference between speech on general policy and support for
a

particular candidate, first noted in Bellotti

applicable to this case.

56

In general,

.

as

he shares the

majority's respect for the state interest in preventing
corruption
The more traditional "natural order" skepticism toward

government regulation, argued at length in Burger's Buckley
dissent,

is also evident in the dissents of Scalia and

Kennedy in Austin

.

Scalia objects to the majority opinion's

view of corporations and corruption. 57 He begins with a
sarcastic parody of the majority opinion:

56

494 U.S. at 678

(Stevens, J.,

concurring).

57

Scalia does not agree with the logic of seeing
corporate privileges as unique, noting that "other
associations and private individuals" are granted
advantages by state governments, without losing their First
Amendment rights. Citing a 1984 decision involving a public
TV station's freedom of speech, he argues that commercial
corporations "are no less entitled to this Court's
concern" While then noting the danger of wealth, he argues
that independent expenditures avoid the threat of
corruption such wealth poses, citing Buckley He also
argues that few candidates would want direct corporate
support
I expect I could count on the fingers of one
hand the candidates who would generally
welcome, much less negotiate for, a formal
endorsement by AT+T or General Motors
494 U.S. at 680-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
.

.

211

Attention all citizens. To assure the fairness of
elections by preventing disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful group,
your Government has decided that the following
associations of persons shall be prohibited from
speaking or writing in support of any candidate:
He characterizes the majority as saying that "too much

speech is an evil that the democratic majority can
59

proscribe".

Scalia instead adopts a laissez faire

attitude toward campaign finance, grounded in a strong view
of the First Amendment

Scalia argues that the majority has in fact made its

decision on the basis of "a hitherto unrecognized genus of
political corruption". He quotes Marshall's opinion to
define this "New Corruption", which is seen as
the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support
for the corporation's political ideas. 60

Scalia views this as an "illiberal free speech principle"
of "one man,

in Buckley

61
.

one minute",

and argues that it was rejected

The impact of such a standard on political

competition is significant, in Scalia'

s

view:

58

494 U.S. at 679

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

59

494 U.S. at 679

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

60

Austin

,

494 U.S. at 684

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

Nor does he accept Brennan's argument of protecting
shareholders, claiming that the Michigan law is designed
not for this "but to protect political candidates". A
shareholder is subject to majority rule, and may easily
sell his stock without disaster. 494 U.S. at 686-87
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
61
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To eliminate voluntary associations - not only
including powerful ones, but especially including powerful ones - from the public debate is
either to augment the always dominant power of
government or to impoverish the public debate. 62

Scalia is skeptical that "a healthy democratic system can
survive the legislative power to prescribe how much

political speech is too much, who may speak, and who may
not"

63
.

Kennedy's dissent shares Scalia'

s

concern for the role

of private groups in the political process,

Horn's Groups And The Constitution

.

citing Robert

Federalist Number

10,

and Toqueville for the proposition that "it is a

distinctive part of the American character for individuals
to join associations to enrich the public dialogue",

group

identity being "a part of the history of American
democracy". 64 He concludes his opinion with the following:
By constructing a rationale for the jurispru-

62

494 U.S. at 694

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

63

494 U.S. at 694-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Kennedy's dissent in Austin joined by O'Connor and Scalia,
takes a similar stance, arguing that the majority
"validates not one censorship of speech but two"
Michigan's law restricting independent corporate speech,
and a Justice-created "value-laden, content-based speech
suppression that permits some nonprofit corporate groups,
but not others, to engage in political speech". 494 U.S. at
695-96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In his view, the
majority's judgment of corporations as speakers goes
against precedents in Consolidated Edison regarding content
freedom and Bellotti regarding freedom for all speakers.
494 U.S. at 698-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Both of these
precedents, however, distinguish speech in favor of
particular candidates, a distinction which Kennedy glosses
over
,

:

64

Austin

,

494 U.S. at 710
213

(Kennedy,

J.,

dissenting).

dence of this Court that prevents distinguished
organizations in public affairs from announcing
that a candidate is qualified or not qualified
for public office, the Court imposes its own
model of speech, one far removed from economic
and political reality. It is an unhappy paradox
that this Court, which has the role of protecting
speech and of barring censorship from all aspects
of political life, now becomes itself the censor.
In the course of doing so, the Court reveals a
lack of concern for speech rights that have the
full protection of the First Amendment. 65

This is a much higher level of trust in the actions of

private economic groups in the campaign finance arena than
is shown by the majority of "natural order" justices.

The "natural order" viewpoint's overall understanding
of competition in the realm of campaign finance is grounded

in a balance between protecting free speech and preventing

corruption of the electoral process. In contrast to their
ballot access and nominations opinions, the majority of
"natural order" justices are much less skeptical of

government regulation of campaign money, and much closer to
the "constructed order" perspective in this area of

opinions.

In their view,

the principal corrupting influence

that government can properly limit is unlimited

contributions, particularly those from business

corporations and those given to candidates for office. The
most consistent exceptions to this modified stance are

Burger and Scalia, whose arguments are much more skeptical
of government regulations and the prevention of

"corruption" as a compelling state interest. One can almost

65

494 U.S. at 713

(Kennedy, J.,
214

dissenting).

argue that a number of justices have "traded places"

between the two perspectives in this area of electoral
jurisprudence

Party Structure and Functions
The most striking feature of the "natural order"

viewpoint on parties, enunciated in the campaign finance
is not the apparent lack of concern for third

cases,

parties by all but Burger, which contrasts with the
solicitude for such parties in the ballot access opinions,
but the relative indifference to parties as an actor in the

campaign finance process. Only Burger's discussion of FECA
gives significant attention to the law's impact on parties.

Minor parties cannot be pleased by the "natural order"
opinions in this area, but major parties have little to
celebrate. The public financing of presidential campaigns,

upheld by most of the "natural order" justices, is a
striking example of how the current system weakens an
66
already shaky party role in the electoral process.

The comments of "natural order" justices in Buckley

reveal some of their views on major and minor parties. The

former are seen,

in terms of ideology,

as including

"candidates of greater diversity" than minor parties. The

major parties are not narrowly pigeonholed:

As noted earlier, the justices' upholding of
contribution limits has indirectly increased party
involvement in campaign finance, by encouraging "soft
money" donations to party organizations.
66
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In many situations the label "Republican" or
"Democrat" tells a voter little. The candidate
who bears it may be supported by funds from
the far right, the far left, or any place in
between on the political spectrum. 67

Minor parties, on the other hand,

"usually represent

definite and publicized viewpoints" and are more

ideologically focused. 68 The justices take no direct

position on whether one type of party is superior to the
other,

but this positive view of major parties is in marked

contrast to the ballot access and nomination cases, where

doubts are raised about the ideological diversity of the

major parties. Still, there is continuity in the portrayal
of the major parties as entities with no fixed ideology

save the winning of elections.

The majority opinion in Buckley raises the question of

whether the FECA "invidiously discriminates against
nonincumbent candidates and minor parties in contravention
of the Fifth Amendment".

69

This echoes the ballot access

"natural order" concern that the political playing field be
kept level for all parties, yet the outcome is very

different.

In dealing with campaign finance,

the justices

find that FECA has not fostered a political imbalance; its

67

424

68

424 U.S. at 70.

69

424

U.S.

at 70.

U.S. at 14.
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restrictions are seen as "evenhanded" in their treatment of

major and minor parties. 70
The public funding scheme for the presidential

selection process is also found not to constitute
"invidious discrimination against minor and new parties in

violation of the Fifth Amendment". All parties are not
required to be treated the same, a position for which the

unanimous ballot access case opinion in Jenness
is cited;

v.

Fortson

the FECA provisions are simply a response to the

historical fact of major party dominance in America.

According to the justices,

"no third party has posed a

credible threat to the two major parties in presidential
elections" since i860; they have been unable to match the

major parties in victories and fund raising. 71

The "natuj-ai order" justices assert that
challengers to incumbents can raise large sums and defeat
their opponents, citing statistical and other evidence in
the record. While acknowledging that minor party claims are
"more troubling", they find no evidence of discrimination
against them in the record, although they do acknowledge
that major parties receive more of the large contributions.
Buckley 424 U.S. at 32-33. The justices also dismiss the
comparison of minor parties' privacy concerns under the
FECA disclosure requirements to the facts of NAACP v.
Alabama and related precedents. They see the claims of
possible harassment as "highly speculative", and outweighed
by "the substantial public interest in disclosure
identified by the legislative history of this Act". The
justices' concern with possible corruption outweighs any
sensitivity to minor party disadvantages. 424 U.S. at 6970

,

72

.

Buckley 424 U.S. at 97-98. This assertion clearly
neglects the presidential election of 1912, where third
party candidate Theodore Roosevelt (running under the
banner of the Progressive Party) received more popular
votes than the Republican incumbent, William Howard Taf t
71

,
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Thus,

the "natural order" perspective defends only a

mixed role for parties in the area of campaign finance. In
Buckley,

the only campaign finance opinion which addresses

parties at any length, the justices identify no special
role,

or great disadvantage,

that qualifies minor parties

for better treatment under federal law, nor do they see a

protected role in campaign finance for parties as a class.
Parties must compete with all other organizations in the

political marketplace. While claims of disadvantage will
not be ignored,

the majority of "natural order" justices

will not give parties any special advantages, or special
role,

in the arena of campaign finance.

Burger's dissent in Buckley offers the major

alternative argument to this indifference within the
"natural order" perspective. He sees much greater

disadvantages and dangers for minor parties under the FECA
legislation, and insists that the weight of such concerns
calls the constitutionality of the FECA into question. To a

greater extent than the "natural order" majority, he is
sensitive to the roles played by parties in campaign
finance
One of Burger's major concerns is the impact of

contribution disclosure requirements on third parties. He

In arguing against claims that minor parties are
disadvantaged, the justices note that the past
accomplishments of minor parties "in furthering the
development of American democracy were accomplished without
the help of public funds". 424 U.S. at 101-2.
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agrees with the majority that minor parties are generally

very ideological, but he uses this to argue that "the
public can readily discern where such parties stand,
without resorting to the indirect device of recording the
names of financial supporters".

72

He argues that minor

party supporters may be more vulnerable to harassment as a
result of disclosure,

thus damaging speech and association.

Burger's dissent in Buckley also argues against the

public financing scheme for presidential elections,

contending that it will have a negative impact on the role
of parties in the process.

He cites an amicus brief

argument that the public financing system "affects the role
of the party in campaigns for office,

changes the role of

the incumbent government vis-a-vis all parties,

and affects

the relative strengths and strategies of candidates vis-a-

vis each other and their party's leaders". 73 In essence,

such a system weakens the role of the parties and is highly

disruptive of the status quo

.

Burger is arguing for a

process in which the role of parties and other forces is
not preempted by a governmental structure.

Burger contends further that the public financing
system "invidiously discriminates against minor parties".
This occurs because public financing favors the current

major parties, an unacceptable bias:

72

Buckley
dissenting)
73

,

424 U.S. at 240

424 U.S. at 247

(Burger,
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(Burger,

C.J.,

C.J.,

dissenting).

The fact that there have been few drastic
realignments in our basic two-party structure in
200 years is no constitutional justification for
freezing the status quo of the present major
parties at the expense of such future political
movements 74
.

Burger sees "grave risks in legislation, enacted by
incumbents of the major political parties, which distinctly

disadvantages minor parties or independent candidates".
Citing the level of support requirement of Jenness as
acceptable, Burger concludes that the public financing

system exceeds this requirement. 75 He argues too that the
system's support for certain parties constitutes public

favoritism

76

In light of their concern in ballot access and

nominations cases, the indifference of the "natural order"

74

424 U.S. at 251

(Burger,

C.J.,

dissenting).

75

424 U.S. at 251

(Burger,

C.J.,

dissenting).

76

Burger also finds the matching funds requirements
of public financing unacceptable, as they equate financial
and political support, thereby putting poor candidates or
candidates with poor supporters at a financial (and
therefore a political) disadvantage. Burger's treatment of
matching funds, as well as the other issues discussed
above, reveal a strong concern for the interests of
alternative political forces. However, this concern is
explicitly tied to Justice Burger's sensitivity to finance
issues in politics; he cites his opinions in both Bullock
and Lubin in support of these objections in Buckley 424
U.S. at 252 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In a broader sense, Burger is also skeptical of the
propriety of public financing of private political
.

activity. He explicitly questions whether "public financial
assistance to the private political activity of individual
citizens and parties is a legitimate expenditure of public
funds". In his view, the presidential selection process
should not be funded by government; parties and candidates
should compete for private support in the political
marketplace. 424 U.S. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
220

justices to minor parties in the area of campaign finance
is somewhat surprising.

They give little attention, and

less favorable consideration,
Buckley,

to third party claims in

and have little to say about these matters in

subsequent cases. Only Burger comes to the defense of
parties, particularly minor parties,

in the financing of

presidential election campaigns. In the realm of campaign
finance, parties are just equal players in a crowded field
of competitors.

Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The campaign finance opinions that enunciate the

"natural order" perspective apply the same standard of

review as in the ballot access and nominations decisions,
but differ in the outcomes of that application. In the

ballot access and nomination cases, the "natural order"

justices adopt a standard of "compelling state interest",
and most often find that standard unmet by the statutes at
issue. The same standard is applied in the campaign finance
cases, but the majority of "natural order" justices find

many FECA provisions and a Michigan law to be justified by
a

compelling state interest in the prevention of corruption

(Burger,

Scalia and Kennedy are the main exceptions)

In Buckley

,

for example,

the "natural order" justices

note that the Court of Appeals,

in the upholding of most

FECA provisions, found a "clear and compelling interest" in

221

"preserving the integrity of the electoral process". 77 The
justices adopt this "compelling state interest" standard,
but employ an additional interest not cited by the Court of

Appeals: the prevention of corruption. They find that the

expenditure limits fail these tests, but they uphold

contribution limits on the basis of the government interest
in preventing corruption.

78

The major example of corruption noted by the justices
is the appearance of improper influence through large

contributions, a "narrow aspect of political association".
The public interest in preventing such influence is seen as
"weighty", while the effect of necessary regulation is seen
as "limited".

79

In addition to corruption,

the "natural order"

justices are also sensitive to issues of national

governmental power. In Buckley they note, with respect to
the FECA disclosure requirements,

that there are

"governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh
the possibility of infringement, particularly when the

77

Buckley

424 U.S at 10.

,

While noting that "governmental action which may
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny", the justices assert that
" [n] either
the right to associate nor the right to
participate in political activities is absolute". If the
government shows "a sufficiently important interest" and
uses "means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement
of associational freedoms", its statutes may be upheld. 424
U.S. at 25, citing CSC v. Letter Carriers 413 U.S. 548
78

,

(1973)
79

.

Buckley

,

424 U.S. at 27,
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29.

'free functioning of our national institutions'

involved".

80

is

These include aiding voters in evaluating

candidates by publicizing the source of their funds;

deterring corruption by publicizing large contributions and
expenditures; and gathering the data necessary to enforce

contribution limitations. 81
Burger's dissent in Buckley on disclosure limits takes
issue with the majority's application of these standards of
review. He argues that the standards are not as strict as

past precedents and the Constitution warrant. Arguing that

greater "precision of regulation" is required, Burger
asserts that "no legitimate public interest has been shown
in forcing the disclosure of modest contributions that are

the prime support of new, unpopular, or unfashionable

political causes". 82 He finds the dangers of corruption to
be outweighed by the potential of adverse impact on such

political causes, a position closer to the "natural order"
stance in the ballot access cases.

Powell's majority opinion in Bellotti also employs the

compelling state interest/"exacting scrutiny" test. But
unlike Buckley

,

the asserted state interests in active

participation and protecting shareholder rights are not
found to meet this test. While these interests are

424 U.S. at 66, citing Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Board 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
80

,

81

424 U.S. at 66-68.

82

424 U.S. at 240

(Burger,
223

C.J.,

dissenting).

substantial,
at issue.

they are not sufficiently connected to the law

Powell puts particular emphasis on the lack of

empirical evidence in the record regarding any dominant or

significant corporate role in past referendum votes. 83

Bellotti indicates that the "natural order" justices will
not automatically accept asserted state interests in

protecting competition from corruption, though the dissents
of Brennan and Marshall in the case are evidence of some

division

84

Brennan'

s

opinion in Massachusetts Citizens For Life

reaffirms the use of the "compelling state interest"

standard when First Amendment rights are found to be
burdened, but as in Bellotti and Consolidated Edison

,

the

facts do not meet the standard. Brennan finds the various
legal and organizational requirements for a "segregated
fund",

as well as the requirement itself,

to be a

"substantial" restriction on MCFL's speech. These facts

make it "evident" to Brennan
that MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent restrictions than it
would be if it were not incorporated. These

83

435

U.S. at 786-88.

Justice Powell in Consolidated Edison reemphasizes
this compelling state interest standard, but again finds
that the interests are not implicated by the regulations
involved, and thus not applicable to the case. 447 U.S. at
540-43.
In their application of a standard of review, Bellotti
and Consolidated Edison reflect a greater level of
antigovernment skepticism than other "natural order"
campaign finance opinions; notably, Burger joins the
majority in both of these opinions.
84
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additional regulations may create a disincentive
for such organizations to engage in political
speech 85

With such a burden,

"it would not be surprising if at least

some groups decided that the contemplated political

activity was simply not worth it". 86 Since the threat of
corporate wealth corrupting politics is not involved in the
case of MCFL, Brennan finds the "compelling state interest"

standard is unmet. 87

85

479 U.S. at 254.

86

479 U.S. at 255.

87

While noting the long history of regulation of
corporate political activity, and the fact that corporate
treasury funds "are not an indication of popular support
for the corporation's political ideas", Brennan asserts
that such regulation "has reflected concern not about use
of the corporate form per se but about the potential for
unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes" MCFL
is not seen to pose those dangers, since it "was formed to
disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital". 479
,

.

U.S.

at 256-59.

Marshall's opinion in Austin reaffirms that the use of
funds to support a candidate is speech, and cites
Massachusetts Citizens for the proposition that regulations
on independent expenditures and requirements for segregated
funds do burden freedom of association. As a result, the
statute "must be justified by a compelling state interest".
494 U.S. at 657-658. The facts of Austin meet the standard;
the statute is "precisely tailored" to serve the state
interest as well. The distinction of media corporations,
whose "resources are devoted to the collection of
information and its dissemination to the public", is also
viewed as compelling, given their "unique role" in the
political process. 494 U.S. at 666-67.
Scalia's dissent in Austin accepts the "compelling
state interest" standard of the majority, but finds it
unmet by the facts of the case. He argues that the Court
has held "that a direct restriction upon speech is narrowly
enough tailored if it extends to speech that has the mere
potential for producing social harm" He argues that such a
principle would overturn a variety of past Court
precedents, including NAACP v. Alabama 494 U.S. at 688-90.
.

.
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In contrast to the ballot access and nominations

cases,

the application of a strict standard of review in

the campaign finance cases is not used consistently to

invalidate most government action. While the "natural
order" justices hold against some regulations, particularly

those involving direct expenditures, many other statutes
are upheld. The explanation lies in their concern for the

prevention of corruption, an interest to they give great
weight

The Role of Government
As the preceding analysis suggests, the majority of

"natural order" justices constitutionally support some

government regulation in the area of campaign finance.

Though the justices tend to give particular weight to
national legislation like the FECA, the Austin decision is

evidence that state regulations will also be treated with

deference under their standards of review. The government
is seen,

in many of the cases,

as a supportive rather than

a destructive influence on the "natural" competitive order.

The dangers of corruption seem to be the key ingredient
that prompts the "natural order" justices to accept a wider

government role in this part of the electoral process.
The Buckley opinion defends a proper role for the

national government in this area. The constitutional power
of Congress in this area is "well established and is not
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questioned by any of the parties in this case". 88 What is
at issue,

then,

is not whether Congress has a role,

but the

parameters of that role, i.e., how far regulation may

proceed before it impinges upon other constitutional
guarantees
A number of actions are viewed as falling outside the

proper parameters of this congressional power. Equalization
of political "voices" by an independent expenditure

ceiling,

for example,

is not accepted as a legitimate

function of government by the Buckley majority

.

According

to the opinion,

The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment, which was
designed "to secure 'the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources'", and "'to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by
the people' " 89
.

Though access to the process should be open, the volume of
voices within that process cannot be artificially
restricted.

88

424

90

Even in its moderated treatment of campaign

U.S. at 13.

424 U.S. at 48-49. Yet, as we have seen, corporate
speech and unlimited contributions to candidates can be
89

limited
424 U.S. at 54-55. The same justification used here
to throw out independent expenditure restrictions also
serves to discredit restrictions on expenditure of personal
and family funds; the government cannot burden First
Amendment rights in order to equalize "the relative
financial resources of candidates". The interests in
preventing corruption are not dismissed completely; rather,
90
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finance regulation, the "natural order" does not fully shed
its skepticism of government involvement in the electoral

process
The desire to reduce the rising cost of campaigns is

also not accepted as a justification for limits on

expenditures
In the free society ordained by our Constitution,
it is not the government but the peopleindividually as citizens and candidates and
collectively as associations and political
committees- -who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in
a political campaign.

91

The government cannot artificially limit the political

process in the name of supposed wisdom.
In contrast,

the Buckley majority views contribution

limits and disclosure requirements as legitimate exercises
of congressional power,

addressing a compelling state

interest in controlling political corruption:
The prevention of corruption and the appearance
of corruption spawned by the real or imagined
coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidate's positions and on their
actions if elected to office. 92

Contribution limits are seen as a "necessary legislative
concomitant" to dealing with corruption, and disclosure

requirements serve an "informational interest" by helping
"voters

[to]

define more of the candidates'

they are seen as sufficiently served by the contribution
and disclosure provisions of the FECA.
91

92

Buckley
424

,

424 U.S. at 57

U.S. at 25.
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constituencies".

93

Free competition must be open, not

manipulated by hidden actors or "other people's money".
Congress is also seen by the Buckley majority as

having the power, under the "general welfare" clause of the
Constitution, to decide on expending public money to fund
the presidential selection process. That clause is

interpreted not as a limitation, but rather a grant, of
power. Three "general welfare" purposes are cited from a
U.S.

Senate report:
To reduce the deleterious influence of
contributions on our political process,
facilitate communication by candidates
the electorate, and to free candidates
the rigors of f undraising 94

large
to
with
from

These purposes all involve the protection and promotion of

political competition, an acceptable purpose for the
"natural order" justices. Whether the means are wise is a

decision for Congress to make, not the judiciary. The
legislative decision to set different standards for minor
parties to obtain this public funding is also seen as

within "the permissible range". The funding of national
conventions and the primary processes are supported with
the same logic. 95

424 U.S. at 28, 80-81. The justices note that such
disclosure applies only to candidate related spending, and
thus is not impermissibly broad under the First Amendment.
93

94

4 2 4 U.S.

95

424

at 90-91.

U.S. at 104-8.
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Justice Powell's opinion in Bellotti reasserts the
"natural order" perspective's skepticism of government

regulation of the electoral process. Taking issue with an

assertion by Rehnquist that the reach of the First
Amendment is more limited with regard to state government
power,

Powell argues that "the states do not have greater

latitude than Congress to abridge freedom of speech"
notes as well that Rehnquist'

s

.

He

distinction between federal

and state powers over speech has never been the position of
a

majority of justices on the Court. 96 In contrast to

national power, the state role in regulation continues to
be scrutinized carefully by the "natural order" justices,

although Austin indicates that some will uphold some state
regulations as well. 97

96

435 U.S. at 780-81.

97

As noted earlier, Scalia argues in the campaign
finance cases for a stricter application of the "natural
order" majority's standard of review. His dissent in Austin
saves its strongest critique for the majority's view of the
proper role of the state in this area. Scalia sees the
majority opinion's critical mistake as
its departure from long-accepted premises of our
political system regarding the benevolence that
can be expected of government in managing the
arena of public debate, and the danger that is
to be anticipated from powerful private institutions that compete with government, and with one
another, within this arena.
494 U.S. at 692
Scalia argues that the framers of the First Amendment
would not even see prevention of the "new corruption" as a
"
desirable objective", much less a "compelling state
interest". He cites Jefferson and Madison, as well as
Toqueville on the critical role of private associations in
politics, in order to buttress his point. 494 U.S. at 69294

.
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As our analysis reveals,

the majority of "natural

order" justices will permit a substantial role for

government in the regulation of campaign finance. The

parameters of this role, however, are measured by how each
state or national regulation relates to the government

interest in preventing corruption, the only goal seen to be

sufficiently compelling to override free speech rights.
Those regulations not aimed at preventing corruption are

much more likely to be viewed as unconstitutional. The
"natural order" justices, while friendlier to campaign

finance regulation than other areas of government
involvement,

still maintain a high standard for approving

particular exercises of this role.

The "Constructed Order" Perspective
In campaign finance cases,

the "constructed order"

justices have been closer to the "natural order" justices
than in other areas of party and electoral jurisprudence.

Both perspectives have been willing to approve some

government regulation of campaign money, but the
"constructed order" perspective stands out for supporting a

wider range of government action and holding government to
a more lenient application of standards of review.

Rehnquist and White, the justices who most consistently
support the "constructed order" perspective in these cases,
argue that the government's role enables, but rarely
damages,

the political process.
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Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti is a good example of
the "constructed order" perspective. While the majority

finds that the Massachusetts statute abridges freedom of

expression protected by the First Amendment, Rehnquist
argues that prohibition of corporate and union spending in

referendum campaigns protects competition and prevents an
imbalance of political influence. 98 For the "constructed
order" justices, government preserves and protects the

competitive process through democratically enacted
regulations, and its judgment should be given great

deference in all cases.

Party Competition And Choice
Like the "natural order" justices, those who favor the

"constructed order" perspective seek to protect political
competition, but are less likely to second-guess government

statutes in order to provide such protection. Their view of
the dangers of corporate corruption is like that held by
the "natural order" perspective, but their definition of

protected speech is more limited, especially in the case of
and their deference toward government solutions is

White,

broader.

In the "constructed order" perspective,

state

decisions to protect competition frequently outweigh speech
rights

.

98

Bellotti
dissenting)

,

435 U.S. at 822
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(Rehnquist, J.,

The "constructed order" justices, who are more

impressed by the threat of financial monopoly, often show

deference to state efforts to control campaign finance.

Blackmun's dissent in Consolidated Edison

,

joined by

Rehnquist, emphasizes the monopoly status and role

structure of the utilities: "the use of the insert amounts
to an exaction from the utility's customers by way of

forced aid for the utility's speech". Such monopoly power

justifies extensive state oversight." Speech and free
choice is perverted by corporate action, so the state may

legitimately intervene to prevent such distortion.
Most of the "constructed order" justices, however, are
not prepared to accept all restrictions on campaign
finance. This is particularly true of independent

expenditures, as shown in FEC v. National Conservative

Political Action Committee (NCPAC)

,

which overturned the

$1000 ceiling on independent expenditures by political

committees on behalf of publicly funded presidential
candidates.

100

Direct speech is seen to be implicated, and

the restriction is compared to "allowing a speaker in a

public hall to express his views while denying him the use

447 U.S. at 549 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). It is
noteworthy that Blackmun describes the effect of monopoly
as "forced aid" to the utility's speech; this element of
coercion is similar to Brennan's concern with "shareholder
rights"
99

FEC v. National Conservative Politica l Action
Committee (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
100
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of an amplifying system".

101

California Medical

Association is distinguished on the grounds that
expenditures from less powerful persons are involved, and
FEC v. National Right to Work Committee is distinguished as

involving a corporation, not a political committee. 102

An important distinction about corruption is made in
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee

.

Noting that the only compelling state interest in

restricting PAC speech is the prevention of corruption,
Rehnquist argues that NCPAC's independent expenditures are
not implicated by that interest, because independent

expenditures by their nature do not corrupt candidates. 103
if spending does not promote corruption,

Thus,

state

interests are greatly diminished. With regard to this
issue,

the positions of the two perspectives are highly

congruent
Rehnquist'
For Life

s

partial dissent in Massachusetts Citizens

joined by Blackmun, White, and Stevens,

,

is

grounded in his unanimous opinion in National Right To Work
Committee

.

Asserting that the latter decision "unanimously

endorsed the 'legislative judgment that the special
characteristics of the corporate structure require

particularly careful regulation'", Rehnquist argues that

Note the similarity to the "tank of gas" analogy in

101

Buckley

"I

.

102

470 U.S. at 493-95.

103

470 U.S. at 496-97.
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cannot accept the conclusion that the statutory provisions
[section 441b]

are unconstitutional as applied to appellee

Massachusetts Citizens For Life (MCFL)

"

.

He highlights the

history of regulation, the purposes of preventing
corruption and protecting shareholders, and the stategranted advantages enjoyed by corporations, citing the NRWC
and NCPAC decisions as well as California Medical

Association

104
.

The corruption concern and state ties are

central to Rehnquist's understanding of these issues.
The principal dissenter in many of the campaign

finance cases is Justice White, who adopts the most

government - friendly "constructed order" perspective among
the justices. White's basic argument is that money is not

equivalent to speech, a position that leads him to approve
most government regulation of campaign finance. For White,
the dangers of corruption posed by unregulated campaign and

political money far outweigh any free speech concern posed
by restrictions on that money.

White refuses to agree that money is speech, calling
that argument "entirely too much". In Buckley

,

he notes

that "money is not always equivalent to or used for speech,

even in the context of political campaigns; there are "many

expensive campaign activities that are not themselves

communicative or remotely related to speech"

.

On the

positive side, expenditure ceilings "help eradicate the

104

479 U.S. at 266-67

(Rehnquist

part)
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C. J.

,

dissenting in

hazard of corruption". 105 White feels the majority is

insufficiently cognizant of the implications of their

decision in this respect:
The holding perhaps is not that federal candidates have the constitutional right to purchase
their election, but many will so interpret the
Court's conclusion in this case I cannot join
the Court in this respect. 106
.

the chosen legislative purpose preserves,

Thus,

restricts,

rather than

the competitive political process.

White's dissent in Buckley sees equal potential for

corruption in contributions and expenditures. He states
that
It makes little sense to me, and apparently made
none to Congress, to limit the amounts an
individual may give to a candidate or spend with
his approval but fail to limit the amounts that
could be spent on his behalf. 107

Like Burger, White is concerned with maintaining and

respecting the logic of congressional intent in
legislation, but he reaches a conclusion opposed to
Burger's.

Instead of arguing that the whole law should fall

as a unit,

White asserts that it should be upheld as a

unit

White's dissent would also uphold the limitations on
personal funds expenditures, supporting that government
effort to preserve the competitive political process.

dissenting).

105

424 U.S. at 262-63

106

424 U.S. at 266

(White,

J.,

dissenting); emphasis

107

424

U.S. at 261

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

(White,

J.,

added

236

Arguing that this restriction serves "salutary purposes
related to the integrity of federal campaigns", White
asserts that it forces candidates to demonstrate financial
support among the voters and works in the direction of more
equal access to the political arena.

108

These interests

are supportive of both a more competitive politics and of a

government role in helping to promote that politics.
White's dissent in Bellotti takes on the issue of

competition and choice explicitly, finding the state
statute was legitimately trying to level the playing field
and prevent misuse of corporate funds. He differentiates

corporate speech, citing Thomas Emerson in opposition to
Powell's use of Emerson in the majority opinion, and argues
that corporations and corporate speech do not "represent a

manifestation of individual freedom of choice". 109 The
emphasis is once again on freedom of choice, except that,
here,

the state is preserving, not restraining,

such

freedom.
Indeed,

in Bellotti

,

White sees the state as

protecting that freedom by seeking to prevent possible
unfair political advantages for corporations. Such
organizations are often in a position of economic
dominance, power which could enable them to dominate "the

very heart of our democracy, the electoral process". As

108

109

Buckley
435

,

424 U.S. at 266

U.S. at 805

(White,

237

(White,
J.,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting).

White notes,

"the State need not permit its own creation to

consume it". 110 As noted earlier, Brennan and Marshall
find common ground with White in this particular dissent.

White's dissent in National Conservative Political

Action Committee continues to argue against the proposition
that money is speech. He asserts that the First Amendment

protects "the right to speak, not the right to spend", and
that money is a producer of speech rather than speech
itself. He also argues that the distinction between

independent and coordinated expenditures "blinks political
reality", noting that the movement of persons between PACs

and candidate staffs reflects the reality that "PACs do not

operate in an anonymous vacuum"

.

He also argues that

contribution limits are pointless without spending
limits

111
.

The "constructed order" perspective on campaign
finance and competition, like the "natural order", is not

held in a consistent fashion by all the justices.
Rehnquist, joined on occasion by Blackmun, approves of most

110

435 U.S. at 809

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting).
and agrees
majority
Notably, Marshall dissents from the
his argument
with
not
with much of White's position, though
521
at
that money does not equal speech. 470 U.S.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
White's brief, one sentence dissent in Massachusetts
Citizens joins Rehnquist 's dissent, but also reaffirms his
view that contributions and expenditures should be treated
in the same fashion, citing his previous dissents in
Buckley Bellotti and National Conservative Pol itical
action Committee. 479 U.S. at 271 (White, J., dissenting).
470 U.S. at 508-11

111

,

(White,

,

238

J.,

government regulations, but is skeptical of expenditure
limits on campaigns or independent spending. White

consistently argues the "constructed order" perspective,
but is alone in opposing the idea that money is a form of
speech. He is much more suspicious of unregulated political

money than of government regulation of such money. Overall,
however, both Rehnquist and White agree on the positive

role government regulation can play in protecting the

competitiveness of the political process.

Party Structure and Functions
Like the "natural order" justices, the "constructed
order" justices have little to say about political parties
in their campaign finance opinions. They envision no

special role for parties in the campaign finance process,
and most do not give any particular attention to the

interests of parties. The exception is Justice Rehnquist,
who defends the rights of minor parties under the public

financing system of presidential selection. Even Rehnquist,
however, does not defend a particular role for parties.

Like Burger, Rehnquist'

s

dissent in Buckley focuses

attention on the treatment of minor parties and independent
candidates; however, Rehnquist'

s

defense of their interests

is premised on different grounds than Burger's.

He argues

that the states are properly subject to fewer First

Amendment strictures than the federal government; only the
"general principle of free speech" is incorporated by the
239

Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, federal statutes must
meet a higher standard of review, opening the FECA to

stronger First Amendment attacks by minor parties.

Rehnquist thus agrees with Burger on the disadvantage for

minor parties created by public financing, asserting that
the FECA "has enshrined the Republican and Democratic

Parties in a permanently preferred position".

112

Rehnquist

thereby distinguishes his ballot access views on the basis
of state versus federal legislative purposes and

authority

113

Beyond this defense of minor parties, however, the
"constructed order" justices, Rehnquist and White, are
silent on the relationship between parties and campaign
finance. Parties are treated no differently than any other

participant in the campaign finance arena. While Rehnquist
does argue that no party should be disadvantaged by federal

government statutes on campaign finance, neither he nor
White (nor any other justice who joins the "constructed
order" perspective)

sees parties as playing any distinctive

role in the process. Parties are left to fend for

themselves in the "market" of campaign money.

112

424 U.S. at 291-93

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

As Chapter 2 noted, Rehnquist is very willing to
judge most state initiatives in the electoral arena by a
lenient standard of review.
113
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Standards Of Evidence and Burden

While many of the justices who adopt the "constructed
order" perspective in the campaign finance cases adopt the
same "compelling state interest" standard of review as the

"natural order" justices, the discussion of competition in
the previous section indicates that their application of it
is more lenient. Unlike their treatment of the ballot

access and nomination cases, the "constructed order"
justices are more likely to demand a compelling state
interest in the campaign finance cases. At the same time,
they are likely to find a supportable state interest. Thus,

while the standards applied may have changed, the results
of their application are similar.

White's application of standards is the most lenient
among the "constructed order" justices. His dissent in

Buckley argues that expenditure limits should be upheld,
contending that there is "no sound basis" for invalidating
them "so long as the purposes they serve are legitimate and

sufficiently substantial, which in my view they are". He
views such limits as reducing the possibility of
corruption, easing the burdens of fundraising, and

restoring confidence in federal elections.
of legitimate and substantial interests,

114

A standard

rather than a

compelling interest, is seen as sufficient to justify
congressional legislation in this area. This is a standard

114

424 U.S. at 264-65

(White,

241

J.,

dissenting).

that is much more friendly to the governmental purposes and

grows out of White's argument that money is not a form of

speech
Overall,

the "constructed order" treatment of campaign

finance statutes does not depart radically from their more
lenient treatment of government regulation of ballot access
and nomination procedures. While they invoke the compelling

state interest standard, they most often find it met. While

White departs from his colleagues in employing a more
lenient standard of review, the only area in which the
results differ are in his approval

(and the majority's

disapproval) of various expenditure limitations. Thus, the

importance of standards of review lies both in their

identity and their application.

The Role Of Government

The "constructed order" perspective in the campaign

finance cases approves a strong and positive role for

government regulation of political money, particularly at
the federal level. While this role is not unlimited (only
White,

for example, approves the FECA limitations on

expenditures)

,

it is as broad as the state role allowed in

ballot access and nomination procedures. In a departure
from these areas, the "constructed order" position is more

often joined by the "natural order" justices, out of a

concern that both share about the corrupting effects of

money in politics.
242

White's dissent in Buckley is a good example of the

"constructed order" perspective on a strong role for

government in regulating campaign money. White is highly
supportive of the right of Congress to regulate the

election process for federal offices. Citing the precedents
of Ex Parte Yarbrouah and Burroughs v. U.S.

.

Justice White

asserts that Congress in this area has "the authority to

protect the elective processes against the

'

two great

natural and historical enemies of all republics, open

violence and insidious corruption'

"

.

A key source of

possible corruption is money in politics, and particularly
the undue influence of great wealth.

115

White's most visible departure from the majority in

Buckley is his acceptance of FECA expenditure limitations.
He sees both contributions and expenditures as aiding

speech, but contends that the government's "nonspeech

interests" in regulating money in federal elections "are

sufficiently urgent to justify the incidental effects that
the limitations visit upon the First Amendment interests of

candidates and their supporters". The expenditures were
also seen by Congress as having "corruptive potential", and

White does not believe the justices should second guess
this judgment.

116

115

424 U.S. at 257

116

424 U.S. at 259-61

(White,

J.,

(White,

243

dissenting).
J.,

dissenting).

Rehnquist's dissent in Buckley reflects his continuing

deference to state governments in most areas, but it also
reveals some issues on which he does not approve of

governmental action. He asserts, in discussing the
Justices' ballot access opinions, that
If the states are to afford a republican form
of government, they must by definition provide
for general elections and for some standards
as to the content of the official ballots which
will be used at those elections. 117

While this state government involvement in controlling the

ballot is seen as not only permissible but a matter of
"necessity",

congressional involvement in public financing

of presidential elections is viewed as lacking "the same

sort of mandate of necessity as does a State's regulation
of ballot access".

118

Rehnquist cannot accept the position

"that because no third party has posed a credible threat to

the two major parties in Presidential elections since 1860,

Congress may by law attempt to assure that this pattern
will endure forever".

119

White's dissent in Bellotti
cases,

,

as in the nominations

emphasizes the evidentiary weight of history and

general political practice in judging the legitimacy of the

Massachusetts restriction. He notes that statutes of this
sort have been on the books for many years and that 31

(Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).

117

424 U.S. at 292

118

424 U.S. at 292-93

(Rehnquist, J.,

119

424 U.S. at 293-94

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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dissenting).

states have similar legislation. He also cites the Federal

Corrupt Practices Act as precedent. White uses this

evidence to argue that the justices have substituted their
judgment for that of the legislature, neglecting the
context of politics, and insists that the legislature

should be left to make such judgments. 120 He also cites

both common law traditions and Securities and Exchange

Commission regulations designed to keep corporations out of
direct political activity. 121 In White's view, past state

practice and general political practice should be respected
as evidence,

and state legislatures should not be second

guessed
In Bellotti

,

White finds a permissible state interest,

which he characterizes as "strong", in detaching corporate
investment decisions from politics. 122 This is an

interesting argument on the corporate form, which asserts
that investors are unlikely to favor but have little voice
in preventing corporate funding of political causes.

Brennan,

Austin

as has been noted,

adopts a similar argument in

.

White's main argument in Bellotti is that regulation
of corporate speech is justified by the fact that they have

advantages gained through state laws and state granted

120

435 U.S. at 804

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

121

435 U.S. at 819

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

122

435 U.S. at 805

(White,

J.,

dissenting).
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privileges. These artificial advantages have put

corporations in an economic position they could use to

dominate "the very heart of our democracy, the electoral
process". The state has a right to prevent this. As White
puts it,

"the State need not permit its own creation to

consume it".

123

The state created nature of corporations

is thus seen as central to distinguishing their speech

rights and justifies state regulation of their activity. It
does,

however,

run afoul the fact that a similar rationale

for permitting party regulation has been severely limited

by White's own colleagues on the Court.

White takes an unusually strong position in favor of
the state interests in Bellotti

.

In challenging the

majority opinion, he argues that
Once again, we are provided with no explanation
whatsoever by the Court as to why the State's
interest is of less constitutional weight than
that of corporations to participate financially
in the electoral process and as to why the
balance between two First Amendment interests
should be struck by the Court. 124
The state interest should be favored in this case so as to

maintain the competitive balance of the electoral process.
Rehnquist's dissent in Bellotti emphasizes the

evidentiary importance of comparative political practice in
judging government statutes. Like White, he notes that
Massachusetts, 30 other states and the U.S. Congress "have

123

435 U.S. at 809

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

124

435 U.S. at 816

(White,

J.,

dissenting).

all concluded that restrictions upon the political activity
of business corporations are both politically desirable and

constitutionally permissible". Such a "broad consensus" was
"entitled to considerable deference from this Court". He
goes beyond the other dissenters, and reaffirms his stance
in Buckley

,

arguing that the application of the First

Amendment to the states is more limited than to the federal
government

125

Blackmun's dissent in Consolidated Edison also argues
for the legitimacy of a state regulation of corporate

political activity. He finds that the Public Service

Commission has a right to prohibit the inclusion of policy
inserts with monthly electric bills, and asserts that the
state has a legitimate interest in preventing undue

advantages gained by monopoly power. Blackmun notes the

widespread nature of prohibitions on political inserts in
utility bills and of political donations by utility
companies. 126 Empirical data on utility behavior and state

practice is again seen as strong evidence.
White's dissent in National Conservative Political

Action Committee reemphasizes his stance that there is no
valid distinction between contributions and expenditures
and that government interests are sufficient to uphold

restrictions on both, including the limits at issue here.

125

Bellotti
dissenting)
126

,

435 U.S. at 822-823

447 U.S. at 550-53

(Blackmun,
247

(Rehnquist, J.,

J.,

dissenting).

He argues that expenditures in this case are more

accurately seen as contributions. He sees their restriction
as part of an "integrated and complex system of public

funding for Presidential campaigns", one which should not
be tampered with lightly.

127

Rehnquist's partial dissent in Massachusetts Citizens
For Life again favors both the choices of a legislature and
the force of precedent. He attacks the majority position by

asserting that it rejects past precedent and "the judgment
of Congress"

.

He goes on to argue that the distinctions

among corporations drawn by Brennan are of degree, not
kind,

and are therefore "more properly drawn by the

Legislature than the Judiciary". 128 His statement is clear
in this regard:

Congress expressed its judgment in section 441b
that the threat posed by corporate political
activity warrants a prophylactic measure
applicable to all groups that organize in the
corporate form. Our previous cases have expressed
a reluctance to fine-tune such judgments; I would
adhere to such counsel here. 129
He argues that National Right to Work Committee establishes
a standard of

"considerable deference" to Congress on these

questions, and asserts that National Conserv ative Political

Action Committee recognizes "an acceptable distinction,

dissenting).

127

470 U.S. at 508

128

479 U.S. at 267-68

(Rehnquist,

C.J.,

dissenting in

129

479 U.S. at 268-69

(Rehnquist,

C.J.,

dissenting in

(White,

J.,

part)

part)
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grounded in the judgment of the political branch,"
between
corporate actors and other organizations whose
noncorporate
status deprives them of state privileges.

130

Rehnquist hammers this point home in his conclusion.
He notes that "the basically legislative character of
the

Court's decision

is dramatically illustrated by its effort

to carve out a constitutional niche for 'groups such as

MCFL'". He compares such actions to a "council of revision
to modify legislative judgments",

and asserts that the

drawing of such modifications should be left to
Congress.

131

It is clear that Rehnquist 's major concern is

to protect legislative judgment,

and not turn the Court

into an unelected legislature.

Conclusions
The degree of harmony between the "natural order" and

"constructed order" perspectives in the campaign finance
cases make these opinions somewhat different as a group,

though both perspectives maintain familiar outlines. Many
of the "natural order" justices,

in their desire to prevent

corrupting effects of campaign money in the electoral
process, are willing to allow significant government

management of these finances. Similarly, many of the

130

479 u.s. at 269-70

(Rehnquist,

C.J.,

dissenting in

part)

Massachusetts Citizens For Life
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part).
131

249

,

479 U.S. at 271

"constructed order" justices are willing to strike down
some government regulations, particularly expenditure

controls,

in the name of protecting free speech and free

competition
Much of the "common ground" between the two

perspectives is reflected in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
FEC v. National Right To Work Committee (NRWC)

,

which

upheld an FEC regulation barring corporations from
soliciting political funds from nonmembers

.

This is the

only unanimous campaign finance decision. 132 Rehnquist,
who advocates the "constructed order" perspective, argues
that the central issue in the case is the legal concept of

"membership". He rejects the NRWC's argument that members

include all those who describe themselves as active and

supportive of the organization, asserting that such an

interpretation would destroy the restriction on nonmembers.
He also notes that NRWC's articles of incorporation state

that it has no members, and asserts that a proper standard
of membership must involve "some relatively enduring and

independently significant financial or organizational
attachment"

132

133
.

459 U.S.

197.

459 U.S. at 201-4. Examples of such attachment,
according to Rehnquist, could include operation or
administration of the corporation; election of officials;
membership meetings; control over expenditure of
contributions; and official membership. He seems to find
all of these lacking in the instant case.
133

250

The necessity of meaningful attachment for full free

speech protection of political funds solicited by

corporations is congruent with the "natural order"

perspective on the corruption of politics by unconnected,
untraceable corporate funds, but also with the "constructed
order" concern with standards of group membership. The

agreement in this case is similar to the demand for a "show
of support"

Fortson

.

in the unanimous ballot access case,

In both cases,

Jenness

v.

all the justices involved agree

that the government can legitimately set standards of

support or commitment in regulating portions of the

electoral process. With regard to the "natural order" view
of campaign finance,

this restriction is permissible

because it prevents corruption by "other people's
money"

134
.

The fulcrum of concern for both perspectives is the

danger of corruption and the impact of corporate entities
on politics. These concerns have a long history in American

political rhetoric, but have been voiced with particular
frequency since the Progressive Era, when reformers

spotlighted the financial corruption of politics by large
corporations, wealthy individuals, and political
"machines". Both sides echo this Progressive suspicion of

money in politics, but the "constructed order" appears more

This is another reflection that the "compelling
state interest" standard can be satisfied for the "natural
order" justices.
134
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prepared to accept government efforts to limit such
corruption, particularly with regard to corporations. While

both perspectives seek to prevent the corruption of
politics, the "natural order" is still more wary of

government regulation as a prophylactic for such corruption
than is the "constructed order"
The views of both perspectives in these opinions are

also marked by their relative indifference to political
parties. The majority of justices pay little attention to

either major or minor parties in their opinions. This
silence seems due in part to the fact that they do not see

parties as indispensable players in campaign finance, but
due also to the absence of parties as plaintiffs or

defendants in the cases. The end result is to ignore an

institution which, thanks to the innovations of the
national Republican Party, is again playing a major role in
135
Only Burger and
the financing of political campaigns.

Rehnquist actively defend the interests of parties,

particularly minor parties, in the campaign finance
process

.

In considering why the differences between the two

perspectives are more muted in this area of decisions, the

aforementioned absence of parties as litigants or centers
of controversy in most of these cases is an important

For an account of the strengthened role of parties
Party
in campaign finance in the 1980' s, see Herrnson,
1980'
Campaigning In The
135

.
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factor. Most of the litigants are associations or

corporations; parties have generally chosen not to pursue

campaign finance issues through judicial challenges,

particularly in the Supreme Court, but have instead relied
on legislative changes to existing laws.

136

As a result,

justices have not been called upon to address the roles and
rights of parties in campaign finance, and the differing

attitudes toward the scope of party freedom do not come
into play as directly.

The focus of this litigation on private associations

and corporations also helps to explain the measure of
"agreement" between the two perspectives in these opinions.
The "natural order" perspective, except for Burger and
Scalia, views the rights of neither "group" with the same

level of constitutional deference as party organizations.

This is particularly true of business corporations. The

associational and speech freedoms of these organizations
are

found to be outweighed in many cases by the danger of

Associational litigants have included the
California Medical Association, the National Right To Work
Committee, and the National Conservative Political Action
Committee. "Corporate" litigants have included the First
National Bank of Boston, the Commonwealth Edison Company,
the Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., and the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. Only in Buckley was a challenge to
campaign finance law brought by a candidate, Conservative
Party Senator James Buckley of New York.
A good example of how the role of parties has been
increased by legislative change is the 1979 amendments to
the FECA, which enabled the flow of largely unregulated
"soft money" through party organizations.
136
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large, unrestricted,

and undisclosed contributions,

i.e.

"other people's money", corrupting the political process.

When combined with a history of restrictions on direct
corporate funding of candidates and a focus on direct
speech as the critical right involved, associational
concerns are given only secondary attention. 137 The right
of association is asserted in these cases mainly to defend

direct expenditures, an issue on which the "constructed
order" takes a more anti- regulatory stance than in other

areas examined in this work. Thus, the right of association
is a less divisive and less visible doctrine in these cases

because of the nature of the litigants, the broad agreement
on protecting direct speech,

and the largely shared concern

about the corrupting effects of "other people's money". The

absence of broad disputes in these cases over freedom of

association is another explanation for why political party
concerns receive less attention in their discussions.
The relative absence of parties from the opinions is
due in part to the fact that most of them have dealt with

provisions of the FECA, a federal statute. An examination
of state campaign finance laws reveals important variations

from the federal approach, particularly with regard to the

The campaign finance opinions of both perspectives
are notable for their almost exclusive grounding in the
First Amendment, with very limited citation to freedom of
association and other party and election opinions. In
addition, few citations are made to social science research
on campaign finance, in contrast to the numerous citations
5
in ballot access, nomination procedures, and (as Chapter
opinions.
will detail) patronage
137
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role of parties. Currently,

fifteen states give public

money to parties. Of these, ten give money from tax
surcharges or checkoffs to a taxpayer-designated party. 138
Five states determine the allocation of funds from such

checkoffs or charges without taxpayer designation. 139
Thus,

nearly one- third of state governments have some

method for publicly funding party activity, which indicates
that a significant number of states envision an important

role for parties in financing the electoral process, a role

largely ignored by the justices' jurisprudence.
Ultimately, the campaign finance opinions of the

justices demonstrate that the division between a "natural
order" perspective and a "constructed order" perspective

does not preclude points of agreement and common ground

between them. With campaign money, most of the justices
agree on the propriety of some role for government in

preventing corruption from the free and unregulated flow of
"other people's money". The divisions arise over how far

government can appropriately proceed in that direction
without running afoul of First Amendment protections.

"a F e d era i

Election Commission, Campaign Finance Law
FEC, 1992), tax+public finance
(Washington, D.C.
provision tables. The states involved are Alabama, Arizona,
Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
and Virginia.
92

:

ibid The five states are California, Indiana,
Minnesota, North Carolina, and Ohio. Indiana uses revenue
from personalized license plates, while North Carolina will
appropriate separate funds for special elections and
contributor tax refunds.
139

.
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Free speech means free competition, not equal results,
to the justices from both perspectives. While to the

"natural order" such competition means ballot access for

party candidates and respect for party nomination
procedures, money in politics is a commodity not tied

solely to parties. As a result, neither perspective defends
any special treatment for parties. Rehnquist (on the

"constructed order" side) and Burger (on the "natural
order" side) do argue that minor parties should not be
dis advantaged by government action, but no justice argues
for the

interests of parties as a key player in the

campaign finance process. While many justices do see a key
role for parties in other parts of the electoral process,

they are left to fend for themselves in the contest for
money,

the so-called "mother's milk of politics".

Ironically,

it may be the relative absence of party

concerns in the campaign finance opinions that is the most
important "fact" for understanding the opinions'

implications for parties. During the period of these

decisions (1976-1990)

both major parties asserted

,

themselves organizationally by a more aggressive role in
140
This role was
raising and disbursing campaign funds.

This history is well treated in a variety of works.
Some of the most notable are Herrnson, Party Campaigning In
Sabato, The Party's Just Begun and Brooks
The 1980'
Jackson, Honest Graft One should also note, however, Frank
Sorauf's cautionary note about who benefits from this new
campaign finance role: "As always, it is not the whole
political party, but only a part of it, that is
strengthened by adaptation". Frank J. Sorauf and Scott A.
140

;

;

.
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encouraged indirectly by the 1979 FECA Amendments
which led
to the rise of "soft money" funneled through
parties. In
essence,

the parties have been largely able to avoid the

judicial forum in dealing with issues of campaign finance.

While the justices may give no special role to parties in
their lexicon of campaign finance, the parties have

established just such a role through their own efforts.
Party associational freedom in this arena has thus far not

needed or "requested" judicial defense. 141

Wilson, "Political Parties and Campaign Finance: Adaptation
and Accommodation Toward a Changing Role", in L. Sandy
Maisel, ed., The Parties Respond: Changes In American
Parties And Campaigns 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1994)
,

What this also means, however, is that many
questions involving the scope of party freedom of
association in the campaign finance process have yet to be
fully addressed by the justices, leaving the door open for
future interpretation.
141
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CHAPTER

5

THE COURT AND PATRONAGE: JOBS, GOVERNMENT, AND
THE HEALTH OF PARTIES

From their earliest days as functioning organizations,

American political parties have utilized government
employment as a tool for recruiting and retaining party
workers, who in turn help the parties turn out votes.

Political patronage had its roots in the first presidential
administrations, but it truly came of age during the

administration of Andrew Jackson, when it became known as
the "spoils system". This partisan use of the "spoils" that

government jobs represented was both widespread and

minimally regulated, at both the state and federal levels,
for most of the nineteenth century.

1

Following the Civil War, however, pressure began to

build for reform of the "spoils system" in the name of
better administration of government. This pressure for a

nonpartisan civil service was increased by public disgust
at the excesses of New York's Tammany Hall and other

political machines. The 1881 assassination of President
James A. Garfield by a disappointed office seeker, and the

public's reaction to it in the 1882 elections, led the
Congress to pass the Pendleton Act of 1883, which forms the

1

Sorauf,

Party Politics In America
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,

p.

82.

foundation of the modern federal civil service system. This
Act was the first significant limitation of patronage. 2
The Pendleton Act has been followed by more than a

century of civil service expansion in the federal and state
governments, greatly reducing the number of patronage

positions available to parties. Progressive era efforts to

professionalize municipal government, the passage of the
Hatch Acts in 1939 and 1940, and socioeconomic changes are
among the many factors which have led to a decline in both
the opportunities and demand for patronage. The public

administrative philosophy of a neutral public service is
now widely accepted by the public at large and is a

particularly potent inhibitor of any resurgence of
patronage

3

Despite these legal and cultural forces, patronage has
not been eliminated from the political landscape,-

opportunities for non-civil-service hiring still exist. The
extent of this remaining patronage is debated. Some

commentators see patronage as extremely limited 4

;

others

assert that it "remains a significant basis for recruiting

See Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service And The
Patronage (New York, NY: Russell and Russell, 1963 -reprint
of 1904 edition), pp. 209-28.
2

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun
Politics. Parties And Pressure Groups
3

,

,

230-31, and Key,
5th ed.
pp. 355-59.

pp.

Sorauf, Party Politics In America
Party's Just Begun
4

.
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;

;

Sabato, The

political workers", particularly at the state level. 5

Limited or not, it is still a campaign issue in many
places. Patronage charges were levelled by Christine Todd
Whitman,

for example,

against Jim Florio in the 1993 New

Jersey gubernatorial campaign. 6 Whatever its status,

patronage remains a political reality, as witnessed by
three major patronage cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the last two decades.

The majority opinions of the justices in these cases

accord patronage a decidedly hostile reception. In Elrod
Burns

v.

the justices upheld injunctive relief for four

,

employees of the Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's
Department, who claimed they had been discharged solely due
7

to partisan affiliation.

In Branti v.

Finkel

,

injunctive

relief was upheld for two Assistant Public Defenders in

Rockland County, New York who had been threatened with
dismissal due to their partisan affiliation. 8 Finally, in
their most recent patronage decision, Rutan v. Republican

5

p.

Bibby,

Parties And Elections In America

Politics,

,

108.

Michael Aron, Governor's Race: A TV Reporter's
Chronicle of The 1993 Florio/Whitman Campaign (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1994), p. 56.
6

Elrod v. Burns 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Ironically, the
sheriff involved, Richard Elrod, had "inherited" his
patronage office from his father, Arthur Elrod, who was
appointed by Chicago political boss Ed Kelly in the 1930' s.
Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping Of America From
Roosevelt To Reagan (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990),
7

,

p.

138.
8

Branti v. Finkel

,

445 U.S.
260

507

(1980).

Party of Illinois, the justices ruled that a group of

Illinois state government employees had stated a valid
legal claim in asserting that they were denied promotion,
transfer,

recall,

or hiring on the basis of partisan

affiliation; this extended the Elrod \ Branti dismissal rule
to those areas of the personnel process as well.

9

Although

the justices did not ban all uses of political affiliation
in the personnel process,

these decisions have further

constricted the government positions available for
patronage

Examining these opinions from the same vantage point
as the ballot access,

nomination, and campaign finance

opinions, one finds the majority justices favoring a

nonpartisan government service in the name of freedom of
speech and association, looking to prevent the current

major parties from "monopolizing" the political process and
stifling alternative views by means of employment
pressures. The dissenting justices, in contrast, see

patronage as a pivotal party function and an historically
legitimate part of the process of politics. Thus, while the

parallels are not exact, concerns about a "natural order"
and a "constructed order" are very much present in these
opinions,

though the "construction" here is not directly

statutory in nature. These two perspectives also divide on

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois

9

(1990)

.
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,

497 U.S.

62

their views of parties, standards of review, and the role
of states in the political process.

The "Natural Order" Perspective
The central concern of the "natural order" perspective
is,

as we have seen in earlier chapters,

the fear that the

two parties are monopolizing the political system through

statutes. Here, the fear is similar: patronage is seen as a

device through which the party in control of government

preserves its power and monopolizes the electoral and
ideological landscape. This appears to be the pivotal

concern driving Brennan, Marshall, White, Stevens, and
Blackmun, who compose the core of the majorities in these

cases

The critical nexus between the justices' understanding
of patronage and "monopoly" is evident in the majority

opinion in Branti, authored by Stevens. Stevens asserts
that the central issue in the case is "orthodoxy", a

monopoly of thought; patronage is seen as leading to such

a

restriction of thought and expression through the pressures
of employment

.

Stevens found a precedent for striking down

government actions that encouraged such orthodoxy in the
famous "flag salute" case of Board of Education v.

Barnette

10
.

The price of patronage is seen as a self-

enforcing monopoly of support and ideas for the party in

445 U.S. at 514, citing Board of Education v.
Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10

,
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power. This view colors and relates to the justices' views
of party functions,

the proper standard of review,

and the

proper role of the states in governing such issues.

Party Competition and Choice

The impact of patronage on competition and democracy
is seen as highly negative by the "natural order" justices.

One of their central objections to patronage is that it

distorts electoral democracy. Brennan's opinion in El rod
views patronage as effecting a strong impairment of "the
free functioning of the electoral process". He uses very

pointed language to describe this impairment: patronage
holds the "power to starve political opposition", and its

practice "tips the electoral process in favor of the
incumbent party".

11

He also characterizes patronage as

leading to "the entrenchment of one or a few parties".
In essence,

12

patronage gives a heavy advantage in political

resources (money, volunteers, etc.) to those who control
it,

and leaves opponents at a comparative disadvantage.

Stevens's concurring opinion in Rutan also stresses
the danger of "entrenchment". He points out that Scalia's

dissent in that case (discussed in section II of this
chapter)

is

"devoid of reference to meaningful evidence

that patronage practices have played a significant role in

11

427 U.S. at 356.

12

427 U.S. at 369.
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the preservation of the two party system"

.

Stevens argues

that patronage instead functions solely to protect the

power of entrenched majorities.

13

He supports this

argument with a footnote citing his own discussion of a

monopolized party system in Anderson

v.

Celebrezze

14
.

This language of monopoly and entrenchment, with its

underlying suspicion of the parties in power, is strongly
reminiscent of the majority opinion in Williams

.

which is

in fact quoted in support of these themes in Brennan's

Elrod opinion.

15

The language of Elrod describes

patronage as "inimical to the process which undergirds our
system of government and... 'at war with the deeper
traditions of democracy embodied in the First
Amendment'".

16

The "natural order" justices' concern with

monopoly is strongly rooted in the First Amendment.
Brennan's opinion in Rut an expands on this point,

giving examples of the adverse effects of affiliation
pressures on the beliefs and political activities of public
employees. Brennan quotes his Elrod opinion to emphasize
that "a democratic system requires the unfettered judgment
of citizens",

a judgment which is infringed by the

13

497 U.S. at 88

(Stevens,

J.,

concurring).

14

497 U.S. at 92

(Stevens,

J.,

concurring).

427 U.S. 357. The opinion quotes Justice Black's
Williams opinion, at 393 U.S. 32: "competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral
15

process"
16

427 U.S. at 357.
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political orthodoxy of ideas that patronage encourages.

17

His Elrod opinion also makes pointed reference to the fact
that patronage has been employed to support such

totalitarian regimes as Nazi Germany, a strongly negative

association between patronage and orthodoxy.
In Branti

.

18

Stevens emphasizes the connection between

patronage and coercion, asserting that sponsorship does
constitute coercion. He also asserts that such coercion
does not need to be "proven"

all that needs to be shown is

;

that someone has been discharged solely for reasons of

political affiliation.

19

Brennan in Rutan emphasizes that

the claims of promotion,

transfer and recall decisions

having no effect on belief and association are not
credible;

"dead end positions" exert a very real pressure

to change behavior to escape such situations.

20

Stevens'

concurring opinion in Rutan argues that the claim of
insignificant burden is contradicted by the "harsh reality
of party discipline at the center of Justice Scalia's

theory of patronage". 21

Linked to this disapproval of monopoly is a finding
that patronage and the consideration of partisan ties in

17

110 S. Ct. at 2736-37.

18

427 U.S. at 353.

19

445 U.S. at 516-17.

20

497 U.S. at 73

21

497 U.S. at 89

(Stevens,
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J.,

concurring).

personnel decisions serve no useful governmental purpose.
Stevens's Branti opinion asserts that party affiliation has
"no relevant ties" to the effective performance of an

assistant public defender's job. Only confidential and

policymaking positions are sufficiently related to party
platforms and functions for such ties to be legitimate
employment criteria.

22

For all other positions, partisan

affiliations are "not relevant to government in its
capacity as an employer", according to Justice Brennan in

Rutan

23
.

It is also argued that there is a strong association

between partisan government and poor administration. In
Elrod,

Brennan cites United Public Workers

v.

Mitchell and

CSC v. Letter Carriers to substantiate the point that

"actively partisan government threatens good

administration". 24 This sounds very much like the

Progressive dichotomy between politics and administration,
though no direct citation is made to this literature.

Brennan supports this view of patronage by emphasizing the

history of the Hatch Act, which has limited the political
activities of federal employees. CSC

v.

Letter Carriers is

cited as approving the Act as a method of preventing

improper influence over the political process:

22

445 U.S. at 519.

23

110 S.

24

427 U.S. at 367.

Ct.

at 2735.
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The judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the
country appears to have been that partisan
political activities by federal employees must be
limited if the Government is to operate
effectively and fairly, elections are to play
their proper part in representative government,
and employees themselves are to be sufficiently
free from improper influences. 25

patronage and partisan influence of or by government

Thus,

employees are seen as two sides of the same coin, that

being the corruption of politics and government by a

monopoly of views and parties. In Elrod, Brennan refers to
the gain provided to representative government by the Hatch
Act.

26

The recent revisions in the Hatch Act by the 103rd

Congress would seem to weaken this argument somewhat,

though not at all fatally.

Despite these objections, the majority finding against

patronage practices requires cause, and is not automatic.
The justices see the appropriateness of such practices in

regard to policymaking positions, even though the

definition of that term has been troublesome to many. In
addition,

25

413 U.S.

they emphasize that not all burdens on the First

427 U.S. at 354, quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers
548, 564 (1973)

,

.

26

427 U.S. at 370. Sidney Milkis argues that the Act
"short-circuited any effort on the part of Roosevelt and
the New Dealers to develop a national party machine based
on federal government spending and organization", but "was
not so clearly a political defeat for President Roosevelt"
FDR was more interested in building an Executive Branch
favorably inclined to liberal public policy, in Milkis'
interpretation. As a result, FDR helped reduce the role of
parties in politics. Milkis, The Presi dent And The Parties
pp.

93,

138.
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Amendment will make an action or statute unconstitutional;
according to Brennan in Elrod
for appropriate reasons".

27

.

"restraints are permitted

There is room for compromise

and dialogue. Stevens follows this position in Branti

.

asserting that party may be an acceptable requirement for
some offices in order to support government effectiveness

and efficiency.

28

But the ultimate conclusion is clearly stated by

Brennan in the beginning of Rut an

-,

"to the victor belong

only those spoils that may be constitutionally
obtained".

29

The constitutional disability of patronage

is thus seen not as the party tie per se,

but its use as a

dismissal or disqualifying mechanism. These justices are

concerned with preventing monopoly and promoting a neutral
civil service; a patronage -dominated system is seen as

detrimental to government and democracy.

Party Structure and Functions

Both implicitly and explicitly, the "natural order"

patronage opinions have much to say about parties as
organizations. Parties are understood as more than joboriented,

job-dependent entities; "political parties are

nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally effective

27

427 U.S. at 360.

28

445 U.S. at 517.

29

497 U.S. at 64.
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methods"

,

according to Brennan in Elrod

30
.

Solidary and

purposive incentives can be as effective as material
incentives in promoting and sustaining political parties.

Brennan does not accept the position that patronage
preserves the democratic process and is the price of the
party system, a position for which the respondents quote
V.O. Key. Brennan vehemently disagrees,

stating that

"partisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition,
not the Constitution".

In fact,

better without patronage.

he feels parties function

31

This point is made even more explicitly in Rutan.

Brennan cites Larry Sabato's Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie:
The American Governorship Transformed and a 1959 article by

Frank Sorauf to argue that many parties have "thrived"

despite the decline of patronage.

32

Parties,

in Brennan'

have no required need to use material incentives in

view,

order to survive and prosper. An examination of the sources
cited,

and the broader work of both scholars, leads to a

more complex conclusion.

3U

472 U.S.

372-73.

427 U.S. at 368-69. The V.O. Key citation is from
Politics. Parties. And Pressure Groups 5th ed., p. 369.
Key argues succinctly that parties continue to use and
demand patronage, but also states that "fortunately, not
all political organizations are corrupt, and over the long
run the spoils system has come to operate within narrower
bounds". This is the position more of a realist than an
enthusiastic supporter of patronage.
31

,

32

497 U.S. at 74-75.
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Larry Sabato's work does note that patronage has

declined across the nation, and cites the effect of Elrod
on that process. He also notes that many governors support

Brennan's viewpoint and have strengthened civil service in
their states. While noting that patronage can lead to

poorly qualified appointees, he emphasizes that political

accountability is often reduced by a civil service system.
Overall, patronage is more a burden than an advantage for

governors

33

Sabato's position in Goodbye To Good-Time Charlie can
be seen as reluctantly supportive of Brennan, but his other

writings are much friendlier to patronage. In The Party's
Just Begun

,

Sabato calls for an increase in patronage in

order to build stronger parties. He argues that "in the

postpatronage age American political parties have become
more structurally skeletal in character than before"; less

patronage has weakened parties as organizations. In
addition to the Progressive reform tradition, Sabato puts
the "blame... for the modern continued decline of patronage"

directly on the Court. A revival of patronage would, in
Sabato's view,

"involve more people in the party

organizations".

34

Brennan's citation of Sabato's

particular work supports his argument, but Sabato's later

Larry Sabato, Goodbye To Good -Time Cha rlie: The
American Governorship Transformed 2nd ed. (Washington,
33

,

D.C.: CQ Press,
34

1983),

pp.

67-69.

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun
270

,

pp.

229-32.

writing opposes Brennan's view; the latter'

citation is

s

thus less than convincing.

Brennan's citation of a work by Frank Sorauf also
raises questions. While noting state and local parties that

have thrived without patronage, Sorauf 's 1959 article

"Patronage and Party" also makes an argument for why many

parties have "needed" patronage:
Above all, patronage has generally been the
political way of life and the political ally of
the local centers of power in their losing battle
for political superiority in America. It survives
to a great extent in their protest against the
growth of national politics and centralized
parties in the United States. 35
The decline of patronage is seen by Sorauf as leading to

more nationalized parties, a point he makes explicitly in
his 1960 article "The Silent Revolution in Patronage",

in

which he argues that parties will not be destroyed by less
patronage, but will be more nationalized and

disciplined.

36

Thus, while he does not call for more

patronage, Sorauf views its disappearance as changing

parties to more national entities. It is just such national
parties that the "natural order" justices seem to favor.
Thus,

while raising questions, this citation also supports

the majority's view of parties.

"Patronage and Party" Midwest Journal

35

Frank Sorauf,
of Political Science

.

3

(1959),

p.

126.

Frank Sorauf, "The Silent Revolution In Patronage",
Public Administration Review 20 (1960), pp. 33-34.
36

If the

provision of material rewards through patronage

and other means is not a pivotal function of parties, what
do parties do? The answer is clearly reflected in the

majority opinions: they focus on policy and ideas. The only
jobs for which party is seen as an appropriate requirement
or consideration are those that entail policymaking and

confidentiality; this point is made in Brant

reaffirmed in Rutan

and

.

The center of the "natural order" perspective's view
of parties and their functions is a vision of parties as

based in ideas and policies, not material employment and
rewards. Therefore, appeals to the historical usage of

patronage have minimal appeal to these justices, and are
not seen by them as strong items for consideration. Parties

can and should survive on more than a promise of "you

scratch my back,

I'll scratch yours". However,

the

scholarship they cite, and the wider range of scholars, do
not necessarily support their viewpoint

Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The "natural order" perspective adopts a standard of
strict scrutiny in the patronage opinions. Brennan's

opinion in Elrod cites the Court's opinions in Buckley

v.

Valeo and the NAACP cases to support a standard of
"exacting scrutiny". The claims of the Illinois employees
against their patronage-based dismissals are found to meet

272

that standard.

37

Such a standard tends to favor those

challenging patronage practices.
In Branti

,

Stevens expands on the Elrod standard. The

proper question to ask in such patronage cases is whether

party is "essential to the discharge of the employee's
governmental responsibilities". More precisely, the hiring

authority must "demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the public office involved"

.

In the particular

circumstance, Stevens sees no such relationship between

party affiliation and the responsibilities of an assistant
public defender.

38

The "natural order" justices have also responded to
the "constructed order" justices'

reliance on history,

custom and tradition as standards of evaluation. In his
Rutan concurrence, Stevens emphasizes that the standard is
not one simply of history and tradition in the political
realm,

as Scalia asserts.

Instead,

"the tradition that is

relevant in this case is the American commitment to examine
and reexamine past and present practices against the basic

principles embodied in the Constitution".

39

The standard of the "natural order" justices is one
that favors a neutral civil service and individual freedom

37

427 U.S. at 362-63

.

38

445 U.S. at 518-20.

39

497 U.S. at 92

(Stevens,
273

J.,

concurring).

of belief.

Parties do have a limited and proper role in

this system, but the use of partisan affiliation as a

criterion in personnel processes must be strictly

scrutinized

The Role of Government
It is clear that the "natural order" majority in the

patronage cases is more strongly inclined to favor claims
of constitutional infringement and national interests than

they are the avowed interests of state and local

governments. In discussing political question and

separation of powers objections to the Court's adjudication
in Elrod

,

Brennan emphasizes that these questions are

relevant to disputes between coordinate branches of the

national government, not to disputes between the

Constitution and state governments. Implying that
constitutional guarantees limit the power of states,

Brennan asserts that "where there is no power, there can be
no impairment of power". 40 This is certainly a nationally

oriented position.
This position is also evident in the treatment of
state interests in Elrod

.

To the assertion that patronage

insures effective government and the efficiency of public
employees, Brennan responds that patronage is a

disincentive to such outcomes, resulting in frequent

40

427 U.S. at 351-52.
274

turnover and hostility bred by the prospect of dismissal.
In addition,

the argument is violated by the continuance of

some employees if they can find sponsorship, and the

inadequate training of new employees. 41

With regard to the defense of patronage using
governmental interests, Stevens in Rutan asserts that this
defense "obfuscates the critical distinction between

partisan interest and the public interest". 42 This is the
concern that ultimately lies at the heart of the whole
"natural order" position: a concern with a neutral public

interest and civil service that promotes maximum political

competition and effective government.

The "Constructed Order" Perspective
In contrast to the "natural order" view of patronage,

which has held a thin majority on the Court, has been a
"constructed order" viewpoint contained in strong and

passionately argued dissenting opinions by Powell
Branti

)

and Scalia

(

Rutan

consistently by Rehnquist

)

,

.

(

Elrod

,

who have been joined

These dissents stress the

important role of patronage in American political history,
and its benefits for the political system. Beyond their

view of patronage, they argue that questions regarding its

propriety are the proper purview of elected representatives

41

427 U.S. at 364-65.

42

497 U.S. at 88

(Stevens,
275

J.,

concurring).

and the people, not the judiciary. They also favor a

reading of the Constitution which supports state authority
in this area. Thus,

for reasons of tradition and deference

to elected branches of government,

these justices support a

different treatment of patronage.

Party Competition and Choice
The "constructed order" justices evince little concern

about the threat of monopoly to competitive democracy.
Instead,

there is a sense that the current system and

traditional practices play important roles in preserving
democracy. Powell's dissent in Elrod calls patronage "a

practice as old as the Republic" that has been a critical

democratizing influence in American politics. He traces
patronage not to the Jacksonian period, as Brennan does,
but to the Washington Administration; patronage in the

Adams and Jefferson Administrations, as well as New York
and Pennsylvania state governments, are noted with a

citation to Carl Fish's The Civil Service And The
Patronage

43
.

Powell's dissenting opinion in Branti

reinforces this view, noting that "patronage is a long-

accepted practice that has never been totally eliminated by
civil service laws and regulations". To support this

43

427 U.S. at 376-78

(Powell
276

J.

,

dissenting)

contention, he cites Eric L

.

McKitrick's essay on Lincoln's

use of patronage in the Civil War years. 44

Fish's work is generally supportive of Powell's view
of the history of patronage.

parties began to emerge,

Fish notes that as the first

"Washington became more of a party

man" and was determined to favor only Federalists for

appointments. John Adams is also portrayed as removing

a

number of government personnel "for party reasons".
However,

Fish argues that the spoils system as such had not

yet come into existence at this time; Jefferson is

portrayed as its true progenitor. 45 As for the democratic
benefits and necessity of patronage, Fish is relatively
equivocal

46

Eric McKitrick's essay on Civil War party affairs also

supports Powell's argument. McKitrick emphasizes the lack
of an opposition party in the South as a critical factor in

weakening its war effort, while party competition in the
North "was on the whole salutary for Lincoln's government
and the Union cause".

47

With regard to patronage, the

absence of political opposition in the Confederate system

14,

44

449 U.S. at 522,

45

Fish,

19,
46

27,

and n.

1

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

The Civil Service and the Patronage

,

pp.

13-

51.

Fish,

The Civil Service and the Patronage

,

p.

235.

Eric L. McKitrick, "Party Politics And The Union
and Confederate War Efforts", in William Nisbet Chambers
The American Party Systems:
and Walter Dean Burnham, eds
Stages Of Political Development 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1975), p. 121.
47

.

,

,
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enabled President Davis to more easily ignore patronage
demands

--a

in McKitrick'

costly luxury in terms of political support,
s

view,

since "one administration [Lincoln's]

had an intricate set of standards for appraising energy and

rewarding it... which was not available to the other". 48
Patronage is seen as part of the political glue which
enables the Union to win the Civil War.

More interestingly, Powell in Elrod discusses the

"strengthened parties" that result from patronage in the
context of civil service reforms. He cites David
Rosenbloom, also cited by Brennan on the history of civil
service,

to argue that corruption,

inefficiency, and the

power of professional politicians were the concerns that
drove the civil service movement; "perceived impingement on
employees' political beliefs was not a significant impetus
to these reforms". 49 Thus,

the argument implies, major

campaigns against patronage have not been waged on free
speech grounds. Similarly, Powell concludes his Branti

dissent with the remark that "the First Amendment does not

incorporate a national civil service system".
In a somewhat different approach,

50

Scalia's Rut an

dissent also takes issue with the majority's view of

patronage and politics. Scalia's opinion begins with the

"Party Politics", pp. 132-33.

48

McKitrick,

49

427 U.S. at 379

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

50

445 U.S. at 534

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).
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assertion that judicial appointments have themselves been
political and patronage related since the Founding, citing
the facts of the landmark Marbury v. Madison case. Seeing

such patronage even on the bench, Scalia comments on the

majority opinion: "something must be wrong here, and
suggest it is the Court".
Scalia'

s

I

51

Rut an dissent speaks to the place of

patronage and its relation to the merit principle at the
heart of the "neutral civil service" concept of public

administration. While he admits that the merit principle
has generally been favored by events and the American

public, he contends there is another point of view, one

favoring patronage. He quotes its classic spokesperson,

George Washington Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, on its

political necessity:
ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some
arguments that nobody can answer. First, this
great and glorious country was built up by
political parties; second, parties can't hold
together if their workers don't get offices when
they win,- third, if the parties goes to pieces,
the government they built up must go to pieces,
52
too,- fourth, then there'll be hell to pay.
I

This is a cogent summation of the "constructed order" view
of patronage. These justices are not dismissing civil

service, but rather,

according to Scalia, the choice

between civil service and patronage is simply not clear

51

497 U.S. at 93

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

497 U.S. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting), quoting
William Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall (New York: Alfred
p. 13
A. Knopf, 1963)
52

,
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enough to put forward a single,

inflexible constitutional

proposition such as the majority's.

53

Scalia also takes issue with the majority's view of
the First Amendment, and advances a more restricted view in

this context.

Scalia writes,

"The provisions of the Bill of Rights",

"were designed to restrain transient

minorities from impairing long-recognized personal
liberties. They did not create by implication novel

individual rights overturning accepted political norms".

Patronage is seen by Scalia as such a norm, facing an
ambiguous constitutional text. In his view, then, the First

Amendment does not constitute an absolute protection for
political speech; the context of such speech must be

considered

54

Complementary to this history are some strong benefits
that patronage is seen as providing to the American

democratic system. According to Powell in Elrod

,

patronage

strengthens parties,

(1)

stimulates political activity,

(3)

gives a needed boost up to minority ethnic groups

(2)

(Samuel Lubell's The Future Of American Politics is cited
to support this point)

,

and

(4)

builds stable,

nonf ragmented parties (the Court's Storer opinion is cited
to support this point)

53

449 u.S. at 94

.

The majority,

(Scalia,

J.,

seen as "simply

dissenting).

497 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted
in Chapter 4, Scalia will take a strong view of the First
Amendment when he views the conduct as more private and the
regulation or practice overriding political norms.
54
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disparaging" these interests,

is viewed as insensitive to

political realities. 55 This emphasis on political

considerations is evident throughout the dissenting

patronage opinions.
Lubell's work is an appropriate citation, but his full

viewpoint is more nuanced than Powell portrays. He does
argue that patronage has aided the process of

"Americanization" and advancement of immigrants, noting
that the early demands of groups are often satiated

initially by "an appointment as assistant district
attorney"

(assistant public defender positions were at

issue in Brant

)

.

He correctly notes, however,

that the

same system "obstructs as well as advances minority

progress"

.

He also notes the declining influence of

patronage brought about by federal largesse and
socioeconomic advancement of immigrants.

56

Thus,

Powell's

use of this argument may be outdated by events.

Justice Powell in Elrod also cites the issue of

suppression of political belief as a red herring. Past
cases cited by the majority,

such as Barnette

the danger of eliminating political beliefs.

,

deal with

In contrast,

dismissal decisions and the patronage system in general
have not resulted in elimination of beliefs; voting has

55

427 U.S. at 382-83

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

Samuel Lubell, The Future Of Ame rican Politics, 3rd
85ed. revised (New York: Harper Colophon, 1965), pp. 76,
56

86

.
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been protected since the advent of the Australian ballot,
and patronage has in historical fact supported vigorous

ideological competition.

57

Once again, differences

between the "natural order" and "constructed order"
perspectives appear to center not on the inherent value of
competition, but on what political practices nurture such

competition

Party Structure and Functions
To the "constructed order" justices,

the practice of

patronage is a key function of political parties. Powell's
Elrod dissent states: "we deal here with a highly practical
and rather fundamental element of our political system

,

not

the theoretical abstractions of a political science

seminar".

58

This reveals the justices' view of the role

of material rewards in politics,

as well as their

separation of political science "theory" and the practical
needs of functioning parties. The "natural order" issue-

centered conception of parties and politics is seen as not

grounded in the concrete challenges of encouraging
political activity and support.
In Brant

,

for example,

Powell cites patronage as a

primary function of political parties, since parties are
formed to place people in positions of power. On this

427 U.S. at 387-88

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

427 U.S. at 381-82
emphasis added.

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting);

57
58
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score,

he cites James Jupp's Political Parties

59
.

Jupp's

view of the "power" of American patronage is more cautious
than Powell's. While he notes that it has been an

"essential feature" of American politics, he also notes
that the loose party discipline and membership of the

American system have avoided machine control that some such
as Ostrogorski had feared. He also notes that the

patronage-based machines have lost much of their power in
the U.S. as a result of "the spread of affluence and the

prof essionalisation [sic] of bureaucracies".

60

Jupp's

work is generally supportive of Powell's argument, but is
more skeptical regarding the current role of patronage and
the reach of its disciplinary powers.

Political competition and survival among parties are
also as much a concern of the "constructed order" justices
as of the "natural order" justices; however,

they take very

different roads to reach that goal and hold different
visions of how it looks. According to Powell in Elrod

,

without patronage, candidates would not be able to acquire
the time and money of volunteers,

local level.

61

friends and cadres at the

Former U.S. Senator Paul Douglas is quoted

on this score:

59

445 U.S. at 528

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

James Jupp, Political Parties (London: Rout ledge
Paul, 1968), pp. 26-27.
Kegan
and
60

61

427 U.S. at 384

(Powell,
283

J.,

dissenting).

If we [liberals in Congress] are to survive we
need some support rooted in gratitude for
material favors which at the same time do not
injure the general public. 62

In other words,

practical politics runs on material

rewards, not just ideas.

This position is reasserted in Powell's Branti

dissent

.

According to him,

"patronage appointments help

build stable political parties by offering rewards to
persons who assume the tasks necessary to the continuing

functioning of political organizations"

.

In addition,

patronage helps to avoid factional splintering and builds
loyalty to the party; the Court's decision in Storer is
cited in support of this assertion. 63
The "constructed order" justices are highly suspicious
of the majority's general view of parties.

Powell's Elrod

dissent asserts that "one cannot avoid the

impression ... that even a threatened demise of political
parties would not trouble the plurality. In my view, this

thinking reflects a disturbing insensitivity to the
political realities relevant to the disposition of this
case".

64

In his Branti dissent, he pointedly emphasizes

the same concern:

"until today,

I

would have believed that

letter to
Former Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-IL)
at
427 U.S.
quoted
the New Republic July 14, 1952, p. 2,
62

,

,

384

.

63

445 U.S. at 527-28

64

427 U.S. at 383

(Powell,

(Powell,

284

J.,

J.,

dissenting).

dissenting).

the importance of political parties was self-evident". 65

The majority justices are seen as being implicitly hostile
to job-oriented parties and the role of material rewards in

parties and politics.

Other pivotal functions of parties are also cited and

discussed by the "constructed order" justices. Parties
serve as a linkage mechanism, a device that enables our

separation of powers system to work. Powell in Branti

highlights this point with regard to the elected branches
of government

Over the decades of our national history,
political parties have furthered - if not assured
a measure of cooperation between the Executive
and Legislative Branches. A strong party allows
an elected executive to implement his programs
and policies by working with legislators of the
same political organization. 66
Parties are the enablers of the democratic system, and must
be allowed to function and support themselves by patronage
if the democratic system is to survive.

Looking at current conditions, Powell in Branti sees
the linkages provided by party falling apart. Legislators

are now frequently free agents,

a phenomena that the

"constructed order" justices have connected to the decline
of patronage.

This failure of discipline "has been traced

to the inability of successful political parties to offer

patronage positions to their members or to the supporters

65

445 U.S. at 528

66

445 U.S. at 530-31

(Powell,

J.,

(Powell,

285

dissenting).
J.,

dissenting).

of elected officials".

Edward Costikyan's Behind Closed

Doors: Politics In The Public Interest- is cited to support
this assertion. The decline of patronage is the reason why,
as Powell claims,

the majority's decision will "decrease

the accountability and denigrate the role of our national

political parties". 67

Costikyan's work, which conveys his experiences as a

Democratic leader in Manhattan during the 1950 's and
1960's,

generally supports Powell's positive view of

patronage. Costikyan argues that patronage is a critical

factor in the ability or inability of parties or executives
to control legislators of their party,

and notes that

supporters expect rewards for their work. 68 He also
argues that anti-political party good government has
failed,

and that party government should be tried to

improve the cities and their governance. 69 However,

Costikyan does not favor blind party discipline, opposing
both reformers and regulars who demanded such discipline in
the party.

Instead,

he favors "small d democracy",

moderation, and compromise. 70 This is not quite the same

67

445 U.S. at 531

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

Edward Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors: Po litics In
The Public Interest (New York: Harcourt Brace And World,
1966)
pp. 253-55
68

.

,

69

Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors

70

Costikyan, Behind Closed Doors
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,

,

p.

pp.

352.

33-39.

vision of party and patronage held by Powell and the other
"constructed order" justices.
Scalia's Rut an dissent also sees harmful consequences
for parties and democracy in the decline of patronage. He

acknowledges the troubled history of political machines,
but is also impressed by the fact of contemporary

complaints of helplessness voiced by elected officials
facing highly cohesive interest groups pushing their narrow
agendas. The practice of patronage supports strong parties
that can serve as a counterweight to such pressures, and

because of this, the practice of patronage should be given
the "benefit of the doubt", and its fate should be left to

popularly elected representatives of the people. 71
These dissenting justices see patronage as a key

component of a democratic system, particularly with regard
to small offices and little known candidates. They give

such candidates and parties much needed support, and a

fighting chance at the polls. To restrict this is to weaken
the democratic process, which they Charge the majority is

doing; by getting voters to vote, patronage performs a

public service. 72
Powell's opinion in Elrod also responds to the charge
that patronage biases or reduces the information received

by voters. He portrays it as a source of information that

71

497 U.S. at 93

72

Branti
dissenting)

,

(Scalia,

J.,

449 U.S. at 528-529
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dissenting).
(Powell,

J.,

adds to,

rather than detracts from, political discourse. It

also enables parties to continue a series of essential
functions: maintenance of precinct organizations, voter

registration, and political favors for citizens. Such

functions are not driven simply by ideas,

"some academic

interest in 'democracy' or other public service
73

impulse"

Standards Of Evidence and Burden
The "constructed order" justices take the position
that the standards of the majority in the patronage cases

have been too stringent and strict. Objecting to the

standard set forth in Elrod, they were even more opposed to
the Branti approach of demanding that party affiliation be

an appropriate requirement for the position in question;

Powell correctly views this as a "new, and substantially
expanded,

standard".

74

As Powell points out, under that

standard it is not enough to show that a position is

confidential or policymaking; a nexus between political

affiliation and the job must be proven. This standard is
"framed in vague and sweeping language certain to create
vast uncertainty".

75

A study of post- Branti court

decisions by Susan Lorde Martin, cited by Scalia in his

73

427 U.S. at 385

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

74

445 U.S. at 522

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

75

445 U.S. at 524

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).
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Rutan dissent a decade later, seems to bear this out.

Martin examines post- Branti Circuit Court decisions
involving patronage dismissals, and finds confusion, with

different Circuits offering conflicting interpretations of
the Brant

precedent.

In Branti,

76

Powell also disputes the precedents cited

for the majority's standard. The pivotal cases cited by the

majority,

i.e. Barnette

.

Kevishian

,

and Perry

,

did not

involve patronage. Nor does the majority address the major

governmental interests at stake in the case. 77 Scalia in
Rutan also questions the majority precedents, arguing that
the "strict scrutiny standard finds no support in our

cases".

78

Both Scalia and Powell see the majority's

argument as being built on faulty precedents. As an
alternative, they propose a standard weighted toward the
states and their asserted interests.

Powell's Branti opinion asserts such a state-friendly

standard as follows: "no constitutional violation exists if

patronage practices further sufficiently important
interests to justify tangential burdening of First

Amendment rights". 79 Scalia in Rutan proposes a similar
standard, arguing that there should simply be a rational

76

Martin, "A Decade Of Branti Decisions",
497 U.S. at 111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77

445 U.S. at 526-27

78

497 U.S. at 98

79

445 U.S. at 527

(Powell,

(scalia,
(Powell,
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J.,
J.,

J.,

cited in

dissenting).

dissenting).

dissenting).

connection between the use of partisan affiliation and the

government's function as an employer. 80 Scalia expands on
this standard later in the Rut an opinion, drawing his

argument from the Court's opinion in United Public Workprs
v.

Mitchell. Under Scalia'

s

standard,

the action involved

must be reasonably deemed by the legislature to further a

legitimate good. 81 This is a relatively easy standard for
a state to

meet

The Role of Government
The "constructed order" view is strongly inclined to

favor state interests involving patronage. One of the

pivotal issues for these justices in the patronage cases is
the fact that the patronage system is being struck down by

the judiciary, not popularly elected officials. Powell in

Elrod

states:

This ad hoc judicial judgment runs counter to the
judgments of the representatives of the people in
state and local governments, representatives who
have chosen, in most instances, to retain some
patronage practices in combination with a merit
oriented civil service. One would think that
elected representatives of the people are better
equipped than we to weigh the need for some
continuation of patronage practices in light of
the interests above identified [footnote
omitted]
and particularly in view of local
conditions [footnote omitted]". 82
,

o

497 U.S. at 98

(Scalia,

J.,

dissenting).

81

497 U.S. at 102 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 300 U.S. 75 (1947)
82

427 U.S. at 386

(Powell,

290

J.,

dissenting)

The positions of elected officials, particularly when

supported by long tradition, are not to be taken lightly.
At the end of Elrod,

Powell states that "we should not

foreclose local options in the name of a constitutional
right perceived to be applicable for the first time after

nearly two centuries".

83

Powell's opening statement in his Branti dissent
speaks directly to the same point:

"the Court today

continues the evisceration of patronage practices begun in
84

Elrod v. Burns "

A footnote in that opinion bears out

his attitude toward patronage and its management:

"a

strength of our system has been the blend of civil service
and patronage appointments, subject always to oversight and

change by the legislative branches of government".

85

Powell proceeds to assert that the Court is unjustifiably

removing such decisions from legislative and executive

discretion

86

By removing this authority,

the majority justices

damage the ability of elected officials and their parties
to govern effectively. According to Powell in Branti

,

strong parties aid governance by enabling implementation of
ideas and platforms,

3

4
5
6

427 U. S
445 U S
445 U S
445 U S

implementation which could be stymied

at 389

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

.

at 521

(Powell,

J.,

dissenting).

.

at 525,

.

at 525-26

.

n.

5

(Powell,

(Powell,

291

J.,

J.,

dissenting)

dissenting).

by a bureaucracy constituted completely by a civil service
system. The majority standard would "impose unnecessary

constraints upon the ability of responsible officials to

govern effectively and to carry out new policies"

.

Powell

quotes Charles Peters of The Washington Monthly in this

regard

87

Scalia in Rutan also stresses this concern. The

majority standard is seen as highly intrusive; "government
office could not function if every employment decision

became a constitutional matter", and a wide degree of

deference should thus be given to the government

Affiliation as well as speech are reasonable grounds for
dismissal if reasonably necessary to enable effective

government

88

Conclusions: Patronage And Party

An examination of the patronage opinions of the
justices

reveals a fundamental and consistent division

regarding the practice of patronage. While the "natural
order" is prone to restrict patronage, the "constructed
order" is much more likely to view patronage positively,

and leave patronage decisions to be made by the democratic

process and elected institutions.

87

445 U.S. at 530

88

497 U.S. at 99-100

(Powell,

J.,

(Scalia,

dissenting).
J.,

dissenting)

The "natural order" view of patronage is highly
negative,

and seeks to reduce its role in the operations of

government. This view is rooted in a concern that favors

political competition and fears the possibilities of
monopoly, a concern that also translates into a vision of

parties as entities not dependent on material incentives.
In addition,

these justices hold patronage to a high

standard of review and put little stock in the state
interests advanced to support the practice of patronage.
All of these positions are centered in a First Amendment

conception of democracy that is grounded in maximum

competition and political opportunity.
Despite its consistent majority on the Court in recent
decades,

this view of patronage has not been the only one

among the justices. There has been a consistent

undercurrent of three and four- justice dissents, which have

defended the practice of patronage at length as part of the
historical fabric of American politics. Their "constructed
order" view is rooted in very different assumptions about

democracy, parties, and state governments.

Like the "natural order" perspective, the "constructed
order" perspective's concern with patronage is both a

product of and a foundation for particular views of
democracy, parties, and the role of the states. The

"constructed order" has a positive view of job oriented

parties and the role of material rewards in politics. As a
result,

they evaluate patronage practices by a more lenient
293

standard. They also favor the authority of elected

representatives to decide the ultimate political parameters
of patronage practices.

In sum,

the "constructed order"

view takes a sanguine view of the political status quo, and
argues for minimal judicial interference in this realm.

Beyond the divisions on the Court, one must also ask
how the opposing views of patronage hold up under the

microscope of political science. Here one finds many of the
same divisions. On the one hand, a number of political

scientists appreciate the importance of material rewards in

building strong parties; Larry Sabato is particularly
forthright in that regard. 89 But a number of political

scientists have also pointed out the down side of patronage
and the fact that the decline of parties is rooted in more

than a loss of patronage.
Factually,

the pro-patronage view may well have the

better argument. The survival of a functioning party
organization is substantially aided by the promise of jobs,
even if parties can survive in some form without such
incentives. Few if any political scientists have taken a

position as ideological and extreme as that of the "natural
order" justices.

With regard to entrenchment and the stifling of
alternative views, the "natural order" justices present
little or no evidence to build their case against

89

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun
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,

pp.

230-32.

patronage. While successful machines have certainly

employed patronage to their advantage, it does not

necessarily result in party entrenchment. Those with
patronage have been thrown out by outsiders in many cases.
Thus, while the "natural order" view may be correct,

it is

by no means an iron law; the entrenchment is vulnerable to

collapse. The "constructed order" justices are also largely

correct in their assertion that the moves to reform

patronage have had much more to do with "effective
government" concerns than they have with efforts to protect
speech and alternative views.
The "natural order" justices make significant use of

political science literature in their opinions. Brennan in
Elrod cites Susan and Martin Tolchin's To The Victor as
well as works by Fish, Rosenbloom, and Friedrich and

Brzezinski 90

,

while Stevens' concurrence in Rut an cites

Richard Hofstadter's classic work The Idea Of A Party
System on the Founders' view of parties as a pathology, not
a political norm.

But the "constructed order" justices cite

an equally wide literature, and appear to have the better
of the argument
In conclusion,

the patronage opinions evince a strong

division among the Justices, one which reflects very
different understandings of the workings of parties and
politics. To this point, the dominant view has been one

90

427 U.S

.

at 353
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that sees patronage as leading to monopoly and corruption

and is a view decidedly unfriendly to job oriented parties,
yet one that finds much support in the public psyche. The

dissenting view, however, probably has the better grasp of
political realities. It may also find its way to a majority
in future cases before the justices,

justices who joined the Elrod, Branti
majorities,

i.e.,

as the majority of
,

and Rutan

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White,

have now departed from the Court. However,

it is unlikely

to find itself in a majority in the "court" of public

opinion any time soon. A good case is made for patronage by
the "constructed order", but the momentum of public opinion

appears to favor the negative view of patronage espoused by
the "natural order" justices.
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CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSIONS -THE " NATURAL ORDER", THE "CONSTRUCTED ORDER",
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTIES AND POLITICS
This dissertation has examined a series of Supreme
Court opinions involving ballot access, party organization
and nomination procedures, campaign finance, and political

patronage, and found that divisions within the opinions

reflect two "schools of thought" regarding parties and

electoral competition. This chapter evaluates the

implications of that finding. It first assesses the

significance of these schools of thought for efforts to

build stronger parties, using the criteria specified in
Chapter

1.

It then examines the patterns of judicial voting

in the cases,

in order to consider the short and long term

future of each school of thought in the deliberations of
the Court. The next section weighs the current literature
in this area in light of the findings here. The final

section measures the overall significance of the schools of
thought and the justices' opinions for electoral
regulation,

the future of political parties,

and American

politics as a whole.

Assessing The Perspectives: Do Thev Strengthen Par ties?
Most of the scholars who study political parties share
a belief that parties play a critical role in American

democracy and are concerned with the health of the party
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system.

1

The strong party attributes assessed here are

derived from the work of James Ceaser and Larry Sabato,

supplemented by questions designed to give greater

definition to the basic attributes.
The interpretations of the justices are also critiqued

from the perspective of the "responsible party" model, an
important variant of the "strong party" model. Those who

advocate for "responsible parties" believe that parties
should take clear and differentiated policy stances,

nominate candidates who share those stances, and work to
enact those policies when their nominees are elected to
office.

In sum,

they believe the primary function of

parties should be programmatic, not simply electoral.

2

The critique reveals that the differences between the

justices represent a debate between direct democracy and
less direct representative processes, as the "natural

order" doubts most government efforts to shape partisan

organization or electoral procedures for the good of the
"beneficiaries'", while the "constructed order" puts

greater faith in the decisions of elected representatives.
Their debate is less over the outcome of politics per se

,

than over the processes used for political choice. In this
regard,

the "natural order" creates more favorable

opportunities for parties to strengthen themselves.

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun

1

,

p.

2.

See APSA, Towards A More Responsib le Two Party
System for the classic statement of this perspective.
2

,
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Ultimately, however, neither perspective creates a fully

supportive environment for stronger parties.

The Linkage of Citizens and Government

The first attribute of a strong party is a clear and

continuing role in linking citizens with their
government. 3 Such linkage involves questions of citizen

opportunity to participate in and influence the parties, as
well as the perceived legitimacy of the electoral process.
Do parties have full opportunity to offer themselves to the

voters? How should citizens participate in party

decisionmaking? How should parties be accountable to
citizens? Do citizens feel the electoral process is

legitimate? The perspectives diverge in their answers and
their understanding of the role parties should play in

linking citizens and government.
The ability of parties to offer their candidates to

voters is essential to their role as linkage mechanisms. If
this avenue is blocked, parties cannot perform this

function effectively. The "natural order" is very sensitive
to this issue,

demanding full opportunity for all parties

to compete at the voting booth, with Justice Marshall the

strongest advocate of this position. The "constructed
order",

in contrast,

asks whether a statute provides

For example, John Bibby calls the linkage function
"the fundamental role of parties in a democratic society".
Bibby, Parties and Politics p. 5.
3

,
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sufficient opportunity for serious candidates with

substantial public support to gain a place on the ballot.
As long as the elected representatives of citizens have

allowed for such opportunities, minor parties that fail to
qualify for ballot position are not seen as being unfairly
disadvantaged. The two perspectives disagree as to what

constitutes sufficient support ("constructed order") or
sufficient opportunity ("natural order") for party

candidates to be placed on the ballot.
The history of widespread regulation of candidate (and

therefore party) access to a ballot position reflects

a

triumph of the "constructed order" perspective's emphasis
on demonstrated public support. Ballot access regulations

were first enacted in part to enhance the legitimacy and

stability of the existing political system. The use of

party-printed ballots for much of the nineteenth century
had made voting subject to much documented fraud and
intimidation. 4 The enactment of secret ballot laws, while

reducing such corruption, also introduced standards of
access,

standards that could be used to disadvantage minor

parties seeking a place on the ballot.

5

While the

Frank Sorauf, Party Politics In America p. 227.
V.O. Key emphasizes the concern with secrecy as a pivotal
factor in the pressure for a government -printed ballot.
5th ed., p.
Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups
4

,

,

639

.

David Gillespie, Politics At The Periphery: Th ird
Parties in Two-Party America (Columbia, SC: University of
South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 81. See also Key, Politics,
Parties, and Pressure Groups 5th ed., p. 641. Key notes
5

J.

,

300

legitimacy of such practices is contested in both the Court
and politics, many restrictive statutes remain on the
books. Thus, parties must demonstrate public support before

they can win a place for their candidates on the ballot.
Parties may also link citizens and government through

citizen participation in party decisionmaking. The

opportunity for such participation is influenced by the
structure of party organization and nominating processes,
and by what entity has the authority to shape those

structures. The "natural order" perspective argues that
parties, particularly national party organizations,

should

have the authority to control their own structures and
processes,

since governance by states could distort the

will of the party. As the justices' decisions demonstrate,
however,

Follette

this rationale can approve both restricted
)

and expanded

(

Tashi ian

)

(

La

participation in party

affairs. The "natural order" has no single model of

intraparty participation.
The "constructed order" perspective takes a different

approach to questions of citizen participation in parties.
The main emphasis is on maintaining a stable and orderly

electoral system which does not confuse the voters or make

party labels meaningless. This emphasis views government as
the proper authority to regulate party affairs and

nomination procedures; those who challenge such regulations

that both organizational and signature requirements can be
used to disadvantage minor parties.
301

have the legal burden of proof in contesting them. Like the
"natural order", however, there is no one participatory
model.

In dissents,

both open primaries
(

Tashi ian

)

justices with this view have supported
(

La Follette

)

and closed primaries

.

The avenues of citizen participation in party

decisionmaking, and the locus of authority for shaping
these avenues, are intimately related to a third linkage
issue: how parties are to be accountable to citizens. The

"natural order" believes accountability is best insured by

leaving the decision to the parties. The "constructed
order",

in contrast, views elected representatives as the

most legitimate and effective locus of accountability for
citizens,

and entrusts them with the power to regulate

party organization and nomination procedures. Government,
not a national or state party committee or convention, is
the proper decisionmaker for ensuring that the party system
is accountable to its citizens.

In recent decades,

the "natural order" view of parties

as the proper center of authority and accountability in

regard to party organization and nomination procedures has

held sway among the justices, but its fortunes in politics
have been less clear. While the justices' decisions have

generally favored substantial deregulation of parties and

nomination procedures and the nationalization of the
presidential selection process, extensive state regulation
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of parties persists.

6

Thus,

the "constructed order"

approach of government management, which dominated politics
from the Progressive Era through 1968, has not disappeared,

though the justices' decisions and the presidential

selection process reforms of 1968 and beyond have placed it
on the defensive.

7

Neither perspective, however,

unequivocally favors expanded citizen participation; both

Larry Sabato, while noting with optimism the
positive implications of decisions like Tashi ian for party
freedom, still wrote the following in 1988: "In this era
when 'less government' is the premiere political mantra, it
is appalling to discover how overregulated the parties are
in most states"
He cites tabular data on state laws
compiled by the Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) to support this assertion. Sabato, The
Party's Just Begun pp. 201-5. As noted in Chapter 1, Leon
Epstein, Jerome Mileur, and other scholars are also
skeptical of how much farther the Court will proceed in
deregulating parties and nomination procedures.
6

.

,

7

The history of the Wisconsin open primary and the
national Democratic Party is indicative of the political
limits of party deregulation. While the national party was
successful in contesting the principle of national control
over state primary rules in Democratic Party v. Wisconsin
ex rel La Follette which allowed the Party to prohibit
Wisconsin from choosing its presidential selection
delegates through an open primary, they have been led to
compromise in practice While Wisconsin Democrats had to
choose delegates by closed caucus procedures in 1984
(Bibby, Politics and Parties p. 66), by 1988 the Party had
reversed itself and decided to permit Wisconsin's continued
use of the open primary. Jewell and Olson, Political
Parties And Elections In American States 3rd ed., p. 271.
A full account of the genesis of the Wisconsin controversy
is provided in Gary Wekkin, Democrat versus Democrat The
National Party's Campaign To Close The Wisconsin Primary
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1984)
For broad discussions of the 1968 reforms, and
critiques of their impact, see Austin Ranney, Curing The
Mischiefs of Faction Ceaser, Reformin g the Reforms; and
Nelson Polsby, Consequences of Party Reform (New York:
The retreat from the early
Oxford University Press, 1983)
reforms in more recent years reflects the continuing
contest between the two viewpoints examined here.
.

.

,

,

:

;

.
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ultimately allow the favored decisionmaker to choose either
expansion and contraction of participation in party

organization and nominating procedures, possibly limiting
the linkage between citizens and government.

All of the issues above shape how citizens perceive
the legitimacy of the current party system,

the ultimate

test of how well a political system is linking its citizens

and government. For the "natural order" perspective, a

legitimate electoral system provides full opportunity for

parties to offer themselves to the voters as governing
coalitions and vehicles for citizen participation. 8 This

view questions the legitimacy of a state-controlled party
system and electoral process. It contends that many
regulations are enacted by state legislatures dominated by
the two major parties,

domination verging on monopoly. This

monopoly can lead to regulations that discriminate
invidiously against minor parties or the bearers of

unpopular ideas. As a result, the "natural order" questions
how accurately the current system links citizen desires

This solicitude does not however, extend to the
practice of party patronage. The "natural order" sees
patronage in personnel decisions involving nonpolicymaking
employees as illegitimate, since it stifles the free speech
of personnel and hires people on the basis of party and not
competency, which is seen as leading to less effective
governance. For this perspective, patronage is not
democratic and does not lead to fairly administered (read
nonpartisan), legitimate government. Instead, it biases and
monopolizes government employment and policy. In contrast
to their other positions, the "natural order" does not view
parties in a positive light when it comes to linking
citizens and government through patronage.
8

,
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with political outcomes, raising issues of systemic

legitimacy
Elected and representative legislatures, not parties,
are the heart of systemic legitimacy and citizen linkage

with government for the "constructed order". For this
perspective, government interests in protecting the

integrity of the political system and preventing voter

confusion are intertwined with the preservation of a
legitimate system. Parties are seen as less accountable to
citizens,

and thereby are less reliable sources of systemic

legitimacy than popularly elected representatives of the
people

9

The campaign finance system is an area in which both

perspectives find common ground regarding the legitimacy of
representative processes structuring how campaign money is

contributed and spent. The perspectives do not, however,
endow this governmental role with equal power and
legitimacy. The "natural order" sees regulation as a proper

way to ensure a democratic electoral process only where the

Patronage practices are an exception to this
skepticism. The "constructed order" sees patronage as a
proper tool of democratic governance, one with long
historical roots. Patronage helps the government to
represent the people who elected the government, and
increases governmental legitimacy by providing opportunity
for a wide range of individuals to serve in the government.
In this area only, the "constructed order" favors a
stronger opportunity for parties to link citizens and
government This perspective has been in the minority among
the justices, however, and has not been favored by recent
historical trends. Thus, patronage is currently not a
viable major strategy for parties to strengthen themselves
as linkage agents between citizens and government.
9

.
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danger of corruption clearly exists: such danger is present
in corporate wealth and large contributions to a political

candidate.

10

The "constructed order" perspective accepts a

wider government role, being willing to allow government
regulation of all but direct political expenditures (and
White will even accept that level of regulation)

in order

to protect the electoral process.

The question of the legitimacy of parties and the

electoral system has been a lively one throughout American
history, and the debate is more active than ever today.

Americans have long had a love-hate relationship with
parties, both participating in and distrusting their

activities. While the "natural order" perspective on party

legitimacy has held sway on the Court, modern public
opinion is dominated by the strong suspicion of parties
first nurtured in the Progressive Era. As a result, parties
are not likely to be seen as fully legitimate centers of

authority over the electoral process, and are unlikely to
gain complete autonomy in structuring themselves to link
citizens and government. 11 Thus, neither perspective has

The use of money in general is not seen as
corrupting, but as a form of free speech. Parties as
institutions are seen as legitimate actors in the process,
but the "natural order" does nothing to guarantee any
special campaign finance role for them.
10

For a pessimistic view of public opinion on
parties and its implications for party "deregulation", see
Sabato, The Party s Just Begun p. 132. The historical
record reveals that the general public has also been
concerned with the legitimacy of campaign finance practices
in recent decades, spurred on by many public interest
11

7

,
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dominated the debate over the legitimacy of the party
system and the electoral process.
Ultimately, both perspectives argue that their

positions on the structuring of parties and the electoral
process help to ensure the linkage of citizens and
government. The "natural order" is grounded in a view that
favors maximum opportunity for largely autonomous parties
to reach voters and choose their own structures and

procedures, but also favors partially regulated money and

nonpartisan governance as characteristics of a legitimate
political system. Their ballot access and nomination

positions (the former often in dissent) generally favor the

strengthening of parties as linkage agents, but their
campaign finance opinions can be seen as neutral, and their

patronage decisions resist that avenue of "linkage". 12

organizations like Common Cause and the Center For
Responsive Politics; witness the popularity of books such
as Philip Stern's The Best Congress Money Can Buy (New
York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988)
The calls for continued
reform indicate that the problem of legitimacy in this area
is far from solved; reform efforts are likely to engender
long term constitutional conflict with the First Amendment
free speech guarantee.
Party patronage has also been in heavy disrepute since
the Progressive Era. With regard to the decline of
patronage in recent decades, see Sabato, The Party' s Just
Begun p. 231. For an argument that a significant amount of
patronage persists, even after the Rut an decision, see Anne
Freedman, Patronage: An American Tradition (Chicago, IL:
Nelson-Hall, 1994)
.

,

.

As noted, the ability of parties to choose their
procedures may be a double-edged sword in terms of linkage;
some parties may expand citizen opportunities, while others
may restrict them.
12
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The "constructed order" views controlled opportunity,
state managed party organizations and nomination processes,

and well regulated money as reflective of a legitimate

democratic system. Parties are not given a great deal of
freedom as linkage agents, except in the area of patronage,

which a number of analysts do see as critical to building
parties and democracy. 13 While the "natural order"

perspective has generally had the advantage in modern
political debates and practice, the "constructed order"

perspective has strong and persistent roots.
In overall terms,

the ability of parties to serve as

agents of popular linkage is generally enhanced by the
"natural order" perspective, although the possible

exception of patronage is an important one. Nonetheless,
parties must take advantage of the freedom provided by the
"natural order", and must also cope with the increased

restriction of patronage. The "constructed order" position
limits the linkage ability of minor parties at the ballot
box,

and has seen elected representatives as the more

legitimate fulcrum of linkage between citizens and
government, except where patronage is concerned. Party

ability to link citizens and government has thus been both

enhanced and compromised by the justices.

Larry Sabato is the most visible spokesman for this
cause, calling for an increase in patronage positions in
government. Sabato, The Party 's Just Begun, pp. 229-32.
13
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The Con testing of Elect inns
In addition to linking citizens and government,

strong

political parties actively contest elections. What types of
candidates do the parties offer to the voters? Is there an

opportunity for all parties to compete for support? Do
parties have sufficient resources to contest elections? The
two perspectives among the justices come to different

conclusions as to the viability of the political status quo
in providing full opportunities for parties to contest

elections. The "natural order" is generally skeptical of
the current state of party competition, while the

"constructed order" has a positive view of the party
system.

The "natural order" is most concerned about the

ability of legitimate candidates and parties to gain a
place on the ballot. Limits on who voters may select

constrain the range of individual character and talent, and
political parties, available for election. The "natural
order" views these limits as an unfair monopoly for the

major parties, since alternative candidates and minor
parties are both disadvantaged by ballot access
restrictions. This perspective would give more parties the
chance to compete for electoral support, creating a

positive environment for stronger party competition.
The "constructed order" views the ability of

candidates and parties to win access to the ballot under
current regulations in a more positive light. Restrictions
309

on ballot access ensure a stable and orderly electoral

process by preventing damaging candidacies and favoring
candidates with strong public support and good
qualifications. Impeding certain candidacies and parties,
however, weakens their ability to gain strength by

contesting elections.
Clearly, ballot access regulation reduces the range of

candidates and parties who may contest elections. Whether
such regulation is responsible for the failure of third

parties and the persistence of a "monopoly" two-party

system in America is debated by the justices and students
of politics.

remain,

14

In practice,

however,

such regulations

supported by the majority of justices and the

political system.
The choice of candidates to contest elections is also
at the center of the party organization and nomination

procedures opinions, and the debate between the two

perspectives is focused on the question of what entity has

Many leading scholars contend that there are
multiple causes for two-party dominance, including their
capacity to absorb protest movements, the existence of the
direct primary, ideological eclecticism, and coalitional
flexibility. Bibby, Politics and Parties pp. 39-43. As
Bibby notes, Leon Epstein makes a strong argument for the
primacy of the direct primary as an explanatory factor.
Epstein, Political Parties In The American Mold pp. 24144. For arguments that put greater, though not exclusive
weight, on ballot regulations as a causal factor, see
Joseph F. Zimmerman, "Fair Representation for Minorities
and Women", in Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman, eds
United States Electoral Systems: T heir Impact on Women and
Minorities (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 3-11,
and Gillespie, Politics At The Periphery.
14

,

,

.
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the authority to structure candidate choice. The "natural

order" views the choice of candidates as best left to the

party organizations, particularly in the case of
presidential selection. This perspective would clearly
enhance potential party ability to contest elections by

opening the door for a stronger party role in nomination

procedures and candidate choice. 15
The "constructed order",

giving

in contrast,

argues that

state or national parties more control over

candidate choice and nomination procedures will produce

candidates who do not reflect the choice of the citizens,
and are therefore less representative in character and
behavior. Their main concern is that candidates are chosen

by citizen-authorized procedures; for the "constructed
order"

,

a public

the character and behavior of candidates is more of
,

governmental concern. The choice of candidates by

parties should not be a fully autonomous process.
The historical record reflects the fact that states

have been active in structuring parties and the nominating

process since the Progressive era. Many politicians and
political scientists have taken issue with this control on
the grounds that it undermines parties and produces

candidates who have fewer party ties or loyalties; they

This opportunity does not guarantee increased party
influence, however, since the current electoral system is
likely to remain centered on individual candidates, not
parties. Party organizations do have an uphill fight in
this area, even with the deregulation enabled by the
justices
15
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argue that returning control to parties will help to
"renew" parties as organizations, producing better

candidates and government. 16 The public mood, however,
favors the continuance of the direct primary and government

regulation of the nominating process. Thus, despite the
increased party autonomy enabled by the recent decisions of
the justices,

the future appears to favor only a limited

resurgence of party influence in candidate selection.
The ability of parties to contest elections is also

fundamentally shaped by their ability to obtain and utilize
essential electoral resources, particularly money and

campaign workers. With regard to campaign finance, both the
"natural order" and "constructed order" perspectives

perceive a need for government regulation, to protect the
electoral process from corruption by unregulated

contributions to candidates from secret sources. While the
"natural order" is still less willing than the "constructed
order" to entrust government with regulatory power, neither

perspective advocates a stronger or more explicit role for
parties in the campaign finance arena; they are neutral at
best to the historical changes that have reduced the role
of parties as institutions in fund raising.

An examination of modern campaign finance regulation
reveals that the system has reshaped the pathways of

For examples of these arguments, see Sabato, The
Party' s Just Begun pp. 205-12 and passim Sorauf, Party
Politics In America pp. 220-24; and the publications of
the Committee For Party Renewal
16

;

,

,
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campaign funds, but not the fundamental dominance of money

m

political campaigns; campaign contributors have found

alternate avenues for their financial support. 17 While
parties have taken on an expanded role in recent decades

through "soft money" and congressional campaign committees,
they still have fewer resources for contesting elections
than the now-dominant candidates, who raise most of their

campaign funds from individual contributors or political
action committees (PACs)

18
.

The only notable impact of the

justices' decisions has been indirect: the "soft money"
loophole, which has led to a larger party role in campaign
finance,

can be seen as a result of the FECA restrictions

upheld by the Court
The issue of patronage is intimately related to the

availability of another resource which parties have

historically needed to contest elections, campaign workers.
The lure of a government job has frequently been an

attractive incentive for an individual to help a party

17

Frank Sorauf emphasizes the quick pace of
"political learning" by participants in the post-FECA
campaign finance environment, and the resulting shifts in
campaign money, in Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and
Realities
.

Sorauf notes, for example, that in 1989-90
congressional candidates received 53% of their
contributions from individuals and 32% from PACs. Party
committees contributed only 1% of the total. Sorauf, Inside
Campaign Finance pp. 30-31. The power of the party
committees is still significant, however, in their
strategic contributions to particular candidates. In this
regard, see Herrnson, Party Ca m paigning in the 19801s and
Herrnson, "The Revitalization of National Party
Organizations"
18

,

,
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campaign and get out the vote on election day. The "natural
order" is very skeptical of this partisan use of government

personnel positions to obtain campaign support. They argue
that hiring for all but high policymaking positions should
be based on merit,

since good government is a product of

neutral competence. This restricts a traditionally
important campaign resource for many parties.
The "constructed order" perspective takes a

diametrically opposed view of the desirability of
patronage. Patronage is seen as a historically legitimate
practice, and party ties are seen to be helpful in the

selection of government personnel, a way of enabling the

government to carry out the platform of the party in power.
On the Court, however,

this pro-patronage position has not

held the day.
In historical terms, patronage has been practiced

throughout American history, though its reach has been

dramatically reduced by state and federal civil service
systems. These systems are the product of fierce criticism
of patronage hiring by reform movements since the late

nineteenth century, critiques which continue to the present
day and are supported by public opinion.

19

In this regard,

the "natural order" is probably more in line with public

sympathies in its desire for a nonpartisan government

19

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun
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.

service, but the "constructed order" still stresses the

usefulness of patronage in dissenting opinions. 20
In summary,

the "natural order" argues that parties

should have maximum opportunity to appeal to the voters and
the power to determine their own electoral strategies and

procedures, both of which would aid parties in contesting
elections. With regard to other resources, however, parties
are given no special role in campaign finance contests, and

party campaign workers are reduced by the restrictions on
patronage. The "constructed order" perspective,
contrast,

in

approves of structuring parties and their ability

to contest elections. Partisanship is, however,

seen as a

legitimate consideration in personnel decisions, giving
some comfort to parties. Thus, while the "natural order"

argues for greater party ability to contest elections, both

perspectives support some type of increased role for

partisanship in the political process.

The Management of Political Conflict

Beyond linkage and the contesting of elections lies
another institutional attribute of a "strong party": the
ability to manage political conflict by aggregating
interests and enabling needed political change. The

perspectives disagree over what level of party competition
With a decreased reliance on individual volunteers
may
in modern high-tech campaigns, the decline of patronage
it
as
parties
for
not be as serious a resource deprivation
decades.
would have been in earlier, pre- television
20
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promotes a healthy level of conflict resolution and
political change. While the "natural order" argues that
third parties play an essential role in achieving these
goals,

the "constructed order" asserts that the current

two-party system has been effective in promoting compromise
and change

Party organizational structures and nomination
procedures, by shaping the character of party

decisionmaking and candidates,

strongly influence how

parties aggregate interests and enable change. The "natural
order" argues that the capacity of parties to manage and

guide conflict is damaged by state- imposed organizational

requirements for parties and nomination procedures. Parties
must be free to structure themselves and choose candidates
for office if they are to evolve politically and serve as

effective managers of changing public demands and political
conflicts
The "constructed order",

in contrast,

argues that

state party organization and nomination procedure statutes

have a positive, not a negative, effect on the ability of

parties to unite interests and enable change. These
statutes implicitly reflect the political choices of state

citizens

,

choices that would be impeded by unregulated

party activity. For the "constructed order", the main locus
of conflict resolution and change is representative

government, not political parties.

316

In historical terms,

the survival and evolution of the

two-party system suggests to many students of parties that
their organization and nomination systems have been roughly

effective in uniting conflicting interests and promoting

necessary political change. The "natural order" argues
against this view, asserting that dissenting candidates and
as well as the true wishes of parties,

ideas,

can be

stifled by state- imposed structures, thereby warping the
shape of interest aggregation and change. While this view
has dominated the Court,

significant state management of

the nomination system persists in the form of the direct

primary

21

The issue of ballot access goes to the heart of

interest aggregation and the opportunities for political
change. The "natural order" perspective argues that limits
on ballot access,

procedures,

like state-constructed nomination

can stifle dissenting opinions and alternative

perspectives,

in this case by obstructing the access of

minor party candidates to a place on the ballot. This
limits the range of interests addressed by the party
system,

and affects the amount of political change. As a

The dominance of the political system by the
Democrats and Republicans since 1860 is viewed as a sign of
political monopoly by a number of commentators, including
Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery Most political
scientists, however, appear to agree with Howard Penniman,
Sait's American Parties that the dominance of the two
parties, and the weakness of most third parties, is a
result of political forces, not legally constructed
monopoly status
21

.

,
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result,

the ability of the party system to manage conflict

can be impaired.

The "constructed order" asserts that government

management of the ballot promotes the uniting of interests
and needed political change, by providing voters with a

meaningful choice of alternative candidates, rather than

a

clutter of numerous candidates. From this viewpoint, third

parties damage rather than enhance the ability of the

political system to aggregate conflicting interests in an
orderly fashion. As earlier chapters have noted, this

perspective is more concerned with promoting stability than
encouraging change
Historically,

it has become more difficult for minor

party candidates to gain a place on to the ballot and offer
voters an alternative group (ing) of interests and platform
for change. This is in part a consciously sought result of

Progressive era electoral reforms, which were responding to
the growing strength of the Socialist Party and other third

parties at the turn of this century. 22 With regard to

political change, however, a strong argument can be made
that the perspectives of third parties have in many

instances been adopted by one of the major parties in later

22

Gillespie, Politics at the Periphery
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,

pp.

34-35.

years,

allowing for significant change under the existing

system. 23

Party campaign finance and patronage practices also
shape the scope and direction of political change. For the

"natural order" perspective, both areas can be properly

regulated in order to prevent corruption that would pervert
political speech, political choices, and long-term
political change. The "constructed order" perspective,
however,

sees patronage as enabling,

rather than

perverting, government policy and healthy long-term

political change. Partisanship is seen as offering a clear
program,

endorsed by the voters, which can structure the

choice of government personnel to effect the changes sought
by voters

While the regulation of campaign finance has been

relatively neutral to parties as agents of change, the

restriction of patronage does limit the ability of parties
to influence change, by restricting the partisan character
of government service. The historical record on patronage

argues for both perspectives,

from different vantage

points. The "natural order" perspective seems confirmed by
the corruption and entrenchment that patronage can enable

V.O. Key asserts that minor parties often reflect
tensions within the major parties over issues, and that the
issues are ultimately addressed by the major party. Key,
Politics. Parties, and Pressure Groups 5th ed., pp. 28081. Sorauf questions the idea that third parties "force"
major parties to address issues, asserting that public
pressure and readiness is the causal factor for major party
action on issues. Sorauf, Party Pol itics In America, p. 48.
23

,
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in the form of political machines.

24

Such machines were

frequently not known for their political openness. At the
same time,

the "constructed order" perspective correctly

reflects that patronage has also performed positive
functions,

including the enactment of political positions

into government programs, enabling political change. 25
In sum,

the two perspectives differ notably on the

role that parties should play in managing political

conflict and change. The "natural order" is skeptical of

government management of the ballot and party procedures,
seeing them as blocking or perverting the ability of

parties to aggregate interests and manage change. With

regard to campaign finance and patronage, however, the
"natural order" sees a lesser role for partisanship in

governmental administration, and a greater danger to longterm changes desired by the public. The "constructed order"
is much more sanguine about the amount of interest

aggregation and change enabled by our partially stateconstructed system, particularly as expressed by elected

For historical background on the relationship
between patronage, political machines, and corruption, see
Steven P. Erie, Rainbow s End: Irish-Americans and the
Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985 (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988);
Freedman, Patronage: An American Tradition For the classic
arguments in favor of patronage, see Riordon, Plunkitt of
Tammany Hall
24

1

.

.

See Riordon, Plunkitt of Tammany Hall
Party's Just Begun pp. 229-32.
25

,
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;

Sabato, The

representatives; parties have a more controlled role,
except in the area of patronage.

The Guidance of Government and Public Policy

Once a party has succeeded in electing its candidates
to office,

it faces the task of trying to govern the

political system. In this regard, a strong party is one

which offers a platform, elects officeholders who work to
enact the platform, and supplies individuals to staff

government and implement the platform. While the two

perspectives considered here are both concerned with this
aspect of party affairs, they do implicitly support

different aspects of "party government". The "natural
order" emphasizes the ideological role of parties, while
the "constructed order" emphasizes the role of partisanship
in governance

The "natural order" argues for a multiparty system

where governing power is not monopolized and parties stand
for particular ideas and policies. The issue of ballot

access reflects this concern with achieving a

nonmonopolized governmental system. A system open to all
candidates and parties is likely to represent a broader
range of ideas than the current two-party system, and

platforms will be more meaningful. The stress is on
platforms rather than their implementation.
The "constructed order" puts less stress on platforms,
but more emphasis on the choices made by democratically
321

elected partisan officials, even if those choices do not

rigorously adhere to party platforms. Ballot access
regulation,

for example,

is viewed as essential to an

effective democratic system. Parties in this perspective
are given the chance to govern only if they can demonstrate

credible public support.
The different types of party systems nurtured by these

views of ballot access result in different patterns of

power sharing and opportunities for parties to govern. The
"natural order" perspective makes it easier for more

parties to pursue governing power, while the "constructed
order" encourages more controlled access to governing

authority. In so doing, the former perspective presents

more opportunity for parties to strengthen themselves in
this area.

Government regulation of party organization and

nomination procedures also shapes the type of party
governance we receive. The ways in which parties structure
themselves and candidates seek their nominations shape the

party platform, the skills of those elected to office, and
the connections between the two. The "natural order"

perspective argues that allowing parties to choose their
own structures and have a major voice in nominating

procedures will produce a more unified party position and
more effective governance. For the "constructed order",
state power in this area is tied to the ability of citizen
to structure their politics through the choices of
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legislators. A state- structured process will ensure that
the results accurately reflect public choices,

and thereby

produce the type of public officeholders and policy

platforms that the public desires. Parties are seen as

properly having an important, but ultimately subordinate,
role in that structuring process.

Historically, the choices of party structure and

nomination procedures have had a major effect on
governance. As James Ceaser has argued, the modern

selection process tends to weaken the tie between
Presidents, other party officeholders, and parties, thereby

making party governance more difficult. 26 The "natural
order" perspective, which favors more party control, and
the "constructed order" deference to state control both

offer the opportunity for stronger party government, but
the former gives parties more freedom to use that

opportunity
The practice of patronage is intimately related to the

issue of governance and the role of political parties. The
"natural order" sees patronage as an obstacle to effective

government administration and an infringement on the free
speech of government personnel. Thus, parties have a role
in advocating and working to enact policy platforms, but

partisanship stops at the door of administrative

26

Ceaser, Reforming the Reforms
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,

p.

109.

implementation; party government does not extend beyond

policymaking

.

The "constructed order" is more sanguine about

patronage,

seeing it as a positive force for carrying out

the platform of the party in government.

In contrast to its

views on ballot access and nomination procedures, the

"constructed order" supports a role for partisanship and

parties in choosing government personnel. Partisan control
and authority is proper if it is embodied in democratically

elected officeholders, rather than mere organizations

contesting to control government. In this way, their stance
is consistent with the "government -centered" deference of

their other positions.
The role of parties in governance is of great import
to the perspectives examined here. The "natural order"

argues that the best government will come from a

nonmonopolized, free electoral process with a disclosed
financial base, a process whose government is run by a

nonpartisan public service for nonpolicymaking functions.
The corruption caused by a possible monopoly of power by

particular parties and ideas is their critical concern. The
"constructed order" asserts that effective party governance
does not occur naturally, but must be ensured by government

regulation controlling the ballot, nomination procedures,
and campaign finance. Once in office, use of partisan

considerations is a part of proper governance in a party
system. Thus, both perspectives create obstructions as well
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as opportunities for the realization of a stronger party

role in governance. This role is at the heart of the

"responsible party government" model, and examining the

implications of both perspectives for this model is our
next task.

The "Re sponsible Party Government" Model

The relationship between parties,

ideas,

and public

policy has been a longstanding concern among students of
parties. The most notable model of how this relationship

should be structured is known as the "doctrine of

responsible party government"

.

The arguments over the need

for "responsible parties", and the character of such

parties, have recurred in the literature on American

politics and parties from the turn of the century to the
present day. 27 The classic statement of the doctrine,
however,

is the 1950 report of the American Political

Science Association (APSA) Committee on Political Parties,

Towards A More Responsible Two- Party System

.

A number of features characterize a "responsible"

political party. Such a party must:
1.
2

.

Evolve and enunciate a reasonably explicit
statement of party programs and principles
Nominate candidates loyal to the party program
and willing to enact it into public policy if
elected

For a historical treatment of these arguments, see
Ranney, The Doctrine of R es ponsibl e Party Government. For a
Challenges
recent perspective, see White and Mileur, eds
27

.
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,

3
.

4.

Conduct its electoral campaigns in such a way
that voters will grasp the programmatic
differences between it and its opposing party and
make their voting decisions substantially on that
basis
Guarantee that public officeholders elected under
the party label will carry the party program
into public policy and thus enable the party to
take responsibility for their actions in
office 28

The distinguishing feature of this model is its explicit
focus on the party as an organization whose members and

officeholders are held responsible for enacting substantive
public policy objectives. As Frank Sorauf notes, a

responsible party "is concerned with capturing and using
public office for predetermined goals and not merely for
the thrill of winning,
spoils,

the division of patronage and

or the reward of the office itself "

29

A "responsible party" would also possess the

attributes of a strong party that we have considered here.
This issue-oriented party would serve as a more effective

policy link between citizens and government. It would
increase the substantive importance of election contests,
and make the aggregation of interests and competing visions
of political change more explicit. Most notably,

it would

make party government an effective reality. Thus, a strong

argument could be made that the responsible parties would
also be stronger parties.

28

Sorauf,

29

Ibid

.

,

Party Politics In America
p.

375;

emphasis added.
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,

4th ed., p. 374.

Does either perspective support or encourage the

growth of responsible parties? The "natural order" appears
to offer notable support for such parties, while the

"constructed order" is more satisfied with the party status
guo. The "natural order" emphasis on parties as vehicles of

ideas is certainly congruent with the issue orientation of

"responsible parties". The view that parties should control
their own organization and procedures is also a necessary
step for parties to take explicit and consistent policy
stances,

in line with this model. Thus,

the "natural order"

perspective would appear to be very hospitable to
"responsible parties".
The "natural order" justices can only offer an open
door,

however,

to the achievement of "responsible parties"

and "responsible party government". While they endorse a

greater role for ideas and more freedom for parties to
control their own organizations and candidate selection,

parties themselves must take consistent platform stances
and use these newfound freedoms. Even if parties actively

work to become more responsible, however, they face the
hurdle of the American political climate. Public opinion on
parties is very negative, and direct primaries, which
reduce party control over candidate selection, are held in

high esteem. 30 Given the power of public opinion, it would
seem that E.E. Schattschneider

30

'

s

1942 assessment of the

Sabato, The Party's Just Begun
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,

p.

207.

future of responsible party government is even more

accurate in the 1990'

s:

"The greatest difficulties in the

way of the development of party government in the United
States have been intellectual, not legal". 31 The justices

have opened the door for responsible parties, but only the

parties and the public may walk through it.

Conclusions: No Guarantee for Stronger Parties
In sum,

the analysis above reveals that the "natural

order" perspective will generally provide more

opportunities for parties to develop the attributes of a
"strong" party. This is particularly true with regard to
the linkage of citizens and government,

the contesting of

elections, and the management of conflict. Neither

perspective, however, offers any guarantee that parties
will develop or emphasize these functional attributes.

Parties can only become stronger through their own efforts
as the development of national party fundraising capacitie

indicates. The "natural order" justices have opened up

opportunities for party self-government, but they cannot

build parties by opinion; only political effort can
strengthen parties effectively.

E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government p. 209,
Challenges, p. 15.
quoted in White and Mileur, eds
31

,

.
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"Natural" Vs.

"Constructed" Order

This analysis of the ballot access, party and

nomination procedures, campaign finance, and patronage
opinions of Supreme Court justices has shown that they
comprise two general perspectives on the nature of
electoral democracy. The allegiance of particular justices
to each perspective needs to be assessed to determine the

consistency with which the position of each is held. This
will enable us to identify the "predictable" and the
"swing" justices. This analysis reveals that, across the

spectrum of cases considered here, the justices have been
split between a small core of "predictable" votes and a

larger number of "swing" votes, whose support for each

doctrine has been qualified. These "swing" justices have

been an important "brake" on the reach of the "natural
order" perspective in Court jurisprudence.

A critical step in assessing the influence of a

particular intellectual perspective is to determine who are
its consistent proponents. The "natural order" perspective
is most consistently asserted by Justices Brennan and

Marshall; only in considering campaign finance do they back

away from a strong skepticism of governmental activity in
the electoral process. Even this seeming inconsistency is

explained by the fact that their main concern is
unchanging: the prevention of political monopoly and
corruption. The difference with campaign finance is that it
is the only area where they feel government statutes
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prevent more corruption than they create. They are often
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Kennedy, whose

only consistently departures from the "natural order"

viewpoint are in the patronage decisions. 32
The "constructed order" perspective has found its most
loyal foot soldier in (Chief) Justice Rehnquist. He has

consistently given great deference to various state
statutes in these areas, viewing them as proper expressions
of the voice of the people expressed through democratically

elected state legislatures. He is usually joined by

Justices O'Connor and Scalia, who regularly depart from the

perspective only in the area of campaign finance.
The remaining justices who have been involved in a

significant number of the cases at issue have been "swing"
justices,

shifting between the perspectives between and

within each area of cases. Justices Powell, Stewart,
Blackmun,

Stevens,

and White fall into this group. Powell

and Stewart lean toward the "constructed order"

perspective,

favoring it in ballot access, patronage, and

some of the nominations decisions; they were more convinced

by the "natural order" only in the area of campaign
finance.

33

Blackmun also leans toward the "constructed

It should be noted that this placement of Kennedy
Rutan, Austin,
is based on a small number of decisions (5)
Burdick Norman and Eu. These cases do, however, cover the
32

:

,

,

spectrum of issue areas examined here.

Given the pro-regulatory tilt of the "natural
order" in the campaign finance cases, Powell and Stewart
could be viewed as largely consistent supporters of the
33
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order",

favoring it in the nomination and ballot access

cases; he is split in the campaign finance opinions, and

supports the "natural order" position only in the patronage
opinions. Stevens,

in contrast,

order" perspective,

leans to the "natural

supporting it in the patronage and

ballot access opinions; only in some of the nomination and

campaign finance cases does he favor the "constructed
order" position. White is the only justice who is

consistently split: he favors the "natural order" in the

patronage and nominations cases, but supports the
"constructed order" in ballot access and campaign
finance

34

The "swing" justices are thus not as clear cut in

their positions as Brennan, Marshall, Burger, Kennedy,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia. A rough grouping, however,

reflects that all but White can be placed close to one of
the two perspectives. The "constructed order" view has seen

Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia joined with regularity by
Powell,

Stewart,

and Blackmun, while the "natural order"

perspective has seen Brennan, Marshall, Burger, and Kennedy
joined in many decisions by Stevens.
There are two major implications that may be drawn
from these patterns of support. First, the patterns

"constructed order" perspective.
White appears to view government involvement in the
electoral process as appropriate, but is less approving of
partisan bias in government or government control of
partisan decisions.
34
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indicate that both perspectives have had to "fight" for

supporters among the justices, since a number of justices
have shifted between the two perspectives. More
importantly, the "natural order" would now seem to be at a

critical disadvantage in this search for support on the
Court. The three most consistent advocates of the "natural

order" perspective -- Brennan, Marshall, and Burger -- have
all left the Court, while the three most active supporters
of the "constructed order" perspective -- Rehnquist,

O'Connor, and Scalia

--

remain on the Court. This is not an

encouraging state of affairs for those who might be
considering constitutional challenges to party and
electoral regulations.

"Natural" and "Constructed" Orders in Scholarly Context

Having analyzed the "natural order" and "constructed
order" perspectives using a set of institutional criteria,
we now understand the justices' views of parties in a wider

perspective. A further question remains, however. How do
these findings and arguments mesh with previous scholarly

literature on parties and the law? This section addresses
the arguments of the literature discussed in Chapter One in
the light of the dissertation's findings.

The "natural order" focus on the parties as the proper

decisionmakers for structuring their own procedures
resonates with the analyses of Gottlieb, Geyh, Lawson,
Sabato,

Price,

and Mileur. These works are united in their
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contention that parties, not governments, are the best

decisionmaker for party and electoral decisions. In fact,
the concern of both perspectives examined here is less with
a

particular substantive result and more with the identity

of the institution that structures the process. The

"natural order" seeks to leave such decisions to the

parties and citizens, while the "constructed order" trusts
the government to make such decisions. This group of

scholars supports the former position.
The analyses of Pierce, Weisburd, and Porto are also

accurately reflective of judicial thinking in this area,
and all appear to implicitly support the "natural order"

trend on the Court. While Pierce's call for the justices to

explicitly disavow the "political question" doctrine has
not been heeded, our analysis reveals that the justices are

now fully engaged in the full range of political decisions
in this area,

and are not likely to remove themselves at

this point. The contention of Pierce and Weisburd that the

"state action" doctrine has been negated by recent Court

decisions also appears validated. 35 Porto correctly

perceives the dominance of a state-friendly,

"constructed

Nonetheless, the state-friendly viewpoint of the
"constructed order" would seem to leave the door open for
possible future state intervention in party affairs. Add to
this the standing precedent of Smith v. Allwright, which
allowed intervention in party affairs to prevent invidious
discrimination, and the face of "state action" might rear
its head again in the right case. Note too, however, that
Justice Marshall explicitly differentiated Smith v.
Allwright from the current freedom of association cases
U.S. v. O'Brien.
35

m
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order" standard of review in recent ballot access cases,
but echoes the "natural order" minority's call for stricter

standards of review to protect minor party interests.

Unlike the analysts above, other scholars take
stronger issue with the justices' decisions, and echo the

"constructed order" at times. Guttman's argument that the
justices have shifted too far in favor of freedom of

association claims can find reassurance in events that
followed her analysis and the findings of this
dissertation. The "constructed order" perspective has

offered a continuing alternative to expanded freedom of
association,

limiting the scope of the Tashi ian opinion and

dominating recent ballot access decisions. The justices now
seem in no danger of giving carte blanche to freedom of

association claims, a fact which Leon Epstein's work
correctly reflects.
The articles by Cammorosano and Brinkley also argue
that an imbalance exists in the Court's jurisprudence,

specifically in the justices' patronage decisions. Their
work correctly portrays the dominance of the "natural
order" disdain for patronage, but gives insufficient

credence to the long term influence of the dissenting
strain that the "constructed order" perspective represents.
The analysis of Daniel Lowenstein, in arguing for greater

legislative authority in party and electoral areas, goes
even farther than the "constructed order" justices have
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been prepared to go, calling for a judicial "hands off"
policy
The historical\quantitative analysis of Hadley and

Epstein covers a wider range of cases than this
dissertation, but its findings seem roughly borne out by
the findings here. While some minor parties do not fare

well in the ballot access cases, others do (Wallace's

American Independent Party, Anderson's National Unity
Campaign)

,

and the dominant viewpoint in the other areas,

the "natural order",

is highly sensitive to minor party

concerns. Minor parties do appear to have been generally
well treated by these judicial opinions.

Clifton McCleskey

'

s

assertion that the justices'

jurisprudence in this area is "confused" is not supported
by the dissertation's findings, but this conflict may be as

much semantics as substance. The division McCleskey sees in
the ballot access cases between Anderson and a number of

earlier cases like Storer and American Party does, in fact,
reflect the arguments of the "natural order" \" constructed
36
The justices
order" debate posited in this dissertation.

are seen as "confused" on freedom of association in the

pre- La Follette organization/nomination opinions, but the

divisions again reflect the contending schools of thought

posited here. 37 With regard to patronage, McCleskey argues

36

McCleskey,

"Parties at the Bar", pp. 352-53.

37

McCleskey,

"Parties at the Bar", p. 361.
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that the justices have applied differing and confusing

bases for evaluating the use of partisan criteria in

government personnel decisions, but this differences is one
of degree,

here.

38

not kind; it is consistent with the findings

While some of McCleskey's critiques of judicial

policymaking have validity, this dissertation takes issue
with his claim that "judicial review has obscured more than
39

it has clarified".

John Moeller's contention that the justices' opinions
reflect not confusion but a contest between three competing

visions of politics is the clearest alternative model to
the schools of thought explicated in this dissertation.

Moeller posits these three visions as contesting in the
justices'

opinions:

political system)

,

"fair politics"

(equal access to the

"First Amendment politics"

of associational rights)

,

and "Madisonian politics"

(politics as an open conflict of forces)

,

with "First

(mixed with "fair politics")

Amendment politics"
the justices'

(protection

dominating

jurisprudence. 40 While the visions Moeller

presents have many similarities to the "schools of thought"

posited here, their focus is ultimately distinct. This

dissertation argues that the justices divide not only over
the type of politics

(and Moeller makes a strong case for

38

McCleskey,

"Parties at the Bar", pp. 363-66.

39

McCleskey,

"Parties at the Bar", p. 366.

40

Moeller,

"The Federal Courts".
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his view)

,

but over what constitutes a legitimate political

system: a state- structured system (the "constructed order")
or an unregulated party politics

(the "natural order")

.

The

issues are related but distinct.

"Natural" and "C onstructed" Orders: Political Implications

The opinions of the justices have significance for the

regulatory environment of the current electoral system and
for efforts to strengthen political parties. Their

decisions also shape the broader character of American
democracy: their concrete actions change or reinforce the

existing system, while the arguments in the opinions
influence the parameters of debate about the system. The

opinions thus have both theoretical and practical

implications
The justices' opinions have altered the regulatory

structure of electoral politics in a number of ways. The
ballot access opinions, dominated by the "constructed
order" perspective, have supported a continuance of

extensive state discretion over what a candidate must do to
gain a place on the ballot. The state role in regulating
nominations,

in contrast,

has been severely reduced by the

"natural order" majority, opening up more choices for
parties. In campaign finance, much of the FECA has been

upheld by the "natural order" as an appropriate device to
prevent corruption of the electoral process. Finally, a

government's ability to use partisan criteria in personnel
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decisions has been virtually eliminated, enabling

government personnel to be less inhibited in holding
alternate political views.
In terms of the justices'

effects on efforts to

strengthen parties, we saw in Part

I

of this chapter that

the dominant "natural order" perspective does more to

promote stronger parties. Nonetheless, it does limit the

party role in personnel decisions.

The "natural order" is

also very suspicious of government management of the

electoral process, a suspicion grounded in a concern of

political monopoly. The danger in many ballot access,
nomination, and patronage regulations is that the party or

parties currently dominating the system will structure such

regulation to their own advantage. This monopoly lies at
the heart of what the "natural order" seeks to prevent: an

artificially restricted political process.
The "natural order" also favors promoting the

programmatic functions of parties, as part of their concern
with monopoly. If the states and parties in power can
structure the processes of politics, they can reduce the

opportunity for alternate views to be heard. Promoting
ideas is seen as a critical function of parties, one that

should not be limited.
The "constructed order", in contrast, offers in great

measure a maintenance of the political status quo. States
could continue to limit access to the ballot in the name of

order and stability, limiting this point of participation.
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State laws could also continue to regulate the nominating
process, even if party organization could not be specified;

participation could also be restricted. Campaign finance
could be regulated to prevent corruption. Finally, partisan

considerations could be properly used in government

personnel decisions, allowing a greater role for party

allegiance in this area.
The "constructed order" sees the major parties as

performing the work of democracy with great effectiveness,
with the contesting of elections being the central

contribution of parties. The structuring of the system is

accomplished by democratically elected legislators;

monopoly exists only if a system is blatantly
discriminatory. State laws are in fact seen to promote, not
reduce, meaningful competition, with the process open but

performing a proper winnowing function.
Such a "constructed" system also has positive and

negative implications for parties and politics. Government
control of nomination procedures limits the parties'

ability to determine an important part of their public
character. On the other hand, the major parties would

continue to benefit from their current ballot access
advantages, as well as the ability to engage in some

patronage practices. Thus, the "constructed order" would in
some ways allow for more party power in politics than the

"natural order"
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The justices are ultimately divided by how they view
the parameters of democracy. The "natural order" argues

that both party competition and voter choice should be as

wide as possible, subject to very limited restriction;
state imposed restrictions could result in a system where
politics, electorally and ideologically,

is monopolized.

The "constructed order" argues that democracy is much more
fragile,

and that democratic representatives can properly

construct a series of rules to structure the electoral

process in order to preserve it.
The debate also speaks to the ongoing development of
an American "administrative state" at the national level.

While the solicitude of the "natural order" towards
national power and processes is certainly in line with the

nationalization of American politics, the "constructed
order" view reveals that the state oriented view of a

federal system has not disappeared. In addition, the

granting of autonomy to parties can be said to reduce the

administrative state's control, while the disapproval of
patronage practices reinforces the trend toward a

nonpartisan "administrative state"
The structuring of political institutions in the

electoral process is also seen differently by the two

perspectives. The "natural order" envisions parties as the
best decisionmakers of their own procedures, and views
ideas as an important component of their

identity. The

"constructed order" views the major purpose of parties as
340

electoral, not ideological. Neither perspective has a fully

consistent position on whether democracy should occur

within or between the parties.
While they have expanded opportunities for parties to

make their own choices in practice, neither the majority
opinions of the justices or the many dissenting opinions
offer a great deal of support to parties in theoretical
terms. While the "natural order" perspective certainly

looks favorably on the interests of minor parties, this

grows more out of their concern for giving voice to all

political voices than it does out of a concern for parties
as parties. The "constructed order" perspective shows some

more concern for the role of partisan considerations in
governance, but it envisions no guaranteed political role
for parties as a group.

Neither perspective argues directly for more
responsible parties or a more party-centered system.
Ultimately, what the justices debate is more democracy and
the electoral process, not the exact shape or functions of

parties.

"Strong parties" are in no way guaranteed by

either perspective.
What is important theoretically for parties is that
the justices have taken on the power to make such choices.

The questions are not dismissed due to their "political"
nature, but are heard. What this means is that the Court is

now an active player in defining these questions. Thus, the

possible directions its decisions might take will add an
341

important voice to ongoing theoretical debates on the

broader questions of democracy, a voice that will only
speak when asked to but will then speak with meaningful

practical authority.
Parties have been emancipated from government control
of their internal choices,

but their interests beyond their

own affairs are not as clearly favored. The ballot is still

restricted for minor parties, campaign finance is candidate
centered,

and patronage has been drastically limited with

little concern for the impact on parties. Thus, parties
cannot be said to have been greatly advantaged in practical
terms by the jurisprudence of either perspective. They are

freer to guide and shape their own identity, but they are

given little special treatment in the political process in

which they contest for power. While control over one's own

household is certainly important, this newly regained
autonomy does not change the fact that parties are a

weakened player in the fiercely competitive arena of
politics; the ballot access, campaign finance and patronage

opinions offer them little assistance in rebuilding their

strength
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